House of Commons Defence Committee The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context: Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report of Session 2005–06 Ninth Special Report of Session 2005–06 Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 24 July 2006 HC 1558 Published on 26 July 2006 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00 The Defence Committee The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies. Current membership Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chairman) Mr David S Borrow MP (Labour, South Ribble) Mr David Crausby MP (Labour, Bolton North East) Linda Gilroy MP (Labour, Plymouth Sutton) Mr David Hamilton MP (Labour, Midlothian) Mr Mike Hancock MP (Liberal Democrat, Portsmouth South) Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) Mr Adam Holloway MP (Conservative, Gravesham) Mr Brian Jenkins MP (Labour, Tamworth) Mr Kevan Jones MP (Labour, Durham North) Robert Key MP (Conservative, Salisbury) Mr Mark Lancaster MP (Conservative, North East Milton Keynes) Willie Rennie MP (Liberal Democrat, Dunfermline and West Fife) John Smith MP (Labour, Vale of Glamorgan) The following Members were also Members of the Committee during the Parliament. Mr Colin Breed MP (Liberal Democrat, South East Cornwall) Derek Conway MP (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup) Mr Desmond Swayne MP (Conservative, New Forest West) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/defcom. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Philippa Helme (Clerk), Richard Cooke (Second Clerk), Ian Rogers (Audit Adviser), Stephen Jones (Committee Specialist), Adrian Jenner (Inquiry Manager), Sue Monaghan (Committee Assistant), Sheryl Dinsdale (Secretary) and Stewart McIlvenna (Senior Office Clerk). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Jessica Bridges- Palmer on 020 7219 0724. Ninth Special Report 1 The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context The Defence Committee published its Eighth Report of Session 2005–06 on the Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context on 30 June 2006, as House of Commons Paper No. 986. The Government’s response to this report was received on 20 July 2006. This is appended below. 2 Ninth Special Report Appendix: Government response Introduction 1. The Government is pleased to present its response to the House of Commons Defence Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2005-06 on the Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. MOD Engagement We welcome the Government’s promise of a full and open debate in Parliament and in the country at large, on the future of the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent. We are surprised and disappointed that the Ministry of Defence has refused to participate in our inquiry. We believe that a genuine and meaningful debate is only possible with the active participation of the MOD. We call upon the MOD to engage fully in our forthcoming inquiries into the future of the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent. We hope the MOD will make a substantive response to this report and that it will address openly the issues we have raised. (Paragraph 12) 2. The Ministry of Defence does not accept these criticisms. We are disappointed that the Committee chose in its report not to recognise the substantive contributions that we made to its considerations. We provided an initial memorandum in November 2005, setting out the expected life of the current system, the possible legal constraints on our decision- making and more detail on the programme of investment at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston. The then Defence Secretary also covered this issue in some detail during his introductory session with the Committee on 1 November 2005. We also wrote to the Clerk of the Committee on three occasions (on 26 September 2005, 24 November 2005 and 29 November 2005) indicating the limitations on the information that could be made available in support of an early inquiry, given that work by officials on this issue was then at a very early stage and that Ministers had not yet become involved. The timing of the inquiry was for the Committee to decide, but this made it difficult for the Department to meet all of the Committee’s requests for information. 3. We will continue to do all we can to support future inquiries by the Committee in this area. This document aims to provide the substantive response to the report which the Committee requested. 4. The Government has promised a full debate on this issue and the publication of a White Paper. We have also made clear that decisions will be taken this year. The means of consulting Parliament will be made clear when we publish the White Paper. The Size of the UK’s Nuclear Arsenal The UK’s strategic nuclear arsenal is small in comparison with the other established nuclear powers. (Paragraph 45) 5. The MOD agrees that the UK’s strategic nuclear arsenal is small in comparison with the other established nuclear powers. This comparison is, however, not necessarily a useful Ninth Special Report 3 one, as the UK pursues a strategy of minimum nuclear deterrence. We do not see Trident as a weapon system for fighting wars, but as having a fundamentally political role in deterring aggression. We would only ever contemplate its use in extreme circumstances of self-defence. The extent of our nuclear capabilities is therefore maintained at the minimum level required to deter aggressors, rather than by the number of warheads held by other countries. 6. The UK has an extremely good record of meeting our obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since the end of the Cold War we have: • withdrawn and dismantled the RAF’s WE177 nuclear bomb without replacement, so that Trident is our only nuclear weapons system. The UK is the only Nuclear Weapon State to have reduced to a deterrent based on a single platform, a single delivery system and a single warhead design. • dismantled all of our remaining Chevaline (Polaris) warheads demonstrating our commitment to irreversible reductions in the UK’s nuclear weapons. • reduced our operationally available stockpile of nuclear weapons to fewer than 200 warheads, (a 70% reduction in the potential explosive power of our nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War). • reduced the readiness of our nuclear forces. Only one Trident submarine at a time is on deterrent patrol, carrying 48 warheads (compared to a previously planned total of 96), normally on several days’ “notice to fire”. Its missiles are not targeted at any country. 7. We noted one minor error in the report on this subject. It is not the case (as stated in para 38 of the report) that the Strategic Defence Review stipulated that no more than 3 warheads would be fitted to each UK Trident D5 missile or that the precise number of warheads carried on patrol at any given time remains classified. The SDR in fact said simply the following: “We will have only one submarine on patrol at a time, carrying a reduced load of 48 warheads.” (SDR Chapter 4 Para 67) The role of the Nuclear Deterrent In considering the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the UK will need to examine whether the concept of nuclear deterrence remains useful in the current strategic environment and in the context of the existing and emerging threats to the security of the country. We will have to consider whether those states and non-state actors posing such threats can, in reality, be deterred from instigating acts of aggression by either existing or new approaches to nuclear deterrence. We will also have to consider how the UK’s nuclear capability should be adjusted to meet new strategic realities. Trident was developed during the final decade of the Cold War, and was designed to counter the threat posed by the size and technical capabilities of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal: we need to consider whether the form of the UK’s current nuclear deterrent is best suited to today’s and tomorrow’s strategic challenges. (Paragraph 55) 4 Ninth Special Report We believe that it is essential that, before making any decisions on the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the MOD should explain its understanding of the purpose and continuing relevance of nuclear deterrence now and over the lifetime of any potential Trident successor system. (Paragraph 56) 8. The Department notes these conclusions. In terms of the current system and current security threats, the Strategic Defence Review considered carefully the relevance of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War world. It concluded that: “the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security.” 9. The SDR did, however, lead to some reductions in the scale of our nuclear capabilities, as set out in our response to Conclusion 2 above.