II. Political and Security Questions A. THE QUESTION OF KOREA1 This chapter deals with: (1) reports of the Towards the close of 1951 agreement had United Nations Command in Korea submitted been reached on the following points under under the Security Council resolution of 7 July agenda item 3: cessation of hostilities within 24 1950;2 as well as a special report to the General hours after the signing of the armistice agree- Assembly on the status of armistice negotiations ment; withdrawal of armed forces from the de- (A/1882); (2) other communications relating militarized zone; and withdrawal of armed forces to the Korean question; (3) the report (A/2187) from coastal islands and territories controlled by of the United Nations Commission for the Uni- the other side. Earlier—in November 1951—full fication and Rehabilitation of Korea (UN- agreement had been reached on item 2, relating CURK); (4) consideration by the General As- to the demarcation line. sembly of the Korean question at the first part On 19 February 1952, agreement was reached of its seventh session in 1952; (5) discussion on agenda item 5 concerning recommendations at that session of the item "Complaint of mass to governments. Initially the Chinese-North Ko- murder of Korean and Chinese prisoners of war rean side had proposed a political conference by the United States military authorities on the covering the whole range of Far Eastern prob- island of Pongam"; and (6) the report (A/2222 lems to be held three months after the armistice and Add.l and 2) of the Agent-General of the agreement became effective. They proposed that United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency the following matters be discussed at that con- (UNKRA). ference: (1) withdrawal of all foreign forces Consideration of the Korean question had not from Korea; (2) peaceful settlement of the Ko- been completed when the General Assembly re- rean question and other related questions. The cessed the first part of its seventh session on 22 United Nations Command delegation pointed December. out that it was a military negotiating team with- out authority to deal with political matters. It 3 was, however, prepared to make procedural 1. United Nations Command Reports recommendations concerning a political confer- ence to deal exclusively with Korean political Reports of the United Nations Command op- problems upon the conclusion of an armistice. erations in Korea were submitted by the repre- It could not consider recommending a discussion sentative of the United States to the Security of matters not directly concerned with Korea. Council, in accordance with the Security Coun- The United Nations Command delegation ac- cil resolution (S/1588) of 7 July 1950. The cepted a revised Chinese-North Korean proposal following information on the progress of truce recommending that within three months after negotiations and of operations is taken from the the armistice became effective "a political con- reports. ference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle a. TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS through negotiations the questions of the with- At the beginning of 1952, truce negotiations drawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the between the United Nations Command and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, et Chinese-North Korean Command centered in the 1 following three agenda items: item 3, "Concrete For map of Korea, see p. 213. 2 See Y.U.N., 1950, p. 230. arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire 3 Reports Nos. 37 to 60 of the United Nations Com- and an armistice in Korea"; item 4, "Arrange- mand operations in Korea: S/2550, S/2593 & Corr.1, ments relating to prisoners of war"; and item 5, S/2605, S/2619, S/2629, S/2662, S/2700, S/2715, S/2768, S/2774, S/2789, S/2805, S/2836, S/2837, "Recommendations to the governments con- S/2897, S/2898, S/2920, S/2970, S/2970-S/2972, cerned." S/2972, S/2982. 156 Yearbook of the United Nations cetera". In agreeing to this recommendation, the (2) Both sides would cease, after the signing United Nations Command representative made of the armistice, the introduction into Korea of the following statement for the record concern- reinforcing military personnel. However, the ro- ing the understanding of this proposal by the tation of 35,000 military personnel a month United Nations Command: would be permitted. Rotation personnel were to "First, we desire to point out that this recommenda- enter Korea only through designated ports of tion will be made by the Commander-in-Chief, United entry, under the supervision and inspection of the Nations Command, to the United Nations as well as teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Com- to the Republic of Korea. Second, in accepting the mission. term Foreign Forces we are doing so on the basis of your statement that this term means non-Korean Forces, No agreement was reached, however, on