The Venezuelan "Caracazo" of 1989: Popular Protest and Institutional Weakness Author(s): Margarita López Maya Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 117-137 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875580 Accessed: 09-02-2016 19:54 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875580?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Latin American Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 19:54:09 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Lat. Stud Press J. Amer. 35, i 17-137 zoo2003Cambridge University I 17 DOI: Io.iox7/SoozzzI6Xoaoo6673 Printed in the United Kingdom The VenezuelanCaracazo of 1989:Popular Protest and Institutional Weakness* MARGARITALOPEZ MAYA Abstract.27 February 1989 saw a popularrevolt break out in Venezuelawhich was to escalatedramatically. Both Caracas and most of themain and secondary cities of the countrywere the sceneof barricades,road closures, the stoningof shops,shooting andwidespread looting. This article describes the events occurring during the Caraca.o or Sacuddn,as the episodeis known,in orderto show the key role playedby the weaknessof a set of socialand political institutions in theviolent forms of collective actionthat prevailed. This data, on a comparativebasis, may enrich our understanding of othersimilar uprisings in the regionand worldwide. Introduction On 27 February1989 a popularrevolt, which was to escalatedramatically, broke out in Venezuela.Both Caracasand most of the main and secondary cities of the country witnessed barricades,road closures, the burning of vehicles, the stoning of shops, shooting and widespreadlooting. The revolt lasted five days in Caracas,slightly less in the rest of the country.The cost in materialand human losses was very high; the deaths,numbering almost four hundred,were largelyof poor people residentin the capital. The unusualand unexpectedviolence of this occurrencehas given rise to a numberof interpretations.This literatureis primarilyconcerned with ex- plainingthe direct or indirectcauses which brought the poor and middle classes of Venezuelaout on to the streets,yet many exceptionalfeatures of the disturbanceremain unaddressed.' For instance,why did it last so long? Why did it attainsuch levels of violence? Whywas it centredon targetssuch MargaritaL6pez Mayais an AssociateProfessor in the Centrode Estudiosdel Desarrolloat the UniversidadCentral de Venezuela. * The authorwishes to thankAlan Angell of St Antony'sCollege, Oxford, as well as theJLAS refereesof this articlefor theirvaluable remarks. She would also like to expressher gratitude to John Wainwrightand Ruth Hodges for their help in translatinginto English and cor- rectingthe earlydrafts. 1 See amongstothers the journalsCuademos del Cendes, no. 10 (1989)and Politeia(1989) both dedicated to the Also M. Kornblith, enlos (Caracas,1999), and entirely Caracazo. Venezuela go FernandoCoronil and Julie Skurski,'Dismembering and Rememberingthe Nation: The This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 19:54:09 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions S118 MargaritaLodpez Maya as shops ratherthan aimedat politicalobjectives ? Why did it occur undera democraticregime? These questionsdeserve a replythat may contributenot only to a better understandingof this revolt in particularbut also of similar protestsin the past or even those occurringin the future. In this articleI describein detailthe eventsoccurring during the Caracazoor Sacuddn,as the episodeis known,in orderto presentthe essentialfacts that will helpme addressthese important questions. I also tryto leavethe pathopen for futurecomparative studies with other outstandingrevolts in LatinAmerican such as the or the accountis based 1948Bogotazo I993 Santiaguenazo.My upon multiplecontemporary press sourcesas well as statementsgiven by witnesses and the authoritiesat the time. What emerges is the weakness of a set of institutionsthat regulated Venezuela's political and sociallife, a weaknessthat playedan importantrole in the durationof the revoltand in the violentforms of collectiveaction that prevailed.I shallalso comparethis episodewith the wave of protests that occurredbetween December 1935 and February1936 in Venezuela,when Juan Vicente G6mez, the dictatorof the countryfor 27 years,died. In this comparisonsome differencessurface that help to explain why in 1989 