NOTES Chapter One Thinking about Globalization—an Introduction 1. The term world public opinion does not mean to imply the existence of a single, uniform globally accepted public opinion but rather an increasing (if largely elite) acknowledgment of matters outside of one’s own immediate local environment. See for example, Abu-Lughod (1989); Bentley (1993); Braudel (1992b); Curtin (1984); McNeill (1967; 1982; 1991); Plattner (1989). 2. The concept of technological styles or technological revolutions (based on the term techno- economic paradigm originally) must not be confused with the rather laden concept of capitalism. Whereas capitalism (for a discussion of capitalism in this context, see Wallerstein, 1974; 1980; 1989; see also Amin, 1990) assumes a fixed, unique socioeconomic form of cap- ital, production, exchange, and labor (with the only distinction of systems in the form of proto- or precapitalist systems until its subsequent and inherent demise), the concept of technological styles provides a far more flexible yet systematically rigorous conceptua- lization of the interconnection between technology, capital, production, exchange, labor, and their embedding in and interaction with social structures (see chapter 2 for a more sub- stantial discussion of the concept of technological styles). 3. In the context of these works, the term flows refers to the movement of physical artifacts, people, symbols, tokens, and information across space and time, whereas networks refer to regularized or patterned interactions between independent agents, nodes of activity, or loca- tions of power (see Modelski, 1972; Castells, 1996; Mann, 1986). 4. For a further account of definitions, see Guillén (2001a, 236; 2001b); Held et al. (1999); Rosenau (1997); Albrow (1997); Kofman and Youngs (1996); McMichael (1996); and Waters (1995). See also the following edited volumes by Hargittai and Centeno (2001), Dunning (1997b), Mittelman (1996), Mander and Goldsmith (1996), Sakamoto (1994), and Featherstone (1990), providing further summaries of the literature. 5. See, for example, Gilpin and Gilpin (2000); Held et al. (1999); Castells (1996); Ohmae (1990; 1995b). 6. See, for example, Fligstein (2001); Doremus et al. (1998); Hirst and Thompson (1999); Krugman (1994); Berger and Dore (1996). 7. See, for example, Meyer et al. (1997); Williamson (1996); Levitt (1983); Bell (1973). Notes 213 8. See, for example, Guillén (2001b); Held et al. (1999); Garrett (1998); Albrow (1997); Boyer (1996); Berger and Dore (1996); Friedman (1994); Stopford et al. (1991); Giddens (1990). 9. See, for example, Vernon (1998); Stryker (1998); Rodrik (1997); Kobrin (1997); Strange (1996); Mander and Goldsmith (1996); McMichael (1996); Ohmae (1995a); Sakamoto (1994); Kennedy (1993). 10. See, for example, Fligstein (2001); Hirst and Thompson (1999); Held et al. (1999); Garrett (1998); Meyer et al. (1997); Albrow (1997); Wade (1996); Sassen (1996); Stopford et al. (1991); Gilpin (1987); Vernon (1971). 11. On the various distinctions of world(-)system(s) with or without a hyphen and in the singular or plural use see Wallerstein (1993) and Chase-Dunn and Hall (Arrighi, 1994). 12. Although rather diverse in its scope and approaches, Frank and Gills identify twelve main “patterns” at the center of world system research (Gills and Frank, 1993). 13. Wallerstein (1974; 1980; 1989) and Amin (1990) argue, that the differentiae specificae of our world system are new since 1500 CE and essentially different from previous times and places (for an early critique, see Braudel, 1992a). For Wallerstein, the differentiae specifi- cae is the ceaseless accumulation of capital. Amin also identifies an economic imperative that is new and unique beginning in the sixteenth century and characterizes the modern capitalist world system thereafter. This is not to argue, that this school argues that there was no form of capitalism before 1500 CE. They do, however, insist that capitalism reached a unique form at this point in history that justifies its unique classification and analytical separation from earlier forms of economic processes. Wallerstein identifies as a result three main aspects that characterize the modern world system emerging in the sixteenth century (for an early critique of this view see, for example, Skocpol, 1977): (1) a core-periphery structure, in which the core economic zone utilizes the periphery for cheap labor and commodities but keeps capital surplus within the core; (2) so-called A/B cycle phases of economic development in which the upward A and downward B economic cycles generate changes of hegemony and of position in the core-periphery structure; and (3) the existence of hegemony-rivalry (political-economic predominance by a center of accumulation regu- larly contested by one or several challengers during the downswing B-phase). Another importance in the distinction between the world system before and after 1500 CE for Wallerstein lays in his identification of more extended long cycles before 1500 CE. For Wallerstein, the phase from 1050 to 1250 CE marked a time of expansion of Europe (the Crusades, the colonizations), in other words an A-phase, whereas the “crisis” or “great contractions of 11250–1450 [CE]” included the Black Plague, and thus resulted in a down- swing B-phase (Wallerstein, 1989). 