Character, Objects and Properties Rory Clive Jubber University College London Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Science and Technology Studies University College London 1 2 Signed Declaration I, Rory Clive Jubber confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 3 4 To my mom Rose, my uncle Rob, my mentor Emma and that non-human animal Mable. 5 6 Abstract: The thesis sets out to accomplish three related tasks at different levels of generality. The first is articulating and defending two problems: The Problem of Resemblance and The Problem of Character, pushing for a shift of focus to the latter. The second level is to consider a general approach to dealing with these problems, the constituent ontology, with a focus on The Problem of Character. I argue that the constituent ontology is a valuable and coherent general approach to giving an answer to these problems. Finally, at the last level of the greatest degree of specificity, I consider particular versions of the constituent approach: one that takes properties to be non-mereological constituents of objects and the other that takes properties to be ontological parts of objects operating under a property mereology. I argue for the latter, which is known as the mereological bundle theory. I argue that this version of the constituent ontology offers a powerful theory of exactly how properties and objects are related by proper ontological parthood. I take the mereological bundle theory to offer the best systematic metaphysics of properties and objects, one that is not only metaphysically coherent but also one that accords well with empirical considerations on the nature of spacetime in physical science. If I am correct, then the world is nothing but a world of properties and fusions of those properties. 7 8 Research Impact Statement: The work contained in this thesis sets out to articulate and defend the general framework of the constituent ontology and then to articulate and defend a particular variant of it that I argue is the best, namely the mereological bundle theory. The constituent ontology has received little explicit focus until recent years. The aim of chapter 2 is to provide a framework to understand the rule of the game by which the constituent ontology is playing. Besides my own work, only Michael Loux has attempted to explicitly engage in this. Chapter 2 therefore contributes to the discussions in articulating the general framework of the constituent ontology. Chapter 3 then sets out to defend the constituent ontology. In particular I clarify Van Inwagen’s charge of incomprehensibility against the constituent ontology followed by my own defence against this charge. This introduces some new avenues in the defence of the constituent ontology. In chapter 5 my work on the mereological bundle theory offers some interesting contributions to the literature. The mereological bundle theory , has received less attention than it should have, with Laurie Paul being the primary exponent of the view. I argue in chapter 5 that not only does the mereological bundle theory offer a precise answer to the Problem of Character via properties being proper ontological parts but if offers a novel solution to the Problem of Resemblance. This solution takes properties to be universals but does not require properties to be wholly present at their instances. In addition, amongst other contributions to the topic, I also offer novel arguments that exponents of the mereological bundle theory should be fictionalists about spatiotemporal parts, that mereological bundle theory need not commit itself to any particular view on the nature of spacetime and I give a discussion around what I call the Problem of Indiscernible Fusions. From each of these novel elements of the thesis contained throughout I intend to prepare for publication a total of seven manuscripts intended for publication in eminent philosophy journals and continue to deliver these papers at philosophy conferences. In terms of future work on the topics contained in the thesis I intend to work to understand how properties as ontological parts feature in modality, causation , the laws of nature and dispositions. The mereological bundle theory has not received enough attention in the literature even with Laurie Paul’s publications on the topic. It often receives indirect 9 citation in discussions on properties and composition but too infrequently is more deeply explored. My intention , starting with this thesis, is to explore that space of metaphysical possibility. 10 11 Table of Contents Introduction .......................................................................... 17 Chapter 1. Resemblance and Character: ................................ 29 1.1 Introduction: Two problems of objects and their properties .............................................................................................. 29 1.2 The Problem of Resemblance .......................................... 30 1.2.1 The One over Many ................................................................................ 30 1.2.2 A brief review of solutions ..................................................................... 37 1.2.2.1 Realism on properties as universals................................................ 37 1.2.2.2 Realism on properties with primitive resemblance ........................ 40 1.2.3 A pseudo -problem? ............................................................................... 44 1.2.4 The failure of paraphrase ....................................................................... 49 1.2.5 Resemblance and Natural Properties .................................................... 57 1.2.5.1 Natural, Sparse and Abundant Properties ...................................... 57 1.2.5.2 Qualitative Sameness and Naturalness .......................................... 60 1.3 The Problem of Character ................................................ 65 1.3.1 The Character of Ordinary Objects ........................................................ 65 1.3.2 Origins and Form: Plato and Aristotle .................................................... 66 1.3.3 Another Pseudo-Problem? ..................................................................... 70 1.3.4 Kath Hauto Character: Categoricalism or Dispositional......................... 73 1.3.5 Character and Resemblance .................................................................. 84 Chapter 2. Character First, Resemblance Second: The Constituent Approach ............................................................ 93 2.1 Introduction to the Constituent Approach ...................... 93 2.2 Constituency, Parts and Ontological Structure ................ 95 2.3 Realism and Properties .................................................... 98 2.4 Concreteness ................................................................. 102 2.4.1 Concreteness and Location .................................................................. 102 2.4.2 The Concreteness Principle of Constituent Ontologies ....................... 110 2.5 Immanence and Instantiation ........................................ 130 2.5.1 Objects as the terminus of instantiation .............................................. 130 2.5.2 Properties as immanent, not transcendent ......................................... 132 2.5.3 Immanence, constituency and instantiation ....................................... 134 12 2.6 Naturalness ................................................................... 141 2.6.1 Logically gerrymandered properties .................................................... 142 2.6.2 Structural Properties ............................................................................ 149 2.6.3 Graded Fundamental Natural properties ............................................ 151 2.6.4 Non- Graded Scientific Natural Properties .......................................... 155 2.7 Recap and summary ...................................................... 158 Chapter 3: In Defence of the Constituent Ontology .............. 161 3.1 Introduction: A maligned approach ............................... 161 3.2 Substance Dualism ........................................................ 169 3.2.1 Dualism ................................................................................................ 169 3.2.2 The dependence of the mental on the physical .................................. 171 3.3 A necessarily false thesis ............................................... 176 3.3.1 Reducio by dilemma ............................................................................. 176 3.3.2 Parthood Pluralism ............................................................................... 180 3.4 The Charge of Incomprehensibility ................................ 185 3.4.1 van Inwagen’s confused stare .............................................................. 185 3.4.2 Unpacking van Inwagen’s confusion .................................................... 191 3.4.2.1 Properties as abstract ................................................................... 192 3.4.2.2 Quantities as ontological parts or constituents ............................ 195 3.5 Properties, quantities and numerical measures ............ 199 3.5.1 Quantitative properties ....................................................................... 199 3.5.2 Quantity, number and proportion ......................................................