View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Sydney eScholarship The Primacy of Narrative Agency: A Feminist Theory of the Self A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Sarah Drews Lucas Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Department of Philosophy The University of Sydney 2016 Attribution of Authorship and Statement of Originality I declare that the research presented here is my own original work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. I also declare that this thesis has not been submitted to any other institution for the award of a degree. A version of Chapter 3 of this thesis will appear in a forthcoming volume of Feminist Theory as “The Primacy of Narrative Agency: Re-Reading Seyla Benhabib on Narrativity”. 2 Abstract Current debates in feminist theory struggle to retain a robust concept of agency in light of the rejection of an independent and sovereign subject. The purpose of my project is to articulate a feminist concept of agency for a self that is relational and non-sovereign (i.e. one that does not equate agency with autonomy) and yet one that remains committed to a conception of the self as both powerful and unique. Narrative agency, which I understand as the capacity to say 'I' over time and in relation to others, meets the challenge of attending to both the inter-relational and the individually empowering aspects of action. The identity of the ‘I’ is a fleeting configuration of narratives that differs from moment to moment; but the capacity to say ‘I’ is constant. This definition of agency is able to account for the extent to which a subject may be constituted by power relations but is still invested in the subject’s unlimited emancipatory potential. In other words, a subject, even at the most basic level, may not be free to choose the content of certain identity-determining narratives, such as gender narratives; however, she always has the capacity to confront and change those narratives. My project draws on the work of Hannah Arendt to provide a feminist politics based on this account of narrative agency. Arendt’s political theory is chiefly concerned with appearance: agency, for Arendt, involves appearing to another member of a plurality through speech or action. This basic schematic is relevant to the analysis of several key aspects of a feminist theory of narrative agency: especially identity, mutual recognition, solidarity, and judgment. For Arendt, identity is not reducible to a series of markers such as race or gender but is, instead, indefinite—composed of a mutable set of interests, or 3 narratives. A subject is constantly negotiating the articulation of these interests, and yet she appears to, and is recognised by, others as a unique being. Solidarity, by these lights, arises not through pre-determined similarities but, rather, interests actively held in common. Conversations about these shared interests allow individual agents to articulate and negotiate judgments and opinions. Bringing together these resources from Arendt and reading them alongside problems of contemporary feminism allows me to endorse mutual recognition, solidarity, and conversation as vital attributes of an emancipatory feminist politics. 4 Acknowledgements I would like to extend my wholehearted gratitude to all of the people who have made the completion of this thesis possible. First and foremost, I would like to think the fiercely intelligent and generous women of my PhD cohort at the University of Sydney who have read and responded to my work since the beginning of this project: Millicent Churcher, Kari Meta-Greenswag, Louise Richardson-Self, Miriam Cosic, Inja Stracenski, Laura MacDonald, Laura Kotevska, Mara Bollard, Elena Walsh (who is the best listener I have ever known), and—especially—Lucy Smith, without whom I would be utterly lost. Thanks also are due to other friends and colleagues in Sydney and around the world who have been readers and/or supporters over the course of my PhD progress: Nick Malpas, Yarran Hominh, Melanie White, Zoe Fitzgerald, Eimear Cradock, Anthony Hooper, Latoya Schadel, Tom Dougherty, Tama Coutts, Rick Benitez, Caroline West, Luke Russell, Barrell Jones, Katherine Van Steenburgh, Mark David Ashworth, James Houlihan, Katherine Guild, Cherie Weaver, David Longoria, Red Hunter, Lindsey Boyd, Alma Gomez, Kristen Schlemmer, Charles Litton, Eileen Jones, Louise Pennebaker, Alicia Sloan, Ciorsdan Glass, Caroline Lents, Eva Boster, and (my hero) Jessie Lubke. I am extremely grateful to the Centre for Political Thought at the University of Exeter for giving me the opportunity to hone my understanding of Political Theory and to deepen my appreciation of Hannah Arendt. And to the wonderful people I have met in