Filosofia Unisinos Unisinos Journal of Philosophy 22(1):59-68, jan/apr 2021 Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2021.221.07 DOSSIER A Dilemma for Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality Um dilema para teorias naturalistas da intencionalidade Michael J. Hegarty1 ABSTRACT I argue that a dilemma arises for naturalistic philosophers of mind in the naturalised seman- tics tradition. Giving a naturalistic account of the mind is a pressing problem. Brentano’s Thesis — that a state is mental if, and only if, that state has underived representational content — provides an attractive route to naturalising the mental. If true, Brentano’s Thesis means that naturalising representation is sufficient for naturalising the mental. But a natu- ralist who accepts Brentano’s Thesis thus commits to an eliminativism about the category of the mental. This is because naturalistic theories of representation are reductive, and so over-generalise by applying to patently non-mental states. According to these theories, it has been argued, phenomena like tree rings and saliva come out as representational. Only proposing further Naturalistic conditions on representation could avoid the eliminativist conclusion. But this shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress towards nat- uralising the mental. And if a Naturalist rejects Brentano’s Thesis, then she gives up on a clear link between representation and mentality. Hence, it is incumbent on the Naturalist to propose another, naturalistically acceptable, mark of the mental. This, again, shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress on the issue of naturalising the mental. Keywords: Intentionality, representation, physicalism, eliminativism, Brentano, materialism, naturalism. RESUMO Eu argumento que surge um dilema para os filósofos naturalistas da mente na tradição semântica naturalizada e, assim, dar uma explicação naturalista da mente é uma questão urgente. A Tese de Brentano - de que um estado é mental se, e somente se, esse estado tem conteúdo representacional não derivado - fornece uma rota atraente para naturalizar o mental. Se for verdadeira, a Tese de Brentano significa que naturalizar a representação é suficiente para naturalizar o mental. Mas um naturalista que aceita a Tese de Brentano compromete-se, portanto, com um eliminativismo sobre a categoria do mental. Isso ocor- re porque as teorias naturalistas da representação são redutivas e, portanto, generalizam excessivamente, aplicando-se a estados patentemente não mentais. De acordo com essas teorias, argumentou-se, fenômenos como anéis de árvores e saliva contam como repre- sentacionais. Somente a proposta de outras condições naturalistas sobre a representação 1 University of Connecticut, poderia evitar a conclusão eliminativista. Mas isso mostra que os naturalistas fizeram ape- Department of Philosophy, 344 Mansfield Road, Unit 1054, 06269- 1054, Connecticut, USA, Email: This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC [email protected]. BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited. Michael J. Hegarty nas um progresso limitado no sentido de naturalizar o mental. E se um naturalista rejeita a tese de Brentano, então ele abandona uma ligação clara entre representação e mentalidade. Consequentemente, cabe ao naturalista propor uma outra marca do mental, naturalisticamente aceitável. Isso, mais uma vez, mostra que os naturalistas fizeram apenas um progresso limitado na questão da naturalização do mental. Palavras-chave: Intencionalidade, representação, fisicalismo, eliminativismo, Brentano, materialismo, naturalismo. Introduction In Section 1 I clarify Brentano’s Thesis and show how reductive naturalists of the kind I am interes ed in general- ly understand it. In Section 2 I sketch the broad naturalistic An enduring problem in analytic philosophy of mind approach that I will focus on: the naturalised semantics tradi- is how to locate the mental in the natural world. How are tion. Then I will explain the problem such naturalists face in we to do full justice to, for example, phenomenal con- naturalising intentionality and how they typically approach sciousness or the intentionality of thought within the con- this task. In Section 3 I state the dilemma and explain how fines of a materialist ontology? It has seemed that reducing naturalists risk committing to eliminativism about the cat- mental facts to physical facts is the surest way to avoid the 2 egory of the mental if they adopt Brentano’s Thesis as it is spectre of Cartesian Dualism. But reductive materialism about the mental faces charges of being inadequate to the commonly formulated. That is the first horn of the dilemma. phenomena.3 Although significant work has been devoted The other horn rejects Brentano’s Thesis, but this then sug- to how phenomenal consciousness might be accommodat- gests that naturalists have made only limited progress towards ed in a materialist account of the mental, it has recently naturalising the mental. In