Fate & free will For the last two classes we have been discussing the relationship between free will and the thesis of determinism; for reasons we have discussed, the thesis of determinism has often been thought to pose a challenge to the reality of free will. But there is even an older challenge to the possibility of freedom: the challenge from fate. To say that our actions are fated is to say that it is already true now that we will do certain things in the future. It is important to see that believing in truths about the future does not involve believing that determinism is true; to simply say that there are truths about the future, one neednʼt think that the laws of nature are deterministic. But many have thought that recognition of truths about the future is enough to move us to adopt the attitude that Taylor calls fatalism: “The fatalist, then is someone who believes that whatever happens is and always was unavoidable. He thinks that it is not up to him what will happen a thousand years hence, next year, tomorrow, or the very next moment.” What we want to know is: why might one adopt this fatalistic attitude in response to reflection on the existence of truths about the future? An ancient argument for this conclusion was offered by Aristotle. An ancient argument for this conclusion was offered by Aristotle. ... if all propositions whether positive or negative are either true or false, then any given predicate must either belong to the subject or not, so that if one man affirms that an event of a given character will take place and another denies it, it is plain that the statement of the one will correspond with reality and that of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the subject at one and the same time with regard to the future. Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it must necessarily be white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not be The conclusion of the argument Aristotle is considering is white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating clear enough: he says that if this be so, there are no real that it is white was true; if it is not white, the alternatives; everything takes place of necessity. proposition to the opposite effect was true. And But what are the premises from which this conclusion is if it is not white, the man who states that it is supposed to follow? making a false statement; and if the man who states that it is white is making a false statement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore be argued that it is necessary that affirmations or denials must be either true or false. Now if this be so, nothing is or takes place fortuitously, either in the present or in the future, and there are no real alternatives; everything takes place of necessity and is fixed. ... An ancient argument for this conclusion was offered by Aristotle. ... if all propositions whether positive or negative The conclusion of the argument Aristotle is considering is are either true or false, then any given predicate clear enough: he says that if this be so, there are no real must either belong to the subject or not, so that alternatives; everything takes place of necessity. if one man affirms that an event of a given character will take place and another denies it, it But what are the premises from which this conclusion is is plain that the statement of the one will supposed to follow? correspond with reality and that of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and In the first paragraph of this passage, Aristotle considers not belong to the subject at one and the same the claim that every proposition - every claim - must be time with regard to the future. either true or false. Here he seems particularly interested in propositions about the future: claims that some event Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it will take place. must necessarily be white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not be The key claim here seems to be that if one man affirms white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating that an event will happen and another denies it, one of that it is white was true; if it is not white, the the two must be speaking truly. That is, if E is some proposition to the opposite effect was true. And future event: if it is not white, the man who states that it is Either it is true that E will happen, or it is true that E will making a false statement; and if the man who not happen. states that it is white is making a false statement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore be argued that it is necessary that affirmations or denials must be either true or false. Now if this be so, nothing is or takes place fortuitously, either in the present or in the future, and there are no real alternatives; everything takes place of necessity and is fixed. ... An ancient argument for this conclusion was offered by Aristotle. ... if all propositions whether positive or negative are either true or false, then any given predicate The conclusion of the argument Aristotle is considering is must either belong to the subject or not, so that clear enough: he says that if this be so, there are no real if one man affirms that an event of a given alternatives; everything takes place of necessity. character will take place and another denies it, it But what are the premises from which this conclusion is is plain that the statement of the one will supposed to follow? correspond with reality and that of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and In the first paragraph of this passage, Aristotle considers not belong to the subject at one and the same the claim that every proposition - every claim - must be time with regard to the future. either true or false. Here he seems particularly interested in propositions about the future: claims that some event Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it will take place. must necessarily be white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not be The key claim here seems to be that if one man affirms white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating that an event will happen and another denies it, one of that it is white was true; if it is not white, the the two must be speaking truly. That is, if E is some proposition to the opposite effect was true. And future event: if it is not white, the man who states that it is making a false statement; and if the man who Either it is true that E will happen, or it is true that E will states that it is white is making a false not happen. statement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore be argued that it is necessary that In the second paragraph, Aristotle says that there is a affirmations or denials must be either true or certain connection between truth and necessity; the false. central claim here seems to be that if it is true that something has a property, then it necessarily has that Now if this be so, nothing is or takes place property. So, applying that to our example, fortuitously, either in the present or in the future, If it is true that E will happen, then necessarily E will happen. and there are no real alternatives; everything takes place of necessity and is fixed. ... If it is true that E will not happen, then necessarily E will not happen. An ancient argument for this conclusion was offered by Aristotle. ... if all propositions whether positive or negative are either true or false, then any given predicate 1. Either it is true that E will happen, or it is true that E will must either belong to the subject or not, so that not happen. If it is true that E will happen, then necessarily E will happen. if one man affirms that an event of a given 2. character will take place and another denies it, it 3. If it is true that E will not happen, then necessarily E will not is plain that the statement of the one will happen. correspond with reality and that of the other will Either it is necessary that E will happen, or it is necessary not. For the predicate cannot both belong and C. that E will not happen. (1, 2, 3) not belong to the subject at one and the same time with regard to the future. This already seems to be enough to get us to Aristotleʼs Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it conclusion: the claim that whatever will happen will happen of must necessarily be white; if the reverse necessity. proposition is true, it will of necessity not be white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating Is this argument valid? What is the form of the argument? that it is white was true; if it is not white, the proposition to the opposite effect was true. And if it is not white, the man who states that it is making a false statement; and if the man who states that it is white is making a false statement, it follows that it is not white.