Myths, Old and New Author(s): Norman Finkelstein Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 66-89 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537366 . Accessed: 22/09/2012 03:39 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies. http://www.jstor.org MYTHS, OLD AND NEVV NORMAN FINKELSTEIN In recentyears, a moreor less cohesivebody of work has emergedwhich challengesthe received wisdom on theorigins of theIsraeli-Arab conflict. Variouslylabelled "new history," "revisionist history," or simply"history" (as againstthe "pre" history of an earliergeneration), this scholarship se- verelyqualifies-without, however, roundly dismissing-the standard inter- pretationof the eve, unfolding, and aftermathofthe 1948 war. Its authors, mostlyIsraeli, argue five major points: 1) theZionist movement did noten- thusiasticallyembrace the partitionof Palestine;2) the surroundingArab statesdid not unite as one to destroythe nascent Jewish state; 3) thewar did notpit a relativelydefenseless and weakJewish David againsta relatively strongArab Goliath; 4) Palestine'sArabs did not take flight at thebehest of Araborders; and 5) Israelwas notearnestly seeking peace at thewar's end. In thisessay I wantto focuson thework of Benny Morris, a formerdiplo- maticcorrespondent of the Jerusalem Post who receivedhis doctoratefrom CambridgeUniversity. Morris is the mostinfluential and prolificof the "new"historians.' The centralconcern of his researchis themost passion- atelydisputed chapter of the 1948 war: theflight into exile of Palestine's indigenousArab population. Morris's first study, The Birth of the Palestinian RefugeeProblem, 1947-1949,2 was near-universallyacclaimed as a classic,a modelof scholarlyrigor and detachment.The recentpublication of Birth's companionvolume, 1948 and After: Israel and thePalestinians,3 is an espe- NormanFinkelstein, who receivedhis Ph.D. in PoliticalScience from PrincetonUniversity, currently teaches in NewYork. He is gratefulto Roane Carey,Noam Chomsky, Allan Naim, and FrankSheed for comments on an earlierversion of this article. Journalof Palestine Studies XXI, no. 1 (Autumn1991), pp. 66-89. DEBATE ON THE 1948 EXODUS: FINKEISTEIN 67 ciallypropitious occasion for taking stock of his-and, by extension,the "new"history's-achievement. In Birth,Morris definitively shatters one ofthe most enduring myths about theorigins of the Israeli-Arab conflict- but only to substitute another that is scarcelymore credible in itsplace. The aimof Morris's study is to explainwhy roughly 700,000 Palestinians fledtheir homes in thewake of the November 1947 United Nations General AssemblyResolution supporting the creation of an Araband Jewish state in MandatoryPalestine.4 The book'scentral thesis is thatneither of the stan- dardaccounts of the Palestinians' exodus can withstand close scholarly scru- tiny:the Zionists did not expel them with premeditation, as the Arabs allege, and theinvading Arab states did noturge them to leave,as theZionists al- lege. The truth,as Morrissees it,rather lies "in thevast middle ground" betweenthese two extremes: ThePalestinian refugee problem was bornof war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largelya by-productof Araband Jewishfears of thepro- tracted,bitter fighting that characterised the firstIsraeli-Arab war; in smallerpart, it was thedeliberate creation of Jewishand Arabmilitary commandersand politicians.(1948, p. 88; Birth,p. 286) Morrisfurther asserts that, under the given circumstances-i.e., mutual fear and hostility,war, and so on-the creationof the Palestinian refugee prob- lemwas "almostinevitable." (Birth, p. 286) The resultsof Morris's research thus apparently belie the most damaging Arabclaims5 and exonerateIsrael of any real culpability for the catastrophe thatbefell Palestine's indigenous population in 1948.6 Whilethese conclu- sionswill not satisfy those among Israel's partisans who will accept nothing butArab culpability, they nevertheless substitute a new version of what oc- curredin 1948which as wellrequires judicious analysis. In thisessay I willargue that Morris has substituteda new myth, one of the "happymedian," for the old. Mycontention will be thatthe evidence Morris adducesdoes notsupport his temperateconclusions and thatthe truth lies verymuch closer to the Arab extreme.7 Specifically, I will argue that Morris's centralthesis that the Arab refugee problem was "bornof war, not by de- sign"is beliedby