Soldierly Virtue: An argument for the restructuring of Western military ethics to align with Aristotelian Virtue Ethics John Doyle Baldari Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Leeds Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science September, 2018 The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. The right of John Doyle Baldari to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. © 2018, The University of Leeds and John Doyle Baldari ii Acknowledgements The journey to this end has followed many paths and passed through many hands. I am deeply indebted to the many people who have supported me throughout this effort. To my ever-patient supervisor, Dr Jamie Dow, I say thank you for your support and patience. You cannot know how deeply I appreciate you giving me this opportunity. To Professor Chris Williams, who set me on this path. I am, in retrospect, cognisantly aware of how much effort you put into my success. Thank you, I could not have done this without your support and patience. To Professor Christopher Megone. We most certainly have had our differences, but I will never forget that you gave me this chance. For that, I am truly grateful. To Professors Helen Stewart and Gerald Lang, whose kindness and support ensured I received an academic position and a future in philosophy. To Professor James Connelly for agreeing to examine this effort, and whose interest in my work was much appreciated both past and present. To the many friends and colleagues I have worked with and enjoyed the time of at the University Of Leeds School Of PRHS. I am especially indebted to the friendship of Thomas Brouwer, Marc Cole, Adina Covaci, John Fernley, Jade Fletcher, Will Gamester, Christina Nick, Andrew Stanners, Sam Symons, Nick Tasker, & Alison Toop. To my dear friend, John Nowakowski, Esq. for telling me I couldn’t do it. To my beautiful wife, Sandra, for putting up with moving halfway around the world so I could pursue this goal. Without her continuous and unfaltering support, I would never have made even my first year. To my amazing daughter, Jasmine, for being perfect in every way. To everyone who has passed on encouragement, sought my advice, enjoyed my company or allowed me to enjoy theirs, or otherwise travelled alongside me during this journey, my thanks! iii Abstract Because wars are fought by human beings and not merely machines, a strong virtue ethic is an essential prerequisite for those engaged in combat. From a philosophical perspective, war has historically been seen as separate and outside of the commonly accepted forms of morality. Yet there remains a general, though not well-thought out, sense that those human beings who fight wars should act ethically. Since warfighters are often called upon to contemplate and complete tasks during war that are not normally required of non-warfighters (civilians), and it is believed these warfighters should act ethically, it becomes necessary to ask: What does soldierly virtue look like? In order to answer this question, I will examine essential elements of moral responsibility and military authority. Once complete, I will propose an Aristotelian- based virtue ethics system, one that is equally valuable to warfighter and civilian. To do this, I will examine the conversation in academia regarding virtue ethics and the foundations of virtue. I will provide both a cursory and deep reading of elements of Aristotle’s conception of virtue, but ultimately I will provide a slightly more rigorous reading and reinterpretation of an Aristotelian-based virtue ethic, with a definitive final recommendation for this interpretation being best for everyone, in war or walking down the street. Upon completing a study of this work, one will walk away with a next- generation interpretation of Aristotelian-based Virtue Ethics that denies eudaimonia as the central principle, relying instead on phronesis as its central theme. Phronesis, when properly developed in the warfighter will lead to moral responsibility, better decision-making, and a seamless re-integration into civilian life once has returned from the horrors of war. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………...iii Abstract………………………….……………………………………………………………iv Chapter 1. Soldierly Virtue…………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 2. Why Moral Deference Fails…………………………………………………22 Chapter 3. Military Authority……………………………………………………………..57 Chapter 4. Interpreting Aristotle’s Account of Virtue in the NE…………………...68 Chapter 5. Phronesis…………………………………………………….……………….109 Chapter 6. The Stoic Account of Virtue in Nancy Sherman’s Stoic Warriors.…148 Chapter 7. What is Soldierly Virtue?......................................................................169 Appendix I. Just War Theory……………………………………………………………172 Appendix II. Moral Intuitions……………………………………………………………175 Appendix III. Educational Deference…………………………………………………..180 Appendix IV. Doxastic Voluntarism……………………………………………………181 References…………………………………………………………………………………183 v Chapter 1 Soldierly Virtue Because wars are fought by human beings and not merely machines, a strong virtue ethic is an essential prerequisite for those engaged in combat. From a philosophical perspective, war has historically been seen as separate and outside of the commonly accepted forms of morality (Sun Tzu, 500BCE, Thucydides, 395BCE, Machiavelli, 1532, Clausewitz, 1832, Mavrodes, 1975). Yet there remains a general, though not always well-thought out, sense that those human beings who fight wars (hereafter called “warfighters”) should act ethically (McMahan, 2004, 693-733). Since soldiers (warfighters) are often called upon to contemplate and complete tasks during war that are not normally required of non- warfighters (civilians), and it is believed these warfighters should act ethically, it becomes necessary to ask: What does soldierly virtue look like? In order to answer this question, I will examine essential elements of moral responsibility and military authority. Once complete, I will propose an Aristotelian- based virtue ethics system, one that is equally valuable to warfighter and civilian. To do this, I will examine the conversation in academia regarding virtue ethics and the foundations of virtue. I will provide both a cursory and deep reading of elements of Aristotle’s conception of virtue, but ultimately I will provide a slightly more rigorous reading and reinterpretation of an Aristotelian-based virtue ethic, with a definitive final recommendation for this interpretation being best for everyone, in war or walking down the street. My understanding of virtue ethics is keenly dependent on an analysis of Aristotle’s concept of phronesis1 and emphasises the necessity to minimize moral deference in order to underscore moral responsibility. Ultimately, my conception of virtue ethics claims that ethical character is 1) rational moral excellence 2) developed through tutored habituation and the concurrent development of 2 phronesis and 3) leads one to become a virtuous politikos. 1 A few common translations include “practical wisdom” or “prudence”, but I will avoid using these philosophically weighted translations and instead define phronesis specifically as it applies to virtue, using the Romanized Greek word to avoid confusion. 2 A few common translations might be “politician”, “societal leader”, or “one who participates in civil life”. I will be using the concept of politikos because Aristotle connects it to the virtuous exemplar. The politikos participates in civil life exhibiting politike using politike techne. 1 In order to assist my interlocutor’s navigation of this work, I will provide a map of the arguments as they are presented here. Initially, I will provide a detailed critique of moral deference as the default moral methodology in military ethics. This critique will claim that the act of taking responsibility for one’s actions is paramount to ethical action. I will follow that argument with an examination of military authority with some commentary on what aspects of military authority are valuable and what can be improved upon. This will lead to a conversation about Aristotelian ethics, beginning with a general look at the concept in brief, followed by a deep reading of the most important elements as laid out by Sarah Broadie. That examination is followed by a few common counter-arguments versus Aristotle’s ethics, with the common responses. This is to establish a starting point for later arguments and place those arguments within the academic debate. The next chapter contains the core of my arguments regarding the centricity of phronesis in a virtue approach. I will introduce Aristotle’s conception, followed by a