AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR POLICY AND PRACTICE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR A Dissertation by PAUL JOSEPH SPRINGER Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 2006 Major Subject: History AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR POLICY AND PRACTICE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR A Dissertation by PAUL JOSEPH SPRINGER Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved by: Chair of Committee, Brian M. Linn Committee Members, Joseph G. Dawson, III Jonathan Coopersmith David Vaught James Burk Head of Department, Walter L. Buenger May 2006 Major Subject: History iii ABSTRACT American Prisoner of War Policy and Practice from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror. (May 2006) Paul Joseph Springer, B.S., Texas A&M University; M.A., University of Northern Iowa Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Brian M. Linn American prisoner of war (POW) policy consists of repeated improvisational efforts during wartime followed by few efforts to incorporate lessons learned. As such, in every war, the United States has improvised its system of POW maintenance and utilization. At no time prior to World War II was the United States military prepared to capture and maintain the prisoners taken in any American conflict. The United States has depended upon reciprocal treatment of enemy prisoners and threatened retaliation for mistreatment of American captives in every war. It has also adhered to accepted customs and international law regarding prisoners, providing housing, food, and medical care to POWs at least the equal of that given to American prisoners. However, the U.S. military has often sought the most expedient methods of maintaining prisoners, a practice that has led to accusations of neglect. In the nineteenth century, American wars were typically fought upon the North American continent and were limited in scope, which facilitated the maintenance of enemy prisoners and eased the improvisation of policy and practice. In the twentieth century, the United States participated in conflicts in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, iv complicating POW issues. World War II and subsequent conflicts show a radical departure from earlier wars, as the army planned for the capture of enemy troops and was better prepared to maintain them. However, the War on Terror represents a return to improvisation, as a lack of planning and a failure to follow established policies contributed to allegations of mistreatment in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. v Dedicated to my wife, Victoria, without whom I would have neither the curiosity to research nor the courage to write. vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In any academic endeavor of this magnitude there are intellectual debts too numerous to mention. I am particularly thankful for the guidance provided by Professor Brian M. Linn. At times, he served as editor, motivator, challenger, and confessor. This dissertation would not exist without his tireless hours of work. The committee members complemented and bolstered his comments, and thus I express a special gratitude to Professors Joseph G. Dawson, III, Jonathan Coopersmith, David Vaught, and James Burk. Each fulfilled a special role in the production of this work. Financial support for the project was drawn from many sources, and I thank the History Department of Texas A&M University; the Glasscock Center for Humanities Research; Andersonville National Historic Site; the Society for Military History; and the Memorial Student Center for generous contributions. I received archival assistance of immense value from the respective staffs of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.; Archives II in College Park, Maryland; and Sterling C. Evans Library in College Station, Texas. Emotional support for six years of doctoral study came from uncountable individuals, but I am especially indebted to my fellow graduate students at Texas A&M, who proved to be lifelong friends as well as scholarly colleagues. In particular, Christopher Mortenson always knew the answers to my questions and maintained a steady balance at the most chaotic moments. I only hope I can provide equal service as he nears completion of his dissertation. vii Of course, the greatest support I have received has been the love of my family. No one has been more patient or long-suffering than my wife, Victoria, without whom I would have no reason to write. The credit for this dissertation belongs to each of these individuals, the errors are mine alone. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………....... iii DEDICATION………………………………………………………………... v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…………………………………………………….. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………... viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN POW POLICY AND PRACTICE……………………………………………... 1 II STRUGGLING INTO EXISTENCE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION………………………………………………... 16 III THE FIRST DECLARED WAR: THE WAR OF 1812…….... 46 IV PRISONERS ON FOREIGN SOIL: THE WAR AGAINST MEXICO………………………………………………………. 87 V BROTHER AGAINST BROTHER: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR…………………………………………………... 103 VI AMERICA BECOMES A WORLD POWER, 1865-1919….... 136 VII AMERICA BECOMES A SUPERPOWER: WORLD WAR II………………………………………………………... 168 VIII CONTAINING COMMUNISM: THE COLD WAR………... 203 IX CONCLUSION: POW POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA……………………………………………………. 247 REFERENCES……………………………………………………………….. 266 APPENDIX………………………………………………………………….... 295 VITA…………………………………………………………………………... 300 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN POW POLICY AND PRACTICE For over two centuries, United States prisoner of war (POW) policy has gradually evolved in response to wartime conditions. American planners have typically struggled to react to the capture of enemy troops. In no major conflict has the United States been prepared for the number of enemy prisoners taken. As a result, American treatment of enemy prisoners has often been improvised. World War II and subsequent conflicts show a radical departure from earlier wars, in that the U.S. Army devoted considerable effort to planning and preparation for POW operations. The changing American concept of humanitarian behavior has guided the improvisation of American POW operations. Efforts to remain economically efficient influenced policy, as did reactions to enemy treatment of American POWs. Essentially, the United States has often conceded the initiative to the enemy in regard to POW policy. The U.S. military has failed to incorporate POW lessons from each conflict, and has thus been unprepared for an influx of prisoners in each war. The problems have been compounded by the use of poorly-trained units for guarding and maintaining POWs, and by efforts to conserve resources used for the maintenance of prisoners. Typically the government has exercised little oversight over POW treatment and has turned over control of POWs to offices and organizations that only exist in wartime. In peacetime, the military has made little effort to prepare for POW operations. This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Military History. 2 Policy and practice are intertwined throughout the history of American treatment of POWs. Policy is theoretical; it creates guidelines for practices in the field which may not be applicable to every battlefield situation. It can exist without practice, as in the case of peacetime planning for the capture of prisoners of war or in the development of international law. Examples of policy guidelines include “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” (1863) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929). Practice is grounded in reality, it often does not follow prescribed policies. In the absence of clearly defined policies, practice can essentially replace policy. This was clearly demonstrated during the Mexican War, when generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott both commanded armies that captured enemies without clear directives from the War Department about how to treat Mexican prisoners. At times in American history, policy and practice have come into conflict, when field commanders have deliberately ignored instructions regarding prisoner of war treatment. Few attempts have been made to address the entire history of POW policy within the United States, although hundreds of works have addressed the events of a single war, or the experiences of a single captive. This approach has been misleading when applied to POW policy over time, because many of the authors began with the assumption that POW practices during a single conflict can be explained without the context of earlier and later wars. While standards of treatment have evolved, many of the fundamental 3 decisions regarding the treatment of captured enemies were made over two hundred years ago and the underlying principles of POW treatment remain unaltered. Three principles of American treatment of POWs are consistent from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror. The first principle is depending upon reciprocal standards of POW treatment, including the threat of retaliation upon enemy prisoners for perceived mistreatment of American prisoners. The United States has treated enemy prisoners in each war at least as well as the treatment received by American prisoners. The second principle is a general attempt to adhere to accepted customs and international law regarding war. The third principle is one of general expediency. American treatment