his own evidence which shows that Palestine's Arabs were expelledsystematically and withpremeditation. "Bornof War,Not y Design"? Morrismaintains that the Palestinian Arab refugee problem was "largelya by-productofArab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterisedthe first Israeli-Arab war." Simplyput, it was "bornof war, not bydesign." Yet, in a noteto Birth, Morris suggests a rather significant qualifi- cationof this view: Theworld "expelled" was oftenused rather loosely by Israelis in 1948. It was quiteoften assumed by non-witnessesthat a givencommunity had been expelledwhen in factit had leftbefore Israeli forces arrived. The 68 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES desireto see the Arabsleave oftentriggered the assumptionthat com- manders-whoit was presumedshared this desire-had had toact overtly and directlyto obtainthis result, when this had notbeen the case. Buti denialof the right to return was aform of "expulsion, " then a greatmany villag- ers-whohad waited near their villagesfor the battle to die down before trying to returnhome-can be considered"expellees." (p. 343, note 7; emphasis added) Thus, Morrisagrees that,in at least one crucial sense, "a greatmany" Palestinianrefugees were systematicallyexpelled fromtheir homes. This thenraises the questions of whether the Zionists intended that the Arabs flee fromtheir homes and whetherthey acted in a mannerconsonant with this intention.If the answer to thesetwo questions is also in theaffirmative, then it becomesimpossible to sustainMorris's thesis that the refugee problem was "born of war, not by design." One could maintainthat, given the armed hostilities,the Zionistshad no alternativeexcept to expel the indigenous Arabpopulation; but one could not stillmaintain that the Arab flight was an unintendedor unanticipated"by-product" of the war. Beforeturning to the evidencein thisregard, it is not withoutinterest to considerthe Arab estimateof Zionistintentions on theeve of thewar. Mor- riscites a Britishreport on theconference of Arab prime ministers in Decem- ber 1947, in which the Arab view of Zionistambitions was summarizedas follows: Theultimate aim of all theZionists was "theacquisition of all ofPalestine, all Transjordanand possiblysome tracts in SouthernLebanon and South- ernSyria." The Zionist"politicians," after taking control of thecountry, wouldat firsttreat the Arabs"nicely." But then,once feeling"strong enough,"they would begin "squeezing the Arab population off their lands ... [and]if necessaryout of the State." Later,they would expand the Jewishstate at theexpense of thePalestinian Arab state. However, the mostmilitant Haganah commanders wished to movemore quickly.... Exploitingthe weakness and disorganization ofthe Arabs, they would first renderthem-especially in Jaffaand Haifa-"completelypowerless" and thenfrighten or forcethem into leaving, "their places being taken by Jew- ish immigrants."The Arableaders . thoughtthat there existed a still moreextreme Jewish plan, of the Revisionists, calling for more immediate expansion.(Birth, p. 24) For all the monumentalcorruption and incompetenceof theArab leaders, one cannotbut be impressedby the prescienceof theiranalyses. Curiously, Morrisvirtually admits as much but,in a peculiarturn of phrase,describes these Arab "prognoses" as "in the nature of self-fulfillingprophecies." (Birth,p. 24) If he means thatthe Arabs, by electingto wage war,facilitated theexpulsion, he is no doubtcorrect. Yet, this in no way belies thefact that it was an expulsion. The Arab flightfrom Palestine divides into basicallytwo stages,the first coveringthe period from the 29 November1947 UN GeneralAssembly reso- lutionto the Israeli independencedeclaration in May 1948, and the second DEBATE ON THE 1948 EXODUS: FINKEISTEIN 69 coveringthe period fromJune 1948 to the signingof the armisticeagree- mentsin mid-1949. I will deal witheach of thesestages in turn. November1947-May 1948 For the period precedingIsrael's birth,Morris focuses primarily on the monthsApril and May. Morris'scentral conclusion reads as follows: The mainwave of the Arab exodus, encompassing 200,000-300,000 refu- gees,was notthe result of a general,predetermined Yishuv policy. The Arabexodus of April-May caught the Yishuv leadership, including the au- thorsof Plan D, bysurprise, though it was immediately seen as a phenome- nonto be exploited.(Birth, p. 128) This conclusionincorporates