NIE 11-l-65 I CQNIRQII ED DI£6EM . 27 January 1965 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-1-65 (Supersedes NIE 11-1-62) The Soviet Space Program CIA· HISTORICAl REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated overleaf 27 JANtJARY 1965 -SECR:ET N? 394 \::OI>lTR:Ott~D DIS3Eio'c The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart­ ments of State, Defense, AEC, and NSA. Concurring: Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB Director of the National Security Agency Abstaining: The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction. WARNING This material contains i a ecting the National Defense of the United States ~~----nriig of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans­ or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited. _.$&€RET 5 / ... ~;- ~I!CRET NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-1-65 The Soviet Space Program ~EGRET TABLE OF CONTENTS Page THE PROBLEM . 1 CONCLUSIONS . 1 DISCUSSIONS . 5 L THE SOVIET SPACE RECORD .................................. 5 Unmanned Scientific Satellites . 6 Lunar and Planetary Probes . 7 Manned Space Flight . 7 Strategic Reconnaissance . 8 Costs . ... 9 II. FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE PROSPECTS . 10 Booster Capabilities and Costs . 10 Scientific and Technical Considerations . 11 Other Indirect Evidence of Future Prospects ........................ 12 IlL OUTLOOK FOR THE PROGRAM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13 Introduction . 13 Probable Timing ................................................... 14 Unmanned Exploration of Near Space ............................... 15 Lunar. and Interplanetary Probes . 15 Manned Space Flight . .. 16 Possible Soviet Military Uses of Space ....... : ....................... 19 Table 1: Estimated Timing of the Soviet Manned Space Flight Projects .... 21 Table 2: Estimated Timing of Soviet Unmanned Space Projects . 22 ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARIES OF SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHINGS, 1957-1964 Table 1: Soviet Launchings of Non-Recoverable Earth Satellites 23-24 Table 2: Soviet Launchings of Lunar and Planetary Probes . 25-26 Table 3: Soviet Manned Spaceflight Projects . 27 Table 4: Soviet Launchings of Photo-reconnaissance Satellites . 28 •,SECRET ~. ~EGRET ANNEX B: PRINCIPAL TYPES OF VEHICLES AND TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN SOVIET SPACE PROJECTS, 1957-1964 Figure 1: Family of Soviet Space Vehicles Used 1957-1964 Figure 2: A-Typical Soviet Planetary Probe Operation B-Typical Soviet Lunar Probe Operation Figure 3:[ 3 Figure 4: Earth Trace of Coverage of US by Soviet Photo-reconnaissance Satellite Launched on 51 Degree Inclination ANNEX C .......................................................... 29 Soviet Scientific and Technical Capabilities for Space Flight . 29 New Propulsion Systems ............................................ 30 Guidance ...................... _. 30 Tracking and Communications Systems . 31 Figure 1: Soviet Deep-Space Tracking Stations at Yevpatoriya ............ 32 Spacecraft Power Supplies . 33 Facilities for Stimulating Space Environment . 33 Life Support Systems . 34 Data Processing ................................................... 35 Orientation and Stabilization of Space Vehicles ........................ 36 Maneuver, Rendezvous and Docking . 37 Re-entry and Recovery . 38 SECRET :;~;CRH THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM THE PROBLEM To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over the next five to ten years. CONCLUSIONS A. The USSR's space program has become a key element in Soviet world prestige. Space remains the major area in which the Soviets can still propound a credible claim to world primacy. The USSR is also concerned to explore the military implications of space capabilities, and at least one military support system is already operational. We believe that the Soviet space program will retain its priority, that its accomplishment will continue to be impressive, and that it will focus on goals for which the USSR can most favorably compete. (Paras. 35-36) B. The Soviet program has been focused so far on four main cate­ gories of activity: a lunar and. interplanetary probes project which scored some initial successes but has been consistently unsuccessfulsince 1959; a manned space flight proj,ect emphasizing biomedical research, which has accumulated a total of more than 450 man hours in seven launches; a strategic photo-reconnaissance project which began in late 1962 and now apparently is performing its mission successfully; unmanned scientific exploration of near-space, a project recently plagued by numerous equipment failures. (Paras. 1, 5-7, 10-18) C. Soviet launchings have sharply increased in the past year. This has been due almost wholly to the reconnaissance project which ap­ pears to enjoy a high priority. A number of satellites recently SECRET ~!!GRET launched by new and diversified techniques could be precursors to meteorological, communications, navigation, or electromagnetic-recon­ naissance systems. (Paras. 