∗ CONTENTS Introduction ..................................................................... 130 I. The Judiciary ........................................................... 131 A. Federal Courts ..................................................... 131 1. U.S. Supreme Court ........................................ 131 2. U.S. Courts of Appeals ................................... 132 3. U.S. District Courts ......................................... 134 B. State Courts ......................................................... 136 1. State Supreme Courts ...................................... 136 2. State Appellate Courts .................................... 138 II. The Academy .......................................................... 139 A. Books .................................................................. 139 B. Articles ................................................................ 143 Conclusion ...................................................................... 150 “I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for . there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and ∗ Library Fellow, University of Arizona College of Law; J.D., University of New Hampshire School of Law. My thanks to Dr. Christian Hans for his encouragement and advice. politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.”1 INTRODUCTION In writing a bibliography of Professor Massey’s scholarly works, I sought to demonstrate the breadth of his corpus and to make the case that his ideas are more relevant now than ever.2 While annotating each work, I came across a multitude of instances in which he was cited by courts and prominent legal scholars. While I desired to include this information in the initial bibliography, doing so proved too tedious given the time constraints. Now, however, I have had the opportunity to compile and annotate the most prominent cases and publications in which he has been cited as an authority. What follows is the result of this effort. While Professor Massey was not a scholar of intellectual property, his areas of expertise—constitutional law and property—serve as the basis for this well established and still growing field of practice and scholarship. Indeed, one might say that constitutional law and property serve as the foundations of intellectual property in the same way that intellectual property serves as the foundation of the law school that houses this publication. Indeed, it is most fitting that a bibliography assessing the legacy of one of the University of New Hampshire School of Law’s most revered faculty members is published in the school’s preeminent journal. 1 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 171 (Edison Martin Imprint 2013) (1936). 2 Nicholas Mignanelli, The Life and Legacy of Professor Calvin R. Massey: A Select Annotated Bibliography, 68 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2017). I. THE JUDICIARY A. Federal Courts 1. U.S. Supreme Court Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida3 In his dissent, Justice David Souter cites Professor Massey’s article, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,4 as representative of the minority view that the Eleventh Amendment “strips the federal courts of jurisdiction in any case in which a state defendant is sued by a citizen not its own, even if jurisdiction might otherwise rest on the existence of a federal question in the suit.”5 Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.6 Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor heavily relies upon Professor Massey’s article, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History,7 to recount the genealogy of that clause, tracing it back to Medieval England.8 Writing for the majority, Associate Justice Harry Blackmun cites the same work as an article that finds in “history a basis for concluding that the Excessive Fines Clause operates to limit the ability of a civil 9 jury to award punitive damages.” 3 517 U.S. 44, 110 n.8 (1996). 4 Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989). 5 Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 110 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting). 6 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 7 Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987). 8 Industries of Vermont, Inc., 492 U.S. at 287–292 (O’Connor, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part). 9 Id. at 271 n.17. 2. U.S. Courts of Appeals Washington Environmental Council v. Bellow10 Judge Milan Smith cites Professor Massey’s article, State Standing after Massachusetts v. EPA,11 to support the proposition that the plaintiff cannot rest its claim upon the precedent in Massachusetts because that case applies only to “state litigants . prosecut[ing] claims that would not be cognizable by individual plaintiffs.”12 United States v. Levesque13 Taking her cue from Associate Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,14 Chief Judge Sandra Lynch cites to Professor Massey’s article, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History15 in a discussion of that clause’s history.16 United States v. Spencer17 Chief Judge Richard Posner cites Professor Massey’s article, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment,18 and his book, Silent Rights: The Ninth Amendment and the Constitution’s 10 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013). 11 Calvin Massey, State Standing after Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLORIDA L. REV. 249 (2009). 12 Wash. Envtl. Council, 732 F.3d at 1145. 13 546 F.3d 78 (2008). 14 Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271 n.17 (1989). 15 Massey, supra note 4. 16 Levesque, 546 F.3d at 84. 17 160 F.3d 413, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1998). 18 Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1987). Unenumerated Rights,19 as works representative of the view that (1) “the Ninth Amendment authorizes federal courts to . [protect] against federal encroachment [upon] certain rights possessed by citizens of the states before they entered the Union” and (2) “that the Ninth Amendment does . empower the states, by creating new state constitutional rights, to truncate the power of Congress under Article I by preempting federal legislation.”20 These views are contrary to the position the majority endorses in this case.21 American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Schundler22 Judge Timothy K. Lewis cites Professor Massey’s article, Pure Symbols and the First Amendment,23 to suggest that the Supreme Court’s decision in County of Allegheny v. ACLU24 “are guided by their view of the messages conveyed by particular religious symbols and whether these symbols are ‘pure’ or ‘ambiguous.’”25 United States v. One Parcel Property Located at 427 and 429 Hall Street, Montgomery, Ala.26 Relying on Professor Massey’s article, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons 19 CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION’S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995). 20 Spencer, 160 F.3d at 414–15. 21 Id. 22 104 F.3d 1435 (3rd Cir. 1997). 23 Calvin R. Massey, Pure Symbols and the First Amendment, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 369 (1990). 24 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 25 Schundler, 104 F.3d at 1445 n.8. 26 74 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 1996). from History,27 Chief Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat concludes that “the historical antecedents of our Excessive Fines Clause themselves required proportionality review.”28 New York v. United States29 Writing for the majority, Judge Joseph McLaughlin uses Professor Massey’s article, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,30 to explicate Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.31 To wit, “[i]n Garcia, five justices joined in a majority opinion that, in effect, concluded that if states desire to preserve any aspect of their sovereignty within the federal system they must look to Congress, and not to the courts.”32 3. U.S. District Courts Kuch v. Rapelje33 Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives cites Professor Massey’s article, The Constitution in a Postmodern Age,34 to conclude that laws against bestiality are still valid on utilitarian grounds, even if Lawrence v. Texas35 has brought disrepute to morality-based 36 legislation. 27 Massey, supra note 7. 28 One Parcel Prop., 74 F.3d at 1171. 29 942 F.2d 114 (2nd Cir. 1991). 30 Massey, supra note 4. 31 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 32 New York, 942 F.2d at 119 (citing Massey, supra note 4, at 72). 33 No. 2:09—CV–12872, 2010 WL 3419823 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2010). 34 Calvin Massey, The Constitution in a Postmodern Age, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (2007). 35 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 36 Kuch, 2010 WL 3419823, at *10. United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc.37 Judge Gary Lancaster cites Professor Massey’s article, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?38 to support the claim “that the nation's obscenity laws cannot stand in light of Lawrence [v. Texas].”39 Alshrafi v. American Airlines, Inc.40 In a footnote describing the modern jurisprudence surrounding the issue of federal preemption, Chief Judge William Young cites to Professor Massey’s article, “Joltin’ Joe Has Left and Gone Away”: The Vanishing Presumption Against Preemption.41 California Democratic Party v. Lungren42 Judge William Orrick III cites Professor Massey’s article, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression,43 in support of the principle that the polling place ought 44 to be a “private, protected sphere.” 37 352 F. Supp. 2d 578 (W.D. Penn. 2005). 38 Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 (2004). 39 Extreme Assoc., Inc., F. Supp. 2d at 590–91 (referencing Lawrence v.