Counterinsurgency’s Impact on Transitions from Authoritarianism: the Case of South Africa Daniel Douek, Department of Political Science McGill University, Montreal August 2011 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) © Copyright Daniel Douek, 2011 ABSTRACT Counterinsurgency’s impact on transitions from authoritarianism remains poorly understood and undertheorized by the insurgency, civil war, and democratic transitions literatures. Using archival sources and interviews with ex-rebels, this paper examines the apartheid counterinsurgency program’s hidden history. A program of clandestine violence and intelligence operations orchestrated at the regime’s highest military and political echelons, it intensified during the 1990-94 transitional period. This paper analyzes its impacts on the state and its security sector during and after the negotiated transition. By marginalizing former rebels with high popular legitimacy, counterinsurgency disables security sector reform, while preserving entrenched criminal networks and racist tendencies within the police and army. This perpetuates institutional illegitimacy and corruption, and weakens security sector responses to post-transition violence, thereby distorting democratic outcomes. It also leaves lasting impacts at the social capital and participatory levels. ii RÉSUMÉ Ni la littérature sur les guerres civiles et ni celle sur les transitions démocratiques ne considère l'importance des opérations militaires clandestines menées par l'État afin d'affaiblir les forces politiques et militaires rebelles. À la lumière du cas de l’Afrique du Sud, basée sur des entretiens avec des ex-rebelles et des archives, cette thèse vise à combler cette lacune en expliquant comment les enjeux politiques et militaires des transitions démocratiques sont déterminés par ces opérations clandestines. Au moment même de la transition démocratique en 1990-94, l’État autoritaire chercha à affaiblir les forces politiques et militaires rebelles. Les opérations militaires clandestines de l'ancien régime visa alors les institutions étatiques de sécurité, dont l'armée, la police, et les services d'espionnage, afin d'y sauvegarder des éléments autoritaires et ainsi renforcer la résistance aux changements démocratiques. Notre hypothèse est que, malgré la transition démocratique, c’est le succès de ces opérations destinées à conserver le personnel et les pratiques autoritaires et racistes de l'ancien régime qui contribua vers le niveau d’implication des institutions de sécurité dans la corruption et le crime, l’importance du taux de violence urbaine ainsi que le niveau de confiance de la population envers ces institutions. iii CONTENTS Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………...vii List of Abbreviations……….…………………………………………………….xi CHAPTER ONE Introduction Background to the Problem……………………………………………………….1 Defining Insurgency and Counterinsurgency……………………………………...4 State Formation, Civil-Military Relations, and Path Dependency………………..6 Path Dependency and State Violence……………………………………………..8 Democratic Transitions……………………………………………………………9 Insurgency, Ideology, and Legitimacy…………………………………………...12 Counterinsurgency’s Impact on Civil War Resolution and Security Sector Reform…………………………………………………………………………...17 Counterinsurgency’s Post-Conflict Impact on the Security Sector……………...19 Transitional Justice………………………………………………………………23 South Africa’s Post-Conflict Urban Violence…………………………………...24 Hypothesis……………………………………………………………………….26 Chapter Description……………………………………………………………...27 Methodology……………………………………………………………………..33 Historical Institutionalism and Process Tracing…………………………………35 Guerrilla Ethnography…………………………………………………………...37 Methodology and Representativeness: Deriving Theory from a Small Sample…47 CHAPTER TWO Umkhonto we Sizwe’s Armed Legitimacy Introduction………………………………...………………….………………....52 History: The ANC Develops an Armed Wing…………………………………...54 MK’s Popular Legitimacy………………………………………………………..56 Tracing Internal Rifts: Dissent within MK and the ANC’s Tenuous Unity……..58 Armed Struggle’s Turning Point: the 1976 Soweto Uprising and its Aftermath...61 “The Apartheid Regime Did All Our Recruiting for Us”: Ideology and Recruitment………………………………………………………………………65 African Ethnicity and Recruitment………………………………………………68 “Armed Propaganda” as Liberation Strategy………….…………………………69 The Four Pillars of Revolution and Cadre Policy: Instilling Discipline…………76 “80% Political, 20% Military”: The Political Objectives of MK’s Selective Violence………………………………………………………………………….79 “Armed Propaganda,” “People’s War,” and the Intensification of Armed Struggle…………………………………………………………………………..86 “Winning Hearts and Minds” and Unravelling Apartheid’s Political iv Gains………………………………………………………………………….