Section 4 I consider ways the nat- been suggested that naturalising intentionality presents an uralist might respond to the dilemma. In Section 5 I sketch even more difficult problem for materialism (Lycan, 2009, some possible directions forward. p. 553). In this paper I will argue that reductive naturalists Before I begin, I should make some clarifications. I shall attempting to naturalise the mental via naturalising inten- be assuming a representational theory of mind without de- tionality encounter a dilemma. fence — as do all the naturalists I consider here. That is, I Franz Brentano proposed that intentionality was will assume that intentional mental states come to be about things because they stand in relation to mental representa- the mark of the mental. This has since become known as 4 Brentano’s Thesis. In contemporary analytic philosophy tions. Also, it is commonplace to distinguish two questions of mind, Brentano’s Thesis is commonly understood as regarding mental representations. What makes a certain state a representational state? And: in virtue of what does a partic- offering necessary and sufficient conditions on mentality: 5 a state is mental if, and only if, that state has underived ular representational state come to represent what it does? representational content (Textor, 2019, p. 56). Brentano’s Some theorists propose to answer both questions within the Thesis is attractive because it promises to provide a way to same framework (e.g. Millikan, 1984), while others advocate separate the mental from the non-mental, and thus offers offering separate theories for each (e.g. Ramsey, 2007 and a clear path to naturalising the mental. In the form just Fodor, 1990). I will s eak generally of naturalistic theories of stated, Brentano’s Thesis implies that if representation is representation, and will not complicate matters by explaining naturalised, then the intimidating task of naturalising the a given theorist’s stance on these issues. I do not think this mental is complete. But, I will argue, a dilemma seems to affects my overall point. present itself to the reductive naturalist at this point. If she accepts Brentano’s Thesis then, I will argue, the nat- 1 uralist ends up embracing eliminative materialism. If she The first step towards naturalising the mental is to clear- rejects Brentano’s Thesis, then, in having naturalised rep- ly separate the mental from the non-mental. Franz Brentano resentation alone, she has made only limited progress on proposed a way to do just that. In Psychology from an Empiri- naturalising the mental. This is not a fatal dilemma, but it cal Standpoint he wrote: does suggest that naturalistic work on mental representa- tion has made less progress on the issue of naturalising the Every mental phenomenon is character- mental than may be generally thought. ized by… the intentional (or mental) inexis- 2 For doubts about the viability of non-reductive physicalism see e.g. Schneider (2012). 3 See, e.g. Chalmers (1996) for an argument that materialism is threatened by an ‘explanatory gap’ in how consciousness could depend on the non-conscious. See also Lycan (2009), Kriegel (2013) and Pautz (2013) for criticisms of reductive approaches to intentionality. 4 See, e.g. Fodor, 1990, p. 16. See also Egan (2014) who glosses representationalism about the mind as “(…) the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities” (2014, p. 115). 5 See, in particular, Ramsey (2007) for further discussion. Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):59-68, jan/apr 2021 60 A Dilemma for Naturalistic Theories of Intentionality tence of an object, and what we might call, represent. The naturalist challenge here though not wholly unambiguously, refer- is to show, first, that the phenomenon of ence to a content, direction toward an ob- natural purposiveness can fulfill this sec- ject (which is not to be understood here as ond requirement, that a natural purpose meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity… may, equally naturally, be a represented This intentional inexistence is characteristic purpose. Second, it needs to show how exclusively of mental phenomena. No phys- the same kind of analysis can be used also ical phenomenon exhibits anything like it to naturalize intentionality in cases where (1995, p. 88-89). facts are represented rather than purpos- es or ends. It must be shown, for example, Brentano here seems to be pointing out some puzzling how this way of naturalizing Brentano’s as ects of mental states (to put things in contemporary relation can apply to the intentionality of beliefs, and of sentences that state facts. terms), and suggesting that these as ects are common to all It needs to be shown in every case that and only mental states. In contemporary philosophy the re- what creates the appearance of Brenta- marks above are almost universally taken to commit Brenta- no’s relation is merely an underlying natu- no to Brentano’s Thesis: intentionality is the (distinctive and ral purpose (Millikan, 2000, p.