The Role of Scientific Methods In S ocial W o rk Thesis presented fo r tive degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy by Eileen Maigaret Munro London School of Economics Untversily of London 1991 UMI Number: U048586 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Disscrrlation Publishing UMI U048586 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ABSTRACT The thesis discusses the widely held view in social work that practice should be based on Intuitive and empathie understanding and that standard scientific procedures are inapplicable. I argue that this anti­ science attitude is misguided and that social workers can and should use scientific methods to test theories and develop more effective ways of helping. There are practical and philosophical reasons for re­ examining this dismissal of science. Social workers' statutory powers and duties have increased rapidly but there is also growing concern about their professional competence. Moreover developments in the philosophy of science challenge social workers' assumptions about science. The first two chapters discuss the importance of overcoming the hostility to science, examining social workers’ duties, training, and practice methods. The first objection to science examined is the claim that science studies only observable behaviour not mental phenomena. I argue that this is based on a false idea of science and suggest instead that there is great similarity in the way scientists and social workers theorise. The next chapter discusses the claim that the scientific search for causal explanations conflicts with a belief in free will; I argue that in fact there is no conflict. The following chapter questions the reliability and scope of fieldworkers* intuitive and empathie judgements and sets out some reasons why they should be supplemented with scientific methods of testing. What counts as empirical evidence and how theories are appraised are the topics of the next two chapters. I argue that the traditional social work view of empiricism is unduly narrow and has hampered social work research. I also address the comparatively new objection to science in social work, namely the relativists' claim that science is not empirical and therefore should not be held up as a model to social workers. The final chapter considers how scientific methods can be incorporated into practice. CONTENTS Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 The Modern Role of Social Work 13 Early history 14 The sick and disabled 21 ChiIdren 24 Offenders 26 Re-organisation 27 Chapter 3 Social Work Expertise 32 History of social work education 33 Current teaching 42 Current fieldwork 48 Chapter 4 Formulating "Practice Wisdom" 63 Intentional behaviour 66 Behaviourism and the exclusion of mind 71 Theories implicit in "practice wisdom" 82 Describing social work methods and goals 89 Chapter 5 Free Will and Causality 98 The philosophical debates 101 Free will 104 Hard determinism 111 Moral responsibility 120 Client self-determination 125 Chapter 6 The Limits of Empathy and Intuition 130 Empathie understanding 132 The scope of empathy 139 The power of empathie therapy 144 Intuition 149 Social work as art 158 "Intelligibility" not "truth" 160 Chapter 7 What Counts as Empirical Evidence? 168 Positivism and social work research 170 Positivism and behavioural evidence 178 Relativism 186 Empiricism 194 Chapter 8 Weighing the Evidence 208 Inductive support 211 Refutations 220 Relativism and the social context 233 Kuhn's philosophy of science 241 Chapter 9 The Scientific Social Worker 249 Large scale and Individual research 250 Formulating practice wisdom 253 Testing 258 Evaluating outcomes 270 Chapter 10 Summary and Conclusions 279 Appendix A 289 Bibliography 294 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION When a young child appears with broken bones in a hospital casualty department and staff suspect non­ accidental injury, they refer the matter to the social services department. Social workers are then involved in a series of difficult judgements and decisions. They must determine whether this is a case of child abuse, consider who might be responsible, speculate on the possible causes, assess the risk of further abuse, and decide what actions to take. Social workers, in this example, need to explain why the abuse has occurred, predict the likely consequences of different courses of action, and decide how to intervene. These aims of explanation and prediction resemble those of natural scientists. Whether the similarity can or should extend to social workers using the same methods as natural scientists has long been disputed. As in the social sciences generally, those who argue for a scientific approach (naturalists) are opposed by humanists who claim that understanding human actions requires different methods from those used in studying the natural world. The latter position has received most support in social work, particularly among fieldworkers. In this thesis, I shall challenge this majority view and argue that social workers can and should use scientific methods in order to develop the most effective ways of helping the many people in our society who have to rely on them. The thesis examines the philosophical debates underlying the conflicting views on science and argues that the widespread hostility to the use of scientific methods that exists among social workers is based on a false picture of them and hence an inaccurate understanding of how they can be used in social work. Philosophical debate, though abstract, is of practical importance. Social workers, seeing so much human suffering and bombarded with requests for help, might be inclined to dismiss philosophy as a luxury, an arcane subject which has little to do with their day-to-day work. But social workers inevitably take sides in the philosophical arguments and the position they take influences the help they offer to clients. In assessing the risk of child abuse, for example, they have to decide what evidence is relevant, how reliable it is, and how they can use it to make a prediction about the safety of a particular child. The social worker who favours the humanist approach may base his decision largely on an intuitive appraisal of the parents while his colleague who adopts a scientific approach will give more weight to empirical research evidence on risk factors. Their philosophical differences have practical consequences, affecting decisions about whether or not a child stays with his parents and, in a few cases where the predictions are disastrously wrong, whether he survives. Moreover, although the debate about using scientific methods in social work is as old as the profession itself. It has recently received increased attention because of issues in both social work and the philosophy of science. It is typically in times of trouble that disciplines become interested in their philosophical foundations and to many it appears that social work today is in difficulties. The steady growth in the statutory duties and powers given to the profession illustrates the increasing expectations society has of it to alleviate personal and social problems. But at the same time, doubts are increasing about the competence of social workers. The public have been shocked by a number of cause célébrés where children have been severely abused or murdered despite being under the supervision of social workers. Within the profession, unease has developed because, in many areas of practice, scientifically based evaluative research has failed to produce convincing evidence of effectiveness. In this unsettled period, attention turns to questions about what knowledge and skills social workers might have and how they can develop them. The philosophy of science also provides a motive for re-examining social workers' assumptions about how they might understand and help their clients. There have been developments in thinking about the nature of scientific reasoning which substantially alter the premises of the traditional debate about using scientific methods in studying human conduct. These philosophical changes have led to some re-appraisal of the disputes in social work and two opposing views are emerging. On the one hand, some propose a new argument against science, namely the relativists' claim that criticisms of the former account of 8 science also Invalidate the claim that science produces more reliable theories. Hence, it is said, science should no longer be held up as a model for social workers. On the other hand, it is argued that the more satisfactory empiricist account is not vulnerable to the criticisms humanists have traditionally levelled at science and so bridges the apparent gap between the two sides in the science debate. It is this view which I shall be presenting and defending throughout this thesis. OUTLINE OF THESIS My first aim is to show that these debates about knowledge are not just of interest to social workers but are of public significance. Chapter Two reports on the expanding role of social work in modern society and details the profession's increasing duties and powers laid down by parliament. In Chapter Three, I consider how social workers meet their responsibilities. A study of the nature of training programmes for social workers and the main approaches to fieldwork indicates that few use scientific methods in appraising theories or evaluating their work. Empirical research studies though cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of such a style of social work and provide grounds for arguing for a scientific approach. Most social workers, however, would argue not that they should not use scientific methods but that they cannot employ them when trying to understand and help human beings.