Neo-pragmatism and Science Adam Govers Master of Arts Faculty of Arts School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne Produced on archival quality paper Submitted in total fulfilment of the Master of Arts March 2016 Abstract This thesis investigates the philosophical doctrine of neo-pragmatism. It investigates three core aspects of the position: its methodological orientation, minimalist approach to truth and anti-representationalism. I relate these to the practice of science, investigating how neo- pragmatism ought to approach philosophy of science and understand scientific practice. In particular I seek to develop its minimalist stance. I do this in two ways. One is by fusing Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude with neo-pragmatism’s account of truth, the other is by investigating how anti-representationalism impacts scientific discourse and how it ought to treat scientific vocabulary. 2 Declaration (i) This thesis comprises of original work towards the Master of Arts. (ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all materials used. (iii) This thesis is 43,780 words in length as approved by the Research Higher Degrees Committee. Signature: Date: 3 Acknowledgements I’d like to thank my supervisor Associate Professor Howard Sankey for helping me over the past two years. His guidance and advice have been indispensable. I’ve learned so much over the course of this thesis and would like to thank him for always pushing me to make the thesis the best it can be. I’d also like to thank Ariel Kruger, Cristian Herrera and Mahdi Foraty of the University of Melbourne, Philosophy of Science Research Group. Thank you for all the criticisms and advice you’ve provided me over the last two years. I’d also like to thank my parents Frances and Michael Govers for their love and support. Without them I wouldn’t have been able to have undertaken and completed this thesis. Finally, I’d like to thank my two brothers Luke and Kayne. Cheers for all the love, may the sparrows always fly high. 4 Table of Contents Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...……6 Chapter 1: The case for Neo-pragmatism.……………………………………………...…….9 1.0 Introduction and overview.…………………………………………....……………..9 1.1 What is Neo-pragmatism?…………………………………………………………...9 1.2 Neo-pragmatism’s methodological orientation: philosophical anthropology and linguistic priority.…………………………………………………………………....17 1.3 Realism; a diagnosis ………………………………………………..…….…………28 1.4 Two perceptions of realism and the problem of Flux……………..……………..….31 Chapter 2: Neo-pragmatism’s minimalist approach to science………………………………50 2.0 Introduction and overview…………………………………………………………..50 2.1 What is the Natural Ontological Attitude?…………………………………………..51 2.2 Is NOA realism in disguise? The issue of Truth.……………………………………58 2.3 The aim of science.………………………………………………………………….69 Chapter 3: Anti-representationalism and scientific vocabulary...……………………………79 3.0 Introduction and overview…………………………………………………………..79 3.1 The problem of science for global anti-representationalism..……………………….80 3.2 Why scientific vocabulary is not purely descriptive: scientific representations according to global anti-representationalism………………………………………..85 3.3 Norms of i-representations and e-representations: resisting Rorty and a collapse into ‘solidarity’…………………………………………………………………………...99 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………..109 References…………………………………………………………………………………..111 5 Introduction This thesis investigates the philosophical doctrine of neo-pragmatism. It investigates three core aspects of the position: (1) its minimalist stance and methodological orientation, (2) its approach to truth and (3) its commitment to anti-representationalism. I relate these to the practice of science, investigating how neo-pragmatism ought to approach philosophy of science and understand scientific practice. In particular I seek to develop its minimalist stance. I do this in two ways. One is by fusing Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude with neo-pragmatism’s account of truth, the other is by investigating how anti- representationalism impacts scientific discourse and how it ought to treat scientific vocabulary. In this thesis I attempt to strengthen and develop the position of neo-pragmatism via a number of readjustments and arguments. In particular I focus on developing a minimalist thesis which uses neo-pragmatism as its guiding doctrine. To do so I attempt to relate neo- pragmatism (throughout the thesis) more directly to science, arguing that neo-pragmatism is a strong thesis capable of investigating science and offering some interesting implications for our understanding of the practice. Thus I will show how neo-pragmatism possesses a strong capacity to provide insightful details about science. While neo-pragmatist discussions are rich in detail and the position itself fast becoming a sophisticated doctrine, there has been very little cohesive discussion about the position in its entirety. Instead, neo-pragmatists have favoured applying their brand of pragmatism to various issues with little interest as to what