Schematic and Symbolic Hypotyposis in Kant’s Critical Works Nicola Jane Crosby-Grayson A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Manchester Metropolitan University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of History, Politics and Philosophy the Manchester Metropolitan University 2015 1 Contents Abstract .................................................................................................................. 5 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ 7 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 8 Structure of the Thesis ..................................................................................... 16 Part 1 Theoretical Ideas, Systems, and Schematic Presentation ......................... 23 Chapter 1: The Method of Reason ................................................................ 24 1.1 Reason as Systematic .......................................................................... 25 1.2 The Position of Ideas .............................................................................. 37 1.3 The Origin and Development of the Idea ................................................ 48 Chapter 2.The Figural Movement of Regulation ............................................... 64 2.1 Regulative and Constitutive .................................................................... 65 2.2 Regulative Figures .................................................................................. 77 2.3 Ideal Figures of Reason ........................................................................ 102 Chapter 3. The Schematic Realisation of Concepts ....................................... 118 3.1 The Schematism of Concepts ............................................................... 119 3.2. The Schematic Realisation of Ideas ..................................................... 138 3.3. Heidegger and the Schema Image ...................................................... 152 Part 2: Practical Ideas and Analogy ................................................................... 174 Chapter 4. Exhibition of the Morally Good Through the Typic of the Moral Law ............................................................................................................................ 176 2 Chapter 5. The Schematism of Analogy and the Figure of Christ: Bridging two types of hypotyposis ........................................................................................... 194 Part 3. Symbolic Realisation and the Expression of Aesthetic Ideas .............. 212 Chapter 6. Rethinking the System .................................................................. 213 6.1. Systems in the First Critique ................................................................ 215 6.2. Systems in the Third Critique ............................................................... 224 Chapter 7. The Symbolic Realisation of Ideas ................................................ 245 7.1. Idea as Symbols .................................................................................. 246 7.2. Kant’s Three Tier Account of the Symbol ............................................ 262 Chapter 8. Aesthetic Ideas and the Reflective Imagination ........................... 282 8.1 Defining Aesthetic Ideas ....................................................................... 283 8.2 Aesthetic Ideas and Symbols ................................................................ 298 8.3 The Aesthetic Ideal ............................................................................... 311 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 323 Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 331 3 …This work is dedicated to the memory of my beautiful mother, who died before I could finish it, to Gary Banham, the best teacher I ever had, and to my wonderful husband Matthew; my everything. 4 Abstract Studies into schematic and symbolic hypotyposis in Kant’s Critical works rarely set out how different types of concept and idea are realised comprehensively. As a consequence, it is difficult to compare the two types of exhibition in respect to how they differ and relate to one another. There are numerous reasons why these two modes have not been set out with clarity, I will focus on three. The first pertains to the nature of the subject matter itself as the schematism chapter is notoriously dense. Attempts to render Kant’s account coherent consistently fail to acknowledge the schema he addresses in the Architectonic of Pure Reason and as a result they cannot be considered comprehensive or exhaustive. Secondly, the realisation of practical ideas is rarely addressed, referred to or included for comparison in works that address schemata and symbols. Consequently, one cannot gain a comprehensive view of Kant’s account of exhibition. The practical schemata (if one may call them that) prove interesting as they challenge the distinction between direct and indirect exhibition that Kant sets out so confidently in § 59 of the Third Critique (5:352). Thirdly, attempts to present Kant’s account of the symbol with clarity either seek to reduce the symbol to a mode of schematic exhibition (in line with schema from the Architectonic of Pure Reason), or, they fail to distinguish between the examples Kant gives and consequently make claims about one type of symbol based upon their understanding of another, all of which results in further confusion and complications. This thesis will present a clarification of Kant’s account of exhibition with respect to the use of symbols, schemata, and analogy to establish the extent to which philosophy must appropriate art to communicate ideas and concepts. It will draw out 5 the rhetorical connotations affiliated with the term hypotyposis and present the consequences of this in respect to philosophical methodology. 6 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisory team, Dr. Ullrich Haase and Dr. Keith Crome for their support and advice throughout the writing of this work. I would especially like to thank the late Dr. Gary Banham who was my director of studies and my close friend, his knowledge of Kant’s works and his patience with my progress were invaluable to me. Thank you to the Philosophy Dept. of Manchester Metropolitan University for the financial support I was awarded to complete this thesis and to Prof. Joanna Hodge for her encouragement. I am very grateful for the help and support of my colleagues at the University of Manchester, specifically Jennie Blake, Rosie Jones and Katie Woolfenden for supporting me and enabling to finish this work. I would also like to thank Dr. I.M. Hotchkies for his continued support. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the love and support of my family and my husband which has given me the strength to keep on writing. 7 Introduction This thesis is directed towards a clarification of Kant’s account of hypotyposis in his Critical works in order to discuss the difference between direct (schematic) and indirect (symbolic) exhibition. Hypotyposis is commonly defined in terms of a vivid, picturesque description of scenes or events. However, Kant’s use of the term is quite specific; he uses it to refer to the process through which concepts are subjected to inspection, illustrated, and thereby granted reality schematically (directly) or symbolically (indirectly). In terms of its etymology hypotyposis is a Greek concept derived from hypo, meaning under, below, beneath, and typosis figure, sketch or outline1. The subject of exhibition in Kant’s Critical works is traditionally approached and introduced through an initial study of §59 of the Third Critique - On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality - where Kant states: All hypotyposis (exhibition, subiectio sub adspectum) consists in making [a concept] sensible, and is either schematic or symbolic. In schematic hypotyposis there is a concept that the understanding has formed, and the intuition corresponding to it is given a priori. In symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied with an intuition that judgement treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in schematising; i.e., the treatment agrees with this procedure merely in the rule followed rather than in terms of the intuition itself, and hence merely in terms of the form of the reflection rather than its content (5:351). Attempts to present a comprehensive explanation of Kant’s account of exhibition often begin with this passage granting it central significance and interrogating it with 1 Gasche, Rodolphe, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, p.206. 8 reference to The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding from the First Critique. Consequently, most analyses fail to address some key features, distinctions and considerations that are set out in, e.g., Kant’s account of schematic exhibition in The Architectonic of Pure Reason (in the First Critique) or his discussion of the realisation of practical ideas in The Typic of The Pure Practical Power of Judgement (in the Second Critique). Examining §59 in light of the chapter on Schematism alone leads to a mistaken assumption that Kant views symbolic hypotyposis