….92 MK’s Legitimacy in Comparison with Other South African Armed Groups……………………………………………………………………………95 MK Operation, Training, and Tactics…………………………………………....97 Case Study: Umkhonto we Sizwe in Malangue Province, Angola, 1975-89………………………………………………………………………....102 “Winning Hearts and Minds”…………………………………………………...103 A Profile of MK in Battle in Angola…………………………………………...105 ‘Special Ops’……………………………………………………………………106 Chris Hani’s Military Role in Angola…………………………………………..109 The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale and MK’s Withdrawal from Angola…………..112 The ANC’s Notorious Prison Camps in Historical Perspective………………..114 Conclusion...………………….………………………………………………...116 CHAPTER THREE Colonialism’s Cutting Edge: Apartheid Counterinsurgency Introduction……………………………………………………………………..118 The Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency……………………………………120 Outsourcing Murder: Askaris and Mercenaries………………………………...121 The Evolution of Counterinsurgency…………………………………………...125 Apartheid’s Military-Industrial Complex, Corruption, and Counterinsurgency……………………………………………………………...129 ‘Securocrats’ and the ‘Total Strategy’…………………………………….……133 SADF Military Intelligence’s Influence on the Bantustans…………………….135 Proxy Forces: Outsourcing Violence…………………………………………...136 Counterinsurgency and Infiltration of MK’s Angolan Bases…………………..138 Counterinsurgency and Urban Violence………………………………………..142 Foreshadowing ‘Third Force’: Counterinsurgency and the 1989 Namibian Election…………………………………………………………………………145 Counterinsurgency During Negotiations, 1990-94……………………………..147 The ‘Third Force’……………………………………………………………….148 Counterinsurgency and the Limits of Plausible Deniability……………………154 Counterinsurgency and Spies Within ANC Leadership………………………..156 The Assassination of Chris Hani………………………………………………..162 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...169 CHAPTER FOUR Case Study: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and their Legacies in the Bantustan of Transkei Introduction……………………………………………………………………..171 History of the Transkei Bantustan……………………………………………...175 The ANC and MK’s Popular Legitimacy in Transkei………………………….180 v Identity, Terrain, and Transkei’s Suitability for Armed Struggle……..………..182 The Militarization of Transkei and Changing Allegiances……………………..189 Cold War’s End and Transkei’s Increasing Strategic Importance to MK…...…197 Counterinsurgency and Resistance In Transkei: The November 1990 Coup Attempt on Holomisa…………………………………………………………...198 Aftermath of the Coup Attempt………………………………………………...205 Transkei as a Haven for MK During the Transition Years, 1990-94…..……….212 MK as Defenders and the Killing of the ‘APLA 4’…………………………….217 Urban Unrest and Youth Violence: Comparing Transkei and South Africa..…………………………………………………………………...217 The Transkei Region, Violence, and the Security Sector in the New South Africa………………………………………………………………220 Crime and Security in Mthatha…………………………………………………223 The Private Security Sector Perspective on Mthatha’s Security Crisis………...225 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...228 CHAPTER FIVE Counterinsurgency and the Marginalization of Umkhonto we Sizwe in South Africa’s “New” Security Institutions Introduction…………………………………………………………………….230 Integration and Marginalization in the ‘New’ Security Forces………………...233 The Evolution of the ANC’s Elite/Mass Dynamics and Dynamics and MK’s Marginalization…………………………………………………………………238 MK’s Armed Struggle and the Negotiated Transition’s Class Dimensions……………………………………………………………………..241 Armed Struggle and Compromise: Guerrilla Visions of Security Sector Reform…………………………………………………………243 Elite-Mass Dynamics and MK’s Marginalization within ANC………………...247 Integration or Marginalization? Cantonment and Apartheid Counterinsurgency at the SADF Wallmansthal Base…………………..............260 The Aftermath of South Africa’s SSR Process in the SANDF…………………266 Lack of MK Integration into the Police………………………………………...273 MK and South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Institutions…………………………....275 Considering Alternative Paths to South Africa’s Security Sector Reform…………………………………………………………281 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...284 CHAPTER SIX Counterinsurgency as Hegemony: A Critical Analysis of the Post-Colonial Legacies of Clandestine State Violence Introduction……………………………………………………………………..286 Skeletons and Ghosts: Mapping ‘Third Force’ Legacies in the vi Post-Transition State……………………………………………………………290 Spy Intrigues and their Impacts on Post-Transition State Institutions……….…298 Counterinsurgency, Knowledge, and Power: State Violence and Hidden Histories in South Africa’s Security Sector……………………………301 The Third Force’s External Dimension………….……………………………..307 Corruption, Militarization, and Fragmentation in Post-Apartheid Policing…………………………………...……………………310 The Persistent Weakness of South Africa’s Security