THE FUNCTION OF FREE RIDERS: TOWARD A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION J. Scott Lewis A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2006 Committee: Donald McQuarie and Rekha Mirchandani, Advisors Stephen S. Chang Graduate Faculty Representative Alfred DeMaris Monica Longmore © 2006 J. Scott Lewis All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Donald McQuarie and Rekha Mirchandani, Advisors The problem of collective action is the problem of free riders. Current theory argues that free riders are detrimental to group solidarity, and predict that free riders will be punished into compliance with cooperative group norms. Observational evidence from a variety of disciplines does not coincide with those predictions, however. Recent studies show that in many cases, 20%- 40% of individuals will free ride regardless of the frequency and severity of punishment. This treatise seeksto explain the persistence of free riders by arguing that free riders perform latent functions in groups that actually maintain or increase group cohesion in naturally forming, long term groups. Analyzing theoretical work on the collective action problem from three disciplines-- economics, evolutionary biology, and sociology--I show how drastically different approaches to the collective action problem converge on similar predictions about the nature and causes of free riding. I then show that these theoretical paradigms share a common origin from rational action models. I discuss why the current logic of rational action models are insufficient to offer a viable solution to the free rider problem. I then move beyond the traditional rational action approach by proposing an alternative kind of rationalisty which free riders pursue. Using game theory, I demonstrate the existence and utility of this new approach, and show how this alternative rationality contributes to a solution to the free rider problem by linking it to equilibrium theory. Equilibrium theory offers a means by which rational action models and functionalist models may be tied together in order to approach a solution to the free rider problem. I argue that iv free riders may perform functions in a group that serve to increase or maintain the solidarity of the group by tending the group toward a state of allostatic equilibrium. I argue that free riders validate or increase the status of productive group members; reduce the probability of incurrence of risk for productive group members; and increase group interdependence by driving down the group's discount parameter. Through these functions, free riders may be seen as an adaptive mechanism by which a group might tend toward an equilibrium state in a dynamic environment. v This work is dedicated to Charles Darwin, il miglior fabbro. vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS No work is the product of one individual. I am deeply indebted to the following people for their contributions to this work. Thank you to Al DeMaris and Monica Longmore for their insightful comments on the manuscript and logic of the argument. Thank you to Donald McQuarie and Rekha Mirchandani for agreeing to advise me on this project, and for their help with the manuscript. A special thank you is extended to Jeff Houser, whose discussions over the course of three years helped develop the arguments made herein. Additionally, a thank you to my wife, children and parents, whose sacrifices while I finished this project were doubtless greater than my own. All have had a profound impact on my life and thought. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 1 Introduction................................................................................................................ 2 The Layout................................................................................................................. 6 CHAPTER TWO. THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION..................................... 13 Chapter Synopsis ....................................................................................................... 14 Defining the Collective Action Problem.................................................................... 14 Sociological Approaches to the Collective Action Problem...................................... 22 The Biology of Cooperation ...................................................................................... 29 Economic Theories of Cooperation ...............................................................……… 32 Examples of Tolerated Free Riding in Man and Animals ......................................... 34 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 40 CHAPTER THREE. PROSOCIALITY................................................................................ 42 Chapter Synopsis ....................................................................................................... 43 The Universal Rule .................................................................................................... 43 Prosociality in Humans.............................................................................................. 47 Maximization Strategies ............................................................................................ 54 Autopoiesis: Is the Group Like an Organism?........................................................... 57 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 60 CHAPTER FOUR. GAME THEORY AND EQUILIBRIUM STATES............................. 62 Chapter Synopsis ....................................................................................................... 63 An Introduction to Game Theory and Embedded Strategies ..................................... 63 viii The Prisoner’s Dilemma ............................................................................................ 65 The Stag Hunt ............................................................................................................ 69 The Chicken Game .................................................................................................... 72 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 75 CHAPTER FIVE. A TYPOLOGY OF FREE RIDERS....................................................... 76 Chapter Synopsis ....................................................................................................... 77 Making Distinctions Between Free Riders ................................................................ 77 Passive Free Riders.................................................................................................... 80 Active Free Riders ..................................................................................................... 82 The Use of a Typology of Free Riders....................................................................... 84 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 85 CHAPTER SIX. SOCIAL ALLOSTASIS ........................................................................... 86 Chapter Synopsis ....................................................................................................... 87 Flexibility and Redundancy ....................................................................................... 88 Social Allostasis......................................................................................................... 92 The Functions of Free Riders..................................................................................... 96 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 99 CHAPTER SEVEN. AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF SOCIAL ALLOSTASIS ............. 100 Chapter Synopsis ....................................................................................................... 101 The Framework.......................................................................................................... 101 The Re-rise of Group Selection ................................................................................. 107 An Allostatic Equilibrium Model .............................................................................. 110 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 113 ix CHAPTER EIGHT. FREE RIDERS AND EMOTIONS..................................................... 114 Chapter Synopsis ....................................................................................................... 115 On Positive and Negative Emotions .......................................................................... 115 How Many Emotions Are There?.............................................................................. 117 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................... 123 CHAPTER NINE. FREE RIDERS IN THE WELFARE SYSTEM .................................... 125 Chapter Synopsis ....................................................................................................... 126 The Misunderstood Welfare System.......................................................................... 126 The Function of