With the other members of his team dead or wounded, Etchberger held the enemy at bay with his M-16 rifle. Etchberger’s defense against the North Vietnamese sappers saved his com- panions, but he was mortally wounded on the rescue helicopter. Etchberger, Medal of Honor By John T. Correll he 19 Americans on the moun- five and seven North Vietnamese and 2010, his three sons were presented the tain top in Laos were in grave Pathet Lao battalions had the mountain Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously danger. Most of them were surrounded. to their father, by President Obama at technicians, operating a top The mountain was not impregnable the White House. Tsecret radar site deep in what was ef- after all. In the long night that followed, On the advice of the CIA, the US fectively enemy territory, just 15 miles North Vietnamese sappers, covered by ambassador in Vientiane, who was from the North Vietnam border. They mortar, artillery, and rocket fire, scaled head of the “Country Team” in Laos, were lightly armed, with only 10 M-16 the perpendicular cliffs and overran the had warned that the small contingent rifles shared among them. The moun- radar site. Only seven of the Americans on the mountaintop could not hold out tain—Phou Pha Thi, which rose almost got away alive, three of them because and proposed sending helicopters to 6,000 feet above the valley below—was of the heroic actions of CMSgt. Rich- extricate them. Seventh Air Force in defended by 1,000 Hmong irregulars ard L. Etchberger, who was himself Saigon, which depended on the radar and US airpower. killed during the last moments of the to guide bombers over North Vietnam, The drop on three sides was nearly evacuation. disagreed and insisted that the site remain vertical and the fourth side was forti- What happened at Lima Site 85 on in operation unless “capture appeared fied. The assumption was that it would Phou Pha Thi was shrouded in official imminent.” be impossible for attackers to climb the secrecy for decades. It would be 42 The radar site on the mountain was sheer face of the mountain. On March years before Etchberger received full and a secret because the Americans were 10, 1968, that proposition was about to public acknowledgment for saving the not supposed to be there. By the terms be tested. A force consisting of between lives of his colleagues, but on Sept. 21, of a 1962 Geneva agreement, Laos 42 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2010 was neutral. No foreign troops were permitted. The United States had withdrawn its forces. North Vietnam did not. But by 1968, both countries were again active in Laos, backing different sides in the ongoing civil war. Sheep Dipped The Air Force’s Rolling Thunder air campaign against North Vietnam was severely hampered by bad weather, es- pecially during the northeast monsoon between October and April. The Combat Skyspot radar bombing system offered a partial solution. It guided aircraft to a precise point in the sky from which ordnance could be released at predeter- mined coordinates. The catch was that the Combat Skyspot radar had to be within 175 miles, line of sight, of the bomb drop point. Phou Pha Thi, one of the tallest Three sides of Phou Pha Thi were nearly vertical, and the fourth was heavily forti- fied. The sappers were able to scale the mountain, above. Photo via Etchberger family In John Witt’s painting for the Air Force Art Collection (l), an Air Force helicopter lifts wounded survivors off the cliff, while Etchberger (with M-16) directs the air support. Above: President Obama presents the Medal of Honor to Etchberger’s three sons: (l-r) Steve Wilson, Cory Etchberger, and Richard Etchberger. AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2010 43 Skyspot-qualified airmen and Sliz, with Etchberger as crew chief. a dozen TACAN technicians John G. Daniel was the board operator signed the agreement. Their and the radar technicians were Donald wives were briefed on the pro- K. Springsteadah and Henry G. Gish. gram—at least some of it—and Etchberger “was one hell of an sworn to secrecy. NCO,” said Daniel, a sheep-dipped The 44 enlisted Skyspot peo- staff sergeant. “He knew the equip- ple and four officers selected ment. ... He knew how to handle all knew each other, having people. ... He knew what to do and served together for years in how to do it. You were eager to follow SAC. Among them was Etch- the man, to do what he wanted you to berger, 35, of Hamburg, Pa. do.” Sliz described Etchberger as “the His leadership abilities were consummate professional. He stood evident early on. up above everybody else.” In a letter Etchberger was president to a friend back in the United