airfield and third, we wish it clearly understood that we do not construction and the composition of a neutral construe the word et cetera to relate to matters outside supervisory organization. On 25 February, the of Korea." United Nations Command stated, in an effort to On agenda item 3, the following were the main break the deadlock on this issue, it proposed four points at issue between the two delegations: neutral nations—Sweden and Switzerland on the (1) The United Nations Command delegation wanted United Nations Command side and Poland and the broadest possible access to all parts of Korea to Czechoslovakia on the Chinese-North Korean assure against the increase of military strength. It side. offered corresponding facilities to the Chinese-North Korean side. The Chinese-North Korean side wanted to Discussion on the item relating to the ex- limit inspection claiming that it would be unwarranted change of prisoners of war began early in 1952, interference in the affairs of North Korea. when the United Nations Command proposed (2) The United Nations Command proposed a pro- that after the signing of the armistice all pris- hibition applicable to both sides on the construction of oners of war would be released, including sol- new military airfields and a ceiling on the number of civilian airfields to be rehabilitated. The Chinese-North diers of one side who had been impressed into Korean side held that the provision would constitute an the armed forces of the other side. As regards abridgment of sovereignty and insisted on unlimited repatriation, the proposal permitted freedom of airfield construction. choice to the individual, ensuring that no duress (3) The United Nations Command proposed a pro- or force would be used to influence him. The vision for the rotation of 40,000 persons per month proposal provided for repatriation of prisoners of in order to enable their personnel to be withdrawn from Korea when their tour of duty was completed. The war, displaced persons and refugees. Finally, the Chinese-North Korean side insisted on a rotation figure United Nations Command said, its proposal pro- of 30,000. vided for a supervisory organ, the International (4) The United Nations Command initially pro- Committee of the Red Cross, to interview all posed that inspection regarding adherence to the terms prisoners of war, to ensure that, whatever their of the armistice agreement relative to reinforcement should be carried on by joint teams of both sides. It choice, it would be made "freely and without accepted in principle, however, the proposal of the fear". Chinese-North Korean side for the inspection to be The Chinese-North Korean delegation, the carried out by a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commis- United Nations Command stated, rejected these sion. But the United Nations Command did not accept the Chinese-North Korean proposal that the USSR be proposals, accusing the United Nations Command accepted as one of the neutral nations. of attempting to keep prisoners of war in slavery, By March 1952 agreement was reached on the to hold them as hostages and to prevent the following points: civilian population in the United Nations Com- mand zone from being repatriated. At the same (1) Inspection teams would be stationed at time, this delegation argued the right of an im- five ports of entry on each side and there would pressed soldier of the Republic of Korea Army be ten mobile teams to investigate reported vio- to remain in the Chinese-North Korean forces. lations. The ports of entry agreed upon were: The United Nations Command report Territory under the mili- (S/2593) covering the period 16 to 31 January tary control of Korean stated that, with the gradual development of the Territory under the mili- People's Army and the tary control of the United Chinese People's Volun- discussion, the Chinese-North Korean representa- Nations Command teers tives maintained an adamant position that the Inchon Sinuiju individual prisoner of war must be repatriated Taegu Chongjin after an armistice, irrespective of his choice. Pusan Hungnam They insisted that the plain wording of the Kangnung Manpo Geneva Convention supported their view. With- Kunsan Sinan ju out admitting it openly, the report said, they im- Political and Security Questions 157 plied that the Geneva Convention was designed own safety they should not discuss the matter to protect the State rather than the individual. with others or make known their decision before In subsequent discussions, although the issue the individual interviews were held. of voluntary repatriation remained unsolved, The interviews were conducted by unarmed agreement was reached on the following points: United Nations Command personnel near the (1) Prisoners of war, when released from entrance to each compound. Each prisoner, carry- custody, would not again be employed in acts ing his personal possessions, was called forward of war in the Korean conflict.