BISMARCK'S DILEMMA: GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1870 TO 1882 Peter WiIliaxn van der Meer B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1994 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQULREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department History O Peter William van der Meer 1998 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY March 1998 Al1 rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or by other means, without permission of the author. National Library Bibliothèque nationale I*m of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. nie Wellington Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada Your fi& Votre réUrence Oor IW Nom refdrence The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, Ioan, disû-iiute or seU reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfonn, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author ret- ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the point at which German foreign policy became an unstable influence within European international relations between 1870 and 1882, as well as the structural and personal factors which influenced the decisions of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck's motivations are crucial to understanding European international relations in the !ate 19th century because he had to contend with the geographical and diplomatic difficulties which were inherent in the creation of the vety powemil (yet vulnerable) Second Reich. It is the position of this thesis that it was Bismarck's policy of flexible non-cornmitment to any single European power which most effectively guaranteed Germany's safety. Consequently, the abandonment of this policy, surnmarized in the Bad Kissingen Memorandum, was a decision based on Bismarck's panicked and irrational response to unexpected Russian hostility towards Germany following the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It is necessary to understand Bismarck's initial policy of non-cornmitment in order to determine the reasons behind his sudden shift towards a fixed alliance with Austria-Hungary. This requires a detaiIed analysis of German foreign policy documents contained within Die Grosse Politik, and a variety of rnemoirs from key figures within the German foreign office during this time period. This study in European foreign affairs provides another interpretation of the varied histonographical positions currentIy in existence. By accepting aspects from many of these positions, it makes use of the traditional focus on the individual actors who heIped to shape Iate 19th century European diplomacy; in addition, this thesis examines the more contemporary perspectives which focuses on the possible influence of economic and domestic socio-political factors on international relations. Through a reassessment of the existing primary sources, this study seeks to resolve the controversy concerning the reasons behind Bismarck's actions, and how much power he had as foreign minister to influence events. ACKNO WLEDGMENTS The time I have spent here has been at times difficult and exasperating, but overall this has been a very positive experience. The primary reason for this is because of the many people with whom it has been my pleasure to be acquainted. It is important to mention those people who have been supportive throughout my stay here. 1would like to mention Dr. SyIvia Russell who never let me settle for anything less than a full exploration of the topic at hand, and who was instrumental for my path in life thus far. At Simon Fraser University, I would like to sincerely thank Mary Ann Pope and the rest of the History Department staff for their patience in the face of my ceaseless requests and questions. 1 would like to extend my appreciation to Dr. Martin Kitchen. His interest and guidance have been a constant source of inspiration. My thanks to Dr. Richard Debo for his willingness to assist his students in whatever capacity necessary. It is also important to acknowledge those people who have been a source of support: Alex Long, Jonathan Mullan, Gwendolyn Lohbmnner, Brenda Smith, Lisa Codd, Dr. Ian Dyck, Shawnessy Johnson, David BarnhiIl, Jacqueline Mosdeil, Thomas KeeIey and Todd Wood. FinaIly it is important to extend rny heartfelt gratitude to my parents, William and Johanna van der Meer for their love and encouragement. 1wiH remember the peopIe you are and were aiways. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract Introduction Chapter One A New Era: The Diplomatic Position ............ 7 of the New German Reich Between 1870 and 1874 Chapter Two Bismarck's Delicate Balance of Power:. .. , . 23 German Policy Leading up to the Congress of Berlin Chapter Three The Abrupt Change of Course ................... 40 Chapter Four The Consequences of the Dual Alliance .. ... .. 64 Epilogue Endnotes Bibliography INTRODUCTION One day on the Pomeranian estate owned by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, a prized Mastiff strayed away from his master. The dog was gone for the night and retumed early in the moming. His master was enraged at the sight of the disheveled dog, who had obviously been out to visit a local bitch in heat. Bismarck, without thinking, acted purely on emotion; in a rage, he picked up a cane and beat the dog to death. In the days that followed, the remorse over the willful murder of one his most beloved pets was nearly impossible to bear. He wept openly like a child and went on endlessly about what kind of hombie beast he had becorne. This situation would not be the ody occasion when Bismarck, in a moment of emotiond distress, would quickly destroy something he had prized and then regret it later. This action would repeat itself in his response to the Bad Kissingen Memorandurn. The consequences of that action would have a profound effect not only on Bismarck and his foreign policy, but also on Europe for the next few decades. The field of foreign policy has been a much studied topic for historians. German foreign policy under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck is no exception. This topic has been explored thoroughly, and many varying methodologies and theories have been devised to explain the events and the motivations of the prime movers of European international relations in this period. The intent of this thesis is to present yet another interpretation of his policies. Atternpting to understand Bismarck's motivations and decisions is a cornplex process. It is a combination of the institutionaVsystemic realities in which Germany existed, as well as the idiosyncrasies of Bismarck himself. It is impossible to gain an accurate understanding of German foreign policy without a detailed analysis of both. Often, historians have ignored one or the other; this has caused diverging and misinformed accounts of this penod of history. Many questions must be answered in order to gain a basic understanding of German foreign policy between 1870-1882. Among these include: what was the crucial turning point which led Germany, and the rest of Europe, from a flexible system of cabinet dipiomacy to a fixed system of mutuaily hostile alliances? Was this the inevitable result of systemic changes within the sphere of international relations, or due to the personai miscalculations of Chancellor Bismarck? In addition, what were some of the other crucial changes which occurred in the direction of Geman foreign policy between 1870 and 1882, and what impact did these changes have on European international relations during this time? These are just a sample of the questions which will be asked and answered in this thesis. In order to grapple with these and other questions, it is important to make the intent of this thesis clear. This thesis will be an exploration of German foreign policy within the frarnework of European international relations between 1870 and 1882. Within this period, there was considerable diplornatic tension due to the emergence of Germany as a new industrial and rnilitary power at the centre of Europe. This significantly altered the previous balance of power when France and Russia were the two premier land powers, while in contrast, most of the German territones remained composed (as they had been for centuries) as a loose collection of srnall, squabbling, and mostly insignificant political units. For Bismarck, the primary task afier achieving unification was to safeguard this satiated state aqd prove to Europe that Gennany was not a pariah which sought domination of the continent. A critical element towards understanding Bismarck's policies is the Bad Kissingen Memorandum (15 June 1877); it must be deterrnined whether this mernorandum is the key to understanding Bismarck's policies between 187 1 and 1879. The Bad Kissingen Memorandum is a rather brief document which outlines Germany's delicate position within Europe and the possibility of a "nightrnare of coalitions" which could Iead Germany into a two-front war. It desout a militas, solution, especially since the European powers made it clear during the "1s war in Sight?" crisis of 1875 that Gemiany would not be permitted to extend further its power on the continent militarily. Bad Kissingen cailed for a flexible and non-cornmitted policy in which Germany would try to foster limited rivalry among the other European powers over peripheral (colonial) disputes; these disputes would not only distract the other powers away from Germany but would allow Bismarck to act as a mediator and encourage the other powers to be dependent on Geman diplomacy.