Exeter— thanks to Terah Walkup, for her delightful friendship and for her invaluable proofreading skills, to Kate Townsend for her support both emotional and intellectual, and to Jessica 5 Fear, Chris Fear, Simon Townsend, and Ross Caroll for their excellent company. Thanks especially to the Exeter Arendt/Heidegger reading group—Iain Hampsher-Monk, Robin Durie, Ed Skidelsky, Jack Owen, Andy Schaap, and Zhangmei Tang—for many hours of productive conversation. To my supervisors, I cannot possibly express the depth of my gratitude. To Moira Gatens—whose strength has been my constant motivation—thank you so much for your patience, your expertise, your guidance, and your tireless encouragement. To Alex Lefebvre at the University of Sydney, thanks for your humour, your insight, your advice, and your friendship. To Andy Schaap at the University of Exeter, thanks for your honesty, your creativity, and your thoughtfulness. Finally, I want to thank my family for being there for me through this and every other endeavour. Thank you to my parents, Sandra (who is my greatest feminist role model) and Richard (from whom I inherited my sense of wonder), who overwhelm me every day with their unconditional love, their kindness, and their support. Thanks to my dearest friend, Sarah Gautier, for beginning where I end and ending where I begin. Thanks to my brother, Randall Lucas, for his open mind and his open heart. Thanks to my grandmother, Mickie Drews, for her steel magnolia strength and her wicked wit. And most of all to my partner, Robert Lamb, thank you for reading and commenting on every draft of every chapter of this project, for your endlessly inspiring conversation, for your courage, and for your love. 6 Table of Contents Attribution of Authorship Abstract Acknowledgements Introduction…………………………………………………………………….…..10 Part I: Narrative Agency and Narrative Identity Chapter One: The Stakes of the Agency Debate…………………………...…....…30 1.1 Foundations of the Debate……………………………………….….…34 1.2 The Politics of Ourselves: Between Agency and Subjection…….….....43 1.3 Escaping the Subject-Centred Frame?....................................................50 Chapter Two: Narrative Identity……………………………………………….…...63 2.1 A Narrative Theory of Personal Identity……….....................................66 2.2 Narrative Identity as Practical and Normative…………………............76 2.3 Critiques of Narrative Identity………………………………….……....86 2.3.1 The Ethical Narrativity Thesis……………………….…….....88 2.3.2 Narrative and Identity Politics……………………….….........97 Chapter Three: The Primacy of Narrative Agency………………………………..104 3.1 Narrative Agency as Primary…………………………………….........106 3.2 The Gender Objection…………………………………………………113 3.3 The Communicability Objection………………………………………121 Part II: Narrative Agency and Feminist Politics Chapter Four: Feminist Resources in Hannah Arendt…………………..................135 4.1 Hannah Arendt and Identity Politics…………………………………...136 4.2 Conditions for Narrative Agency…..…………………………..............141 4.2.1 Plurality..……………………………………………………..142 4.2.2 Natality……………………………………………………….150 4.2.3 Narrativity……….……….…………………………………..154 4.3 Toward a Model of Feminist Politics………………..………………....160 7 Chapter Five: A New Feminist Theory of Judgment………………………………..167 5.1 Enlarged Thinking: Arendt on Kant…………………………………......171 5.2 A Feminist Theory of Judgment?..............................................................179 5.3 Practices of Freedom vs. Communicative Freedom………………..........189 5.4 Communicating the Harm of Rape………………………………………200 Chapter Six: Loneliness as the Lack of Narrative Agency…………………………..209 6.1 Arendt on Loneliness in Totalitarianism…………………………............211 6.2 Ontological Agency: Agency as Appearance…………………………….218 6.3 Political Agency: Preserving the World of Action……………………….227 6.4 Agency in Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Novels..………………………...232 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………238 References…………………………………………………………………………….247 8 Take the unknowable more seriously than anyone ever has, because most women have died without a trace; but invent the capacity to act, because otherwise women will continue to. - Catharine MacKinnon The conditions of human existence—life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and the earth—can never ‘explain’ what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that they can never condition us absolutely. - Hannah Arendt It’s the people who love us or hate us—or both—who hold together the thousands of fragments we are made of. - Elena Ferrante 9 Introduction In a popular 2009 talk, the Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie relates two anecdotes that illustrate the error involved in reducing other