ISSN 2057-1461 LSE Global South Unit When the outcome of the civil war became foreseeable, Beijing nevertheless maintained an ambiguous stance on the NTC’s legitimacy. Even after Russia had recognized the NTC as the WORKING PAPER SERIES sole legitimate authority in Libya following the US, UK and France, Beijing asseverated that China’s recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel government in Tripoli should only be forthcoming after conditions had matured. China did not recognise the NTC’s legitimacy until 12 September, once conditions suciently mature in Beijing’s eyes had been forthcoming. In the communication that informed the NTC of China’s decision to recognise its legitimacy, Beijing declared that China respects the choice of the Libyan people, highly values NTC’s important position and role (in Libya), and wishes to maintain contact with it. It also conrmed that China hopes the new regime will continue to honour the contracts China signed with Gadda and will actually put them into practice. As the last member of the UN Security Council to recognise their legitimacy, of course the heads of the NTC were glad to hear of China’s decision and welcomed its participation in Libya’s reconstruction (Chinese Foreign Aairs Ministry, 2011). e rebels broadcast mixed signals, however, on China’s role in Libya in the post-civil war period. Abdul Haz Ghoga, then vice-president of the NTC, said he hoped China would play a role in Libya’s reconstruction and praised China-Libya cooperation. After the 42-year rule of Gadda, Libya needs China more than ever, Ghoga added (Li Zhi, 2011). On the other hand, one NTC spokesperson vowed that the new regime’s disposition of new contracts with foreign countries would be based on their contribution to Libya’s regime change. at hinted that China perhaps would be punished economically by the new regime. One episode between Beijing and NTC should be mentioned. In an UN conference after the Working Paper No. 5/2015. civil war ended, China declined to release part of Libya’s frozen overseas funds. At a subsequent news conference on 3 September, Chairman Jalil of the NTC charged Beijing with intent to use the funds as a bargaining chip, but asked the NTC to protect China’s Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy: interests in Libya. Whatever happened between the two sides, China eventually agreed to release the overseas funds, and Beijing’s recognition of NTC was cemented, although rather China’s Engagement in the Libyan Civil War as a Case Study. belatedly in the NTC’s eyes. By Jian Junbo and Álvaro Méndez. III. CHINA’S INTERACTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE LIBYAN QUESTION. A key aspect of China’s changing approach was inter-linked with its contacts and experiences with the international community during the build up to the conict and as the civil war accelerated. III.1. China’s interaction with the West. China abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973, although it favoured the no-y zone as a peace-keeping action to stop the escalation of the crisis under UN involvement (while opposing the NATO-led bombing of Libya as derogating from the spirit of Resolution 1973). A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed regret over the multi-national armed attack on Libya in a press conference: “China never favours the use of force in international relations, advocates adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and related international laws, and respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya” (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). ere were several reasons why Beijing consistently opposed the US-supported, NATO-led air attack on Gadda’s troops. Firstly, it had not been supported or authorized by the UN. In Beijing’s eyes, only the UN has the legitimate right to lead an intervention or authorise others to intervene in Libya’s civil war with the aim of peacekeeping by force. From this perspective the NATO-led air attack was contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, and also violated the non-interference principle that Beijing cherishes and the UN recognises. Secondly, the bombing overreached the African Union’s and Arab League’s original objectives. Neither organisation wanted an escalation or complication of the crisis due to armed intervention. Meanwhile, China hoped its anti-interventionist stance would conserve consistency and reinforce cooperation with the AU and the Arab League. After the bombing began, AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping declared in Tunisia that the AU advocated a peaceful resolution of the Libya crisis, and opposed the use of force until all chances of peaceful resolution had been exhausted (People’s Daily, 2011a). In a special AU conference held on the Libya issue this organisation clearly stated its opposition to any kind of foreign armed intervention in Libya. On 27 April the AU issued a formal statement: “e African Union urges all related parties to refrain from launching attacks, including attacking the Libyan senior ocials and socio-economic infrastructure as air strike targets of military action”. Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also censured the Western military strikes against Libya as overreaching the act of setting up the no-y zone in Libya that the Arab countries had originally supported; that is, the Arab League did not support these air strikes, although some members like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates broke ranks and joined the strike action. irdly, air strikes made the situation in Libya more complicated, which was not good news for Chinese economic interests. e situation in Libya had previously been stabilising, and China’s infrastructure projects in the country might have been resumed earlier. Foreign armed intervention made the future of the country more uncertain. Fourthly, Beijing was obliged to make up for its mistake in abstaining from Resolution 1973 by censuring NATO’s action in Libya, because the abstention actually encouraged the Western armed intervention, which China had had the right to veto as a permanent member of the UNSC. So China’s opposition to the air strikes was also a remedial measure. Against this background, China began to voice its opposition on every possible occasion. When French President Sarkozy visited Beijing after the strikes began, Chinese President Hu Jintao informed him that China was unhappy with the NATO-led bombing of Libya. If the air strikes led to civilian deaths, it would violate the original intent of the UN resolution, Hu added. Foreign Aairs Minister Yang Jiechi appealed for an immediate ceasere in Libya when he met with Guido Westerwelle, his German counterpart, in Beijing. Germany was one Western country that was not involved in the air attack on Libya. Ironically, despite China’s disagreement with the air strike plan, it took no substantial measures to stop it. China could at least have initiated debates in UN, bringing some international pressure to bear on the West, or cooperated with other international actors to try and stop the strikes through coordination between the AU, the Arab League and the West. However, China did nothing except for some rhetoric. As the civil war came to an end, China’s representatives, invited by France, attended the Friends of Libya international conference in Paris. ere Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun advocated four action points concerning Libya’s political transition and reconstruction in the post-Gadda era: 1) restore stability in Libya as soon as possible; 2) open up the political Chinese investment in Libyan oil should not be exaggerated, however; it was quite small transition inclusively so as fully to cater for the interests of dierent factions, tribes and compared to that of Western companies. Moreover, in due course Chinese eorts to invest in geographical areas, and maintain Libya’s national unity; 3) respect the choice of the Libyan Libyan oil and gas encountered resistance from Libya. For instance, CNPC’s bid for Verenex people and the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya, letting the people Energy was rebued by the Libya government in September 2009. Chinese oil and gas decide their own future and destiny; 4) strengthen coordination and cooperation with the operations employed only about 400 Chinese nationals – a small scale for Libya. Before the civil war the key investors in Libyan oil were from the West: ENI (Italy), Occidental (USA), AU, Arab League, and the Islamic Conference Organization under UN leadership to help Petro-Canada and BP (UK), Hess (USA), Marathon (USA), Conoco-Phillips (USA), Libyans restore stability and rebuild their homes. Chevron Texaco (USA) and others. Italy, Germany, Spain and France have been the major markets for Libya’s oil exports. According to International Energy Agency statistics, as at In sum, China took no active steps to stop either the NATO-led air strike or the 2010 only 3 percent of Libya’s total oil exports went to China, while Europe got over 85 West-supported rebel attack on Tripoli, nor did it coordinate with the West to stabilise Libya’s percent (Peng Liguo, 2011). situation, except for some diplomatic persuasion and opposition. Besides the oil sector, the other sector of the Libyan economy that China was heavily invested III.2. China’s interaction with international organisations. in was contract works, especially infrastructure, such as construction of railways, power stations, airports, blocks of ats, schools and governmental buildings, telecommunications plant, and so on. According to the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), China abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which set up a Libya became China’s third-ranking partner in the world in terms of newly signed overseas no-y zone in Libya, so as to retard the escalation of the crisis.