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Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Bell & Howell Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 IMÏ EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY: AN ESSAY ON THE PROBLEM OF META-JUSTIFICATION DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Lawrence Mark Sanger, MA., BA. ***** The Ohio State University 2000 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor George Pappas, Adviser Professor Marshall Swam Professor George Schumm Department of Philosophy UMI Number 9971634 UMI* UMI Mlcrofonn9971634 Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition Is protected against unauthorked copying under Title 17, United States Code. Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Another first principle is — That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallaciom. If any man should demand a proof of this, it is impossible to satisfy him. For, suppose it should be mathematically demonstrated, this would signify nothing in this case; because, to Judge of a demonstration, a man must trust his faculties, and take for granted the very thing in question. —Thomas Reid, An Esscy on the Intellectual Powers o f Man VI. V. ABSTRACT Epistemic circularity is, roughly stated, a property of an argument such that its conclusion must be true if one may be said to have a justified belief in its premises. An example is an argument for the general reliability of sense-perception that makes use of sensory belief among its premises; as William Alston has pointed out, epistemic circularity poses a difBcult problem for defending the reliability of sense-perception. It is also a key element in for a related (and broader) meta-epistemological problem, dubbed here The Problem ofMeta-Justificatioru First we pose a question: how can we ultimately justify our standards of justification? The difhculty can be neatly stated in the form of a Meta-Regress Argument similar to the classic regress argument for foundationalism. The options offered by the Meta-Regress Argument are: self-support meta-foundationalism, meta-coher«itism, meta-regressism, strict particularism, strict methodism, and meta-skepticism. One might attempt to defuse the threat of epistemic cncularity by attempting to show it to be ‘ Vntuous,” rather than vicious. But no one has adequately argued that epistemic circularity is indeed virtuous, and several arguments can be deployed u showing it to be vicious. Meta-coherentists, drawing on insights related to the Method of Reflective Equilibrium, might try to find ways to mitigate the viciousness; but their attempts fail. Varieties of particularism and methodism, two positions on the Problem of the Criterion, might also be offered as a way to escape epistemic circularity; but these views too fall prey to serious objections. The results of Chapters 1-3 of this dissertation, sketched above, appear to support meta-skepticism. It is possible, however, that there are some beliefs that are epistemically rational but nonjustified (i.e., neither justified nor unjustified). Such beliefs can support justification standards without themselves being justified. In this way, meta-skepticism can be avoided. This solution to the Problem of Meta-Justification is developed in Chapter 4 in a way that owes a heavy debt to the epistemology of the great Scots philosopher, Thomas Reid. m Dedicated to my mother rv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am gratefiil to my adviser. Professor George Pappas, for his help, criticism, and patience. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, George Schumm and Marshall Swain. Ail three committee members made comments that led to substantial improvements. A few, but far feom all, of these comments are noted in the text and footnotes. George Schum m also made numerous proofeeading corrections, for which I am grateful. I would also like to express my gratitude to some other philosophy department professors and to some graduate students (including Robert Kraut, Joe Salerno, and Ty Lightner), as well as members of an internet discussion group, the Association for Systematic Philosophy. Hearty thanks to Jimmy Wales for allowing me time off woric to finish (and for giving me an extra incentive to finish), and thanks to Jake Rogers for help proofi%ading a penultimate draft Thanks to Carolyn Cutler for encouraging me to teach fiddle for a living for a while; fellowing that good advice gave me the time and money to finish. Finally, I wish to thank my mother, Lana Sanger, and some other people (especially Margarita Zagirova), for encouraging me to fin ish . VITA July 16,1968 Bom Bellevue, Washington 1991 BA. Philosophy, Reed College 1995 MA. Philosophy, The Ohio State University 1992-6,1997-8 Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Philosophy VI TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ......................................................................................................... ii Dedication ......................................................................................................iv Acknowledgments ...........................................................................................v V ita................................................................................................................vi Introduction .................. ............. ............................ ...................................... I Chapters: 1. On Justifying Standards of Justification ................................................... 5 IJ. Justification Standards ...................................................... 5 1JI. The Problem of Meta-Justification — .................................7 I Jn . Track Record Arguments -------------------------------------- 17 IJV. What Epistemic Circularity Is ............................................23 I .V. Licensing Standards..........................................................39 1 .VI. How Justification Standards are Interrelated ----------------- 42 1 .Vn. The Meta-Regress Argument .............................................46 2. Is Epistemic Circularity Vicious? ....................... 55 2 J. What’s Wrong with SelfiSupport Meta-Foundationalism?.. 55 2 JI. Alston’s View as an Introduction — ..................................57 2Jn. Arguments for Benignity -------------------------------------- 61 2 JV. The Argument fit>m Philosophical Requirements ------------ 70 2.V. The Equal Availability Argument ___________________ 79 2.VI. The Arbitrary Case Argument ______________________ 88 2.VH. The Supports Argument __________________________ 92 2.Vm. Conclusion ___________________________________ 96 v u 3. Other Attempted Solutions to the Problem of Meta-Justification — ............ 98 3 J. Introduction: Coherentism and Meta-Coheientism ---------- 98 3 JI. Meta-Coherentism and Epistemic Circularity ......................101 3 Jn . Can MRE Help to Xfitigate the Viciousness of Epistemic Circularity?.............. 105 3 JV. Does the Size of the Circle Matter? .................................... 115 3.V. Meta-Regressism-----------------------------------------------120 3.VI. The Problem of the Criterion ---------------------------------- 134 3.Vn. Unlicensed Meta-Epistemology ......................................... 130 3.Vm. Strangely Justified B elief................................................. 137 3 JX. Conclusion ....................................................................... 140 4. A Reidian Meta-Epistemology ________________________________ 143 4J. Meta-Skepticism ...............................................................143 4 JI. Toward a Theory of Minimal Epistemic Rationality ............151 4 jn . Rationality and Properly Basic Doxastic Practices ...............157 4 JV. Strawson’s Dissolution of the Problem of Induction, and Salmon’s Criticisms ................................................... 170 4.V. The Principle of Rationality ...............................................180 4.VI. Nonjustified Beliefs .......................................................... 196 4.Vn. A Solution to the PMJ and a Refutation of Meta-Skepticism ..............................................210