Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs June 30, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048 Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Summary A priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. Before the issue of Iran’s uranium enrichment program emerged in 2002, U.S. officials had consistently identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes. That pressure harmed Iran’s economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran’s international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement (“Joint Plan of Action,” JPA) that halts the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. It runs from January 20–July 20, 2014, but can be extended for an additional six months. Talks on a “comprehensive solution” on Iran’s nuclear program began on February 20, 2014, and the fourth high-level round ended on June 20, 2014, with the parties reportedly still far apart on the core issue of the size and scope of Iran’s program to enrich uranium. The talks are to resume on July 2 and run continuously until the expiration of the JPA on July 20. Rouhani’s presidency also has improved prospects for an end to the 34 years of U.S.-Iran estrangement. On September 27, 2013, at the end of Rouhani’s visit to the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York, President Obama and Rouhani spoke by phone—the first leadership level contacts since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The JPA and further nuclear talks have eased tensions somewhat between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf region, who are all allies of the United States. However, the Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states express concern that Iran’s re-integration into the region and the international community will give Iran additional political and economic resources to support pro-Iranian movements and regimes in the region. State Department reports on international terrorism, including the latest one for 2013, assert that Iran continues to provide funds and arms to a wide range of movements, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria, Iraqi Shiite militias, and rebels in Yemen and Bahrain. President Obama has maintained—both before and after the JPA was signed—that the option of U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities remains open. However, further U.S.—or Israeli—discussion of military options against Iran is unlikely unless the JPA collapses or fails to translate into a comprehensive nuclear settlement. In line with a provision of the JPA that no new sanctions be imposed on Iran during the JPA period, the Administration has threatened to veto bills, including S. 1881, that would add sanctions on Iran—whether or not their provisions would take effect only after the JPA expires. Rouhani’s unexpected election win—a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election results—appeared to demonstrate that support for domestic reform remains strong. Iran’s judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms. However, some political prisoners have been released and some media restrictions have been eased since Rouhani took office. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43333, Interim Agreement on Iran’s Nuclear Program, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr. Congressional Research Service Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Contents Political History ............................................................................................................................... 1 Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition .................................................................................... 2 Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, and Expediency Council ...................................................................................... 2 Council of Guardians and Expediency Council .................................................................. 3 Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament), the Assembly of Experts, and Recent Elections ................................................................................................ 8 The Presidency .................................................................................................................... 8 The Majles ........................................................................................................................... 9 The Assembly of Experts .................................................................................................... 9 Recent Elections and Their Implications ........................................................................... 10 Other Human Rights Practices ....................................................................................................... 14 Iran’s Defense Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs .................................... 17 Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force ....................................................... 17 Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy .......................................................... 20 Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities ............................................................................ 21 Early International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program ..................... 24 Developments During the Obama Administration ............................................................ 26 Missiles and Chemical/Biological Weapons............................................................................ 31 Chemical and Biological Weapons .................................................................................... 31 Ballistic and Cruise Missiles and Warheads ...................................................................... 32 Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups .......................................................................... 34 Support for International Terrorism ......................................................................................... 34 Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States ........................................................... 35 Yemen ................................................................................................................................ 38 Iranian Policy in Iraq ............................................................................................................... 38 Supporting Militant Anti-Israel Groups ................................................................................... 39 Iran and Hamas.................................................................................................................. 39 Iran and Hezbollah ............................................................................................................ 40 Syria ......................................................................................................................................... 41 The Caucasus and Central Asia ............................................................................................... 42 South and East Asia ................................................................................................................. 43 East Asia ............................................................................................................................ 43 South Asia: Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 43 Pakistan ............................................................................................................................. 44 India ................................................................................................................................... 45 Al Qaeda .................................................................................................................................. 45 Latin America .......................................................................................................................... 46 Africa ....................................................................................................................................... 48 Sudan ................................................................................................................................. 49 U.S. Policy Approaches and Additional Options ........................................................................... 50 Background on Relations since the 1979 Revolution .............................................................. 50 Obama Administration Policy: Pressure Coupled with Engagement ...................................... 52 2009-2013: Emphasis on Pressure .................................................................................... 52 Response to Rouhani ........................................................................................................