14. As Buzan and Jones (1981) have reminded us, there is an established tradition of the impor- tance of the analysis of change in the International Relations literature (see also Holsti et al., 1980), but not until the late 1980s and early 1990s have we seen a “return to history” that has, as Knutsen (1992) points out, become somewhat surprisingly dehistoricized in the course of the twentieth century (see also Holsti et al., 1980). Hobson (2001, 5) even states that there is little doubt that much, though not all, of the contemporary International Relations approaches are “historophobic,” viewing historical analysis as superfluous or exogenous to the subject matter of the discipline. 15. For realist long-term approaches see, for example, Waltz (1993), in which he argues that for more than 300 years the drama of modern history has turned on the rise and fall of great powers; Gilpin (1987) who applies his form of structural realism to long-term political and economic history; the power transition theories (see e.g., Organski, 1968; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Kugler and Lemke, 1996; see also Doran, 1989); and to some degree also some recent works of the English school of International Relations, for example, Watson (1992; see also Doran, 1989). 214 Notes 16. For early calls from the sociology stratum to bring in, as Skocpol put it, the “international” into historical sociology see, for example, Skocpol (1979); Frank (1967); Tilly (1975); and Wallerstein (1974). 17. See, for example, Jarvis (1989); Halliday (1987; 1994; 1999); Linklater (1990); Buzan et al. (1993); Scholte (1993); Rosenberg (1994); Thomson (1994); Spruyt (1994); Frank and Gills (1993); Ferguson and Mansbach (1996); Hobson (1997; 1998; 2001); Hobden and Hobson (2001). 18. Spruyt (1994), for example, analyzes in his extraordinary study the rise of three new varia- tions emerging in response to economics changes in the late Middle Ages, the development of the sovereign state, the city-league, and the city-state. 19. For example, electrification crowded out other forms of energy engines, such as steam- driven ones, in the early twentieth century. Another well-studied example includes the emer- gence and rise of the sovereign state, which has proven to be more successful than the city-state or city-league variant of sociopolitical organization. Spruyt (1994) concludes, that in the long run sovereign states displaced city-leagues and city-states. States won because their institu- tional logic gave them an advantage in mobilizing their societies’ resources by which he includes not just economic resources but also institutional and structural ones. 20. See, for example, Borrus et al. (1984); Zysman and Tyson (1983); Zysman and Doherty (1995); Katzenstein (1985); Hall (1986); Kim and Hart (2001). 21. For a discussion, see Nelson and Winter (1974; also Nelson and Winter, 1982, Chapters 1–2); see also Hodgson (1988, Chapters 2–5). 22. See, for example, Dosi et al. (2000; 1988; Dosi and Nelson, 1994). 23. See, for example, Nelson and Winter (1982); Nelson (1987); Saviotti and Metcalfe (1991); Witt (1991); Hodgson (1993); and Andersen (1994). 24. Here we shall focus on the long-wave tradition of long-term change and only point the interested reader to other perspectives on economic change, combining ecological, anthro- pological, sociological, historical, and economic analyses, such as the well-known work by Polanyi (e.g., Polanyi, 1944; see also Polanyi et al., 1957; Dalton, 1968), developing a three- stage evolutionary model of economic growth and writers such as Jones (1988), taking a very different approach than Polanyi, who argues that demographic change is the driving force of economic change, so the potential for increased intensity of production (laying the foundations of the Industrial Revolution) is not a uniquely Western and late medieval phe- nomenon, but has indeed existed in many times and places during the existence of the state system worldwide. 25. The following section relies in large parts on the excellent historical review by Louçã (see Freeman and Louçã, 2001, Part I). 26. See also Andersen (1994, Chapter 1). See, however, Hodgson (1993, Chapter 10), who argues that Schumpeter’s view of economic evolution