Mulvihill, N. (2019). Is it time to drop the term ‘prostitution’ from policy discourse? Journal of Gender-Based Violence, 3(3), 385-393. https://doi.org/10.1332/239868019X15682997312551 Peer reviewed version Link to published version (if available): 10.1332/239868019X15682997312551 Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research PDF-document This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Policy Press at https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/tpp/jgbv/2019/00000003/00000003/art00009 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research General rights This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/ Journal of Gender-Based Violence • vol xx • no xx • 1–9 • © Centre for Gender and Violence Research University of Bristol 2019 • Print ISSN 2398-6808 • Online ISSN 2398-6816 https://doi.org/10.1332/239868019X15682997312551 open space Is it time to drop the term ‘prostitution’ from policy discourse? Natasha Mulvihill, [email protected] University of Bristol, UK In this paper, I wish to explore whether it is time to drop the use of the term ‘prostitution’ in English policy discourse. I argue here that ‘prostitution’ is a culturally loaded term and is insufficiently precise in describing the different contexts in which the exchange of sex for money or other resources between adults takes place. This lack of clarity has implications for policy action, which in turn materially affects the lives of those involved in the sex industry. I draw on MacKinnon’s (1989) thesis of the eroticisation of dominance as a productive framework for explaining why violence, harm and coercion are possible within the exchange of sex for money (or other resource), though not inevitable. I propose that we distinguish four categories: sex entrepreneurship, sex work, survival sex and sexual exploitation. For some scholars, such categorisations overlook how disparate practices are connected (Jeffreys, 2009), most obviously by patriarchy or economic inequality. However, I believe we need to see both the connections and the distinctions: if we conflate different practices, we lose the particularity of the contexts of practice and weaken the rationale for policy action. Worse, policy interventions may be harmful. I suggest these four categories can help us identify and distinguish between structural and interpersonal harm and structural and interpersonal coercion and help to formulate attendant criminal justice and social justice measures. key words sex work • prostitution • sexual exploitation • policy • discourse To cite this article: Mulvihill, N. (2019) Is it time to drop the term ‘prostitution’ from policy discourse?, Journal of Gender-Based Violence, vol xx, no xx, 1–9, DOI: 10.1332/239868019X15682997312551 Introduction In this paper, I wish to explore whether it is time to drop the use of the term ‘prostitution’ in English policy discourse.1 I argue here that ‘prostitution’ is a culturally loaded term and is insufficiently precise in describing the different contexts in which the exchange of sex for money or other resources between adults takes place. This lack of clarity has implications for policy action, which in turn materially affects the lives of those involved in the sex industry. I draw on MacKinnon’s (1989) thesis of the eroticisation of dominance as a productive framework for explaining why violence, harm and coercion are possible within the exchange of sex for money (or other resource), though not inevitable. I propose that we distinguish four categories: 2018 sex entrepreneurship, sex work, survival sex and sexual exploitation. For some scholars, 1 Natasha Mulvihill such categorisations overlook how disparate practices are connected (Jeffreys, 2009), most obviously by patriarchy or economic inequality. However, I believe that we need to see both the connections and the distinctions: if we conflate different practices, we lose the particularity of the contexts of practice and weaken the rationale for policy action. Worse, policy interventions may be harmful. I suggest these four categories can help us identify and distinguish between structural and interpersonal harm and structural and interpersonal coercion and help to formulate attendant criminal justice and social justice measures. Definitions According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, the term ‘prostitute’ comes from the Latin prostitutus, combining the prefixpro- (meaning ‘before’ or ‘in front of’) and stitū- (from statuere, meaning to cause to stand, establish). The word originally then conveyed the idea of standing in public or being exposed publicly. It is not until the sisteenth century onwards in England that prostitution appears as a term for women offering sex indiscriminately, first as a verb and later as a noun. Prior to this, words such as ‘harlot’, ‘strumpet’ or ‘whore’2 were used (see Lister, 2017 for a summary). The key here is the link to dishonour; to a woman corrupting her sexuality. This moral judgement persists in current usage, where it may apply to all genders but, in the popular imagination, applies foremost to women. ‘Prostitution’ can also be used as a metaphor for ‘selling out’: debasing one’s talents in exchange for greater financial reward or notoriety. In contemporary British culture, the word ‘prostitute’ conjures red lights and street workers or belles de jour working out of expensive hotels. These images simultaneously castigate and titillate, yet the contemporary exchange of sex for money is far more complex. If we start first with prostitution referring to the exchange of sexual acts between adults – defined as penetration (as defined in Section 4(4) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003) and/or masturbation – for money or some other non-monetary resource. This exchange occurs outdoors on streets, on industrial estates, at transport hubs or in parks, for example; it occurs indoors in private flats, brothels, in the homes of sellers or buyers, in hotels and rented holiday accommodation, at sex parties and sex clubs, among other venues. Individuals who provide such services would usually term themselves ‘full-service’,3 ‘independent’ sex workers, ‘escorts’, ‘street workers’ or ‘brothel workers’. However, there are also a range of sexual or erotic practices exchanged for money – including for example, erotic massage, stripping, bondage, discipline, sadism and masochism (BDSM), webcamming, acting in pornography, or some forms of sugar dating: these are distinct practices in their own right, some involving no genital or even in-person contact, yet which in other contexts may be offered in conjunction with full-service work. It is important to recognise this wider context of sexual services since there are common features across these settings and the same sellers and buyers may move between each (for further discussion, see Hester et al, 2019). It also matters in terms of conceptualising a policy response. MacKinnon’s (1989) eroticisation of dominance In the very first issue of the Journal of Gender-Based Violence, Maddy Coy called on us to ‘extend Liz Kelly’s (1987) continuum of violence against women to prostitution, 2 Is it time to drop the term ‘prostitution’ from policy discourse? drawing on definitions of VAWG, research evidence on harms and conceptual links between men’s abusive practices’ (Coy, 2017: 117). Rather than employing this continuum, I suggest we consider MacKinnon’s (1989) work on the eroticisation of dominance and power. MacKinnon links masculinity to the eroticisation of dominance and femininity to the eroticisation of submission (1989: 130; Mulvihill, forthcoming). This dynamic accounts for the masculine-ness of sex buying (see also Mulvihill, 2018). The eroticisation of dominance underpins the sale and purchase of sex, sometimes in complex ways that appear to flip the dynamic: in BDSM, for example. It is that underlying context which makes violence and harm possible – though not always inevitable. I define harm here as the injurious impact of any act or omission which affects an individual (or group) physically, psychologically, emotionally, sexually, financially or spiritually. Such harm may or may not currently be designated a criminal offence. I believe it is conceptually useful to distinguish between structural and interpersonal harm and coercion. I understand the term ‘structural’ to relate to social relations (for example, relations of class, age or sexuality) and social institutions (for example, government, medicine, the law): in other words, contexts where we cannot definitively hold one individual as singly representative or accountable. I use ‘interpersonal’ to refer to contexts where individuals can be identified and named (for example, a sex worker, a family member, a trafficker). I recognise of course the relationship between both and the possibility of grey areas, but conceptually and practically, I hope to show why it is important to recognise these distinct areas of social practice. Four conceptual categories To replace the term ‘prostitution’ and ‘prostitute’ in English policy discourse, I propose four categories: sex entrepreneurship; sex work; survival sex and sexual exploitation. The typology focuses on individuals but also has implications for the intermediaries and corporations