exactly is meant by neo-pragmatism. Discussions often break down into anti- representationalist or deflationist dialogues on very particular issues. Thus another key aim of the thesis is to bring together the various neo-pragmatist arguments and to demonstrate how they fit together and form a single position called neo-pragmatism. Finally, I hope to also move beyond the realism-anti-realism debate. The thesis will seek to capture the core intuitions of realism without having to adopt either a correspondence theory of truth or representationalism, two often held core theses of realism. It will seek to avoid realism’s elaborate metaphysics, offering a minimalist position which will be more than able to account for science, satisfying realist intuitions without having to accept any problematic realist thesis. I will therefore attempt to work out a number of persisting issues for this minimalist position of neo-pragmatism. 6 The thesis structure therefore is as follows: In chapter one I argue (the case) for neo-pragmatism. I do two things in the chapter to achieve this. First, I offer some explanation of the various ways the thesis can be formulated. This will provide the necessary background for the arguments to come in the thesis. In this part of the chapter I investigate what neo-pragmatism is. I question what its core theses are and seek to establish a set of core principles that can define the position. In doing this I will explain what kind of neo-pragmatism I am proposing to develop, while noting how my reading of the doctrine revises neo-pragmatism to overcome some challenges that I identify. My brand of neo-pragmatism will therefore be capable of tackling the challenges that I will investigate in chapters two and three. Then, in the second half of this chapter, I turn critical. I investigate a flaw that I have identified in minimalistic realisms which are similar to, though distinct from, neo-pragmatism. I explain the problem and explicate the significance it has. I will show why it should motivate an attempt to develop a neo-pragmatist inspired minimalist position that can appeal to modest realists and capture the core intuitions that motivate their position yet refrain from accepting any of realism’s key commitments. In chapter two I take Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) and develop it into a more robust minimalist position. I provide my own special reading of it, interpreting the Natural Ontological Attitude as a proto neo-pragmatist position which in many ways can act as a starting point for neo-pragmatists to develop. Following this, I focus on two particular issues that concern the Natural Ontological Attitude and its approach to science. The first is to focus on the relevance that neo-pragmatism’s account of truth has for the position. It can come to the aid of NOA to defend it against a number of criticisms that have been brought against it. I explain what these criticisms are while demonstrating how the neo-pragmatist can assist Fine in resolving them. Then, in the final part of the chapter, I focus on the question of whether science has a general aim and whether it is truth. I argue that while NOA contends that there is no general aim of science, we can exploit neo-pragmatist investigations into truth to show that truth does constitute an idealised, quasi-general aim of science. I explain how this works and why it is an attractive idea. In chapter three I discuss neo-pragmatism’s commitment to anti-representationalism. I focus on how the thesis impacts and relates to the practice of science, explicating the significance that anti-representationalism has for scientific representations and the related assertoric 7 practice that surrounds it. I assist neo-pragmatists in developing a global application of anti- representationalism by resolving some issues that confront the position when it comes to science. Thus the aim of the chapter is to improve the prospects for a global anti- representationalism. To accomplish this I address what I perceive to be a challenge that prevents the global anti-representationalist from applying the thesis to science. There are two inter-related issues that confront global anti-representationalism: one is that we want to affirm that science is genuinely assertoric. The other is that science is still descriptive and about the world. I explain how we can uphold these intuitions regarding science under global anti- representationalism, offering a solution on how science’s seemingly significant descriptive dimensions can be subsumed within anti-representationalism despite its endorsement of expressivism. Thus I show that scientific vocabulary and its use of assertoric practices can be made sense of according to anti-representationalism. 8 Chapter 1: The case for Neo-pragmatism 1.0 Introduction and overview This chapter sets the groundwork for the thesis by investigating what neo-pragmatism is, thereby allowing the following chapters to focus on and develop its minimalist and anti- representationalist elements. In section 1.1 I will explain what neo-pragmatism is and look at how the position can be formulated.