1, 8-9, 19-20) D. The Soviet space effort has been characterized by repeated use of a few components and techniques, plus a total reliance on military boosters and an extensive sharing of other equipment and facilities with the ballistic missile program. This practice has kept down costs, but the space effort has been expensive and it now app.ears to have reached a stage where new and more costly systems will be necessary_ to sustain the previous rate of progress. Like Khrushchev, the new Soviet leaders will balarice economic and other considerations carefully in decisions about future space projects. (Paras. 2-4, 21-23, 28-32) E. Future missions will include unmanned space vehicles for the exploration of near-space, the moon, Mars, and Venus. The Soviets will probably continue to take advantage of each opportunity for the launching of probes to Mars and Venus to analyze the atmosphere and surface of the two planets. Lunar probes will be equipped for in­ vestigating the lunar surface. (Paras 37-39, 42-47) F. In the near term the Soviets will probably seek to rendezvous and dock two or more vehicles in earth-orbit and thereby to develop techniques for the assembly and resupply of space stations. If they can use current spacecraft, initial docking experiments could take place during 1965, and a space station to accommodate two or three persons could be achieved in 1966. We have no evidence, however, that exist­ ing Soviet manned spacecraft are suitable for this mission. If a wholly new spacecraft is required, rendezvous and docking is unlikely before 1966; a small manned space station could probably be placed in_ orbit about a year later. (Paras. 48-52) G. We believe that a new large booster with a thrust on the order of two million pounds is under development in the USSR, and that it could be available for manned operations as early as 1966. A year or two after its first manned flight, the Soviets will probabry use it and _appropriate space hardware to create a large manned space station. Such a station might weigh as much as 100,000 pounds and accom­ modate a rotational crew of five to ten persons for extended periods. It .could be created in about the same time frame, by multiple rendez­ vous operations using existing boosters, but we consider this approach unlikely. (Paras. 24-25, 53) 2 ~ECR!!T -. SECRI!T H. The propaganda value of a manned circumlunar flight, and its simplicity and low cost relative to a manned lunar landing, lead us to consider this as a prime Soviet goal. If the USSR is not seeking to beat the US in a manned lunar landing, this project would probably be timed to precede the Apollo mission in an attempt to detract from the US achievement and to identify the USSR with manned explora­ tion of the moon. Use of the present space booster for the circumlunar mission is possi~le but unlikely. Using the new, large booster noted above, the mission could be accomplished as early as 1967, but con­ sidering the problems of technology and cost, we think it more likely that the Hight would not occur before 1968, and it might be even later­ especially if the project is planned to incorporate advanced hardware required in a subsequent manned lunar landing project. (Paras. 54-58) I. We do not believe that a manned lunar landing competitive with the present Apollo schedule, i.e., aimed at the 1968-196f.l period, is a Soviet objective. The apparent status of Soviet space technology, eco­ nomic considerations, statements by the leadership, and continued com­ mitments to other major space missions all lead us to this conclusion. It seems certain, however, that the Soviets intend to land a man on the moon sometime in the future, and some R&D effort toward this goal is almost certainly in progress. (Paras. 33-34, 59, 61) J. We estimate that another, very large booster with a thrust on the order of five million pounds is under developmen~ and could become available fo:r manned space Hight as early as 1968. Using this booster and an earth-orbital rendezvous technique, and with a very high degree of success in aU phases of the project, the firs~ Soviet attempt at a manned limar landing might occur as early as 1969. In view of the magnitude of the technological problems and the level of resources which the Soviets are likely to commit to this project, we believe a more probable date for such an attempt to be a few years late:r. (Paras. 26-27, 60, 62) K. If the Soviets choose to direct their efforts toward even more extensive manned exploration of space, they may develop very large, quasi-permanent stations for the assembly and launching of spacecraft from near earth orbit. A suitably large space station could be created in the early 1970s using the very large booster discussed above. If so, a ~I!CRET 3 v.. - l!SI!GRET manned lunar landing mission launched from a space station could occur in the middle 1970s.