politicaltargets were not the centralfocus of the crowds. The articleis dividedinto fourparts. In the first,I reviewsome conceptual interpretationsof revoltsof this nature.In the second, I describein narrative the eventsof the firstday of the CaracaZo.In the thirdpart, I look at the second and subsequentdays of the disturbancein the same manner.In the fourth part, I take stock of the materialand human losses. I end with a historical comparisonof the Sacuddnwith the protests of 1935-1936 and drawsome conclusions. I. Popularrevolts In its forms of protestand the predominantlyviolent natureof the collective actions which took place, the popularrevolt of 27 February1989 and sub- sequentdays is reminiscentof popularuprisings in some LatinAmerican cities in the past and also of the notorious food riots experiencedby European societiesduring the centuriesof transitionto modernity:barricades, burnings, stoning,the occupationof streetsand premises, looting with booty sometimes sharedout, sometimesnot.2 According to some relevantspecialist literature on urbanuprisings, actions of the type carriedout duringthe Sacuddnwere Semantics of Political Violence in Venezuela,' ComparativeStudies in Societyand History, vol. 33, no. 2 (1991), pp. 288-33 5 and R. Hillman, Crisisand Transitionin Venezuela(Boulder, 2 1994). See S. Arrom and S. Ortoll, Riotsin the Cities.Popular Politics and the UrbanPoor in LatinAmerica, 1761-g9ro (Wilmington, DE, I994); G. Rude, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbancesin France and England (London, 1964); E. P. Thompson, Costumesin Common (London, I993). This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 09 Feb 2016 19:54:09 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TheVenezuelan Caracazo of i989 I 19 characteristicof pre-modernEuropean societies, since in modern societies social unrestis normallychannelled through organised actors using a reper- toire of forms of protest predominantlypeaceful or conventionalin nature, though occasionallyconfrontational in specialcircumstances.3 However,as these forms of protesthave emergedunusually powerfully in manyof the world'ssocieties in the last two decades,new interpretationsare needed to addressthis issue.Walton and Seddonfor examplehave proposed an analogybetween the European transitionsto modernityand the pres- ent situationof many Third World countriesas a way of interpretingthis phenomenon.They arguethat the latter are going through a societal tran- sition characterisedby the passagefrom paternalistmodernisation, which in the case of LatinAmerica was promotedby a pro-developmentpopulist state, to liberalmodernisation led by internationalfinancial agencies throughthe impositionof policiesshaped by neo-liberaldoctrine.4 The popularsectors of these societies,like the poor in Englandin the seventeenthand eighteenth centuries,are seen as havingevolved a 'moraleconomy' duringthe modern paternalistphase, that is to saya moralcode by which theyexpect to be tied to the economy,the authoritiesand the wealthy.In accordancewith this code, the poor feel that they have the rightto be protectedby the authoritiesfrom the vicissitudesof the marketand to be able to obtain at least the minimum resourcesnecessary for their survival.The similaritybetween the forms of action of recentprotest and the earlierones, as well as the virulenceof each, can be attributedin part to the fact that when the authoritiesabandoned paternalismin order to applythe doctrineof laissezfaire,then, as now, they betrayedthe moralcode that exists between them and the poor. Severalarticles written in Venezueladuring the I990oshave shown that the CaracaZowas triggeredoff by a set of causes,among which the betrayalof the moraleconomy as outlinedby Waltonand Seddonplayed an importantrole.5 But as Waltonand Seddonhave recognised,each society also protestsin its own wayaccording to its historyand institutions. That is why, evenif similarin some features,popular revolts such as the Bogota.oof 1948,the Santiagueiazoof i993 or the numerousviolent protests occurringtoday againstneo-liberal policies show, when compared,important differences in actors,motives or forms of collectiveaction." In this regardit is useful to go backto the idea of 3 Thompson, Costumes,1993; E. J. Hobsbawn,Primitive Rebels, Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements(Manchester, 1959). 4 J. Walton and D. Seddon,