States, of his senior graduating class Etchberger said, “I hate to be away at Hamburg High School. He from home, but I believe in the job. joined the Air Force in 1951 It is the most challenging job I’ll ever and qualified as a radar opera- have in my life.” tor. During the 1960s, he was Lima Site 85 was in northeastern based at the 1st Combat Evalu- Laos, the stronghold of the Communist ation detachment at Bismarck, Pathet Lao. Part of the security was the N.D., where he helped develop mountain itself. At the higher reaches, and improve the capabilities of the sheer face of the cliffs rose at angles the radar bomb scoring system. of 80 and 90 degrees on the north, south, One of his officers at Bismarck and west sides. About 1,000 Hmong had been Capt. Stanley J. Sliz, tribesmen, known as fierce fighters, and Etchberger was considered “one hell of an NCO” and “the consummate professional” by his crew. who was also chosen for Heavy some Thai special forces were expected Green. In April 1967, Etchberger to hold the eastern slope. mountains in Laos and 160 miles west was promoted to chief master sergeant, The enemy had long since discovered of Hanoi, fit the bill. The Air Force USAF’s highest enlisted grade. the site and had made several attempts already had a tactical air navigation to dislodge it, including an attack by system beacon there. Eighteen Weeks An-2 Colt biplanes using improvised The mountain was known to airmen The installation team went in first, munitions. US airpower was increasingly as Lima Site 85, after a rough landing placing a TSQ-81 radar, a mobile vari- used to disperse enemy troops moving strip on the southeastern flank, oper- ant of the Combat Skyspot system, and into the vicinity. A combat controller ated by the CIA’s proprietary airline, other facilities on the mountaintop in had been sent to direct local air strikes. Air America. August. Living and working space at The US ambassador, William H. Sulli- The Air Force could not openly the site, which was only 150 feet long, van, was opposed to arming Heavy Green deploy airmen to Lima Site 85 and it was crowded with the radar, TACAN, personnel but, about a week before the was unwilling to send them into Laos operations vans, generator, bunkers, attack in March, approved giving them with fraudulent identities. If captured and metal huts. a limited number of M-16s. The airmen while pretending to be civilians, they The Heavy Green operators deployed had no real training with the weapons, would have no protection as prisoners to Udorn Air Base in northern Thailand only a general familiarization and the of war under the Geneva Convention. in October, setting up shop in the Air opportunity for some informal firing. It was decided that they would be—in America compound, although the air- By March 10, the radar on Phou Pha the vernacular of covert operations— men—now civilians—lived in rented Thi had been operational for 18 weeks. “sheep dipped.” They would be dis- housing off base. When at Udorn, they That day, a Sunday, mortar, artillery, charged from the Air Force, hired by wore uniforms and carried military ID and rocket rounds began falling on the Lockheed Aircraft Service Corp., a as a cover role. For their two-week mountaintop around 6 p.m. The barrage subsidiary of Lockheed Aircraft, and rotational duty tours to the mountain, ceased at 7:45 p.m., but the Hmong go to Laos as employees. When their they wore civilian clothes and carried were engaged in heavy fighting at lower mission was over, they would be wel- Lockheed ID. The boss, Col. Gerald H. elevations. comed back into the Air Force. Clayton, was manager of the Lockheed About 9 p.m., Ambassador Sullivan The project was called Heavy Green. field services group at Lockheed. decided evacuation would begin the The teams to conduct the operation Heavy Green did not completely next morning, despite Air Force reluc- were drawn from the 1st Combat cut ties with the Air Force. Clayton tance to close the site. There were 19 Evaluation Group, which ran the was also commander of Det. 1, 1043rd Americans on the mountain: 16 Heavy Strategic Air Command radar bomb Radar Evaluation Squadron, which Green operators and support person- scoring system, on which Combat had headquarters at Bolling Air Force nel, a combat controller, and two CIA Skyspot was based. Heavy Green Base in Washington, D.C. The site was paramilitary officers. would take over the TACAN as well. operational on Nov. 1. After the initial shelling, Sliz’s team In September 1967, after listening to The radar operators were divided went to get some rest while another team the classified briefing and offer, 48 into teams, one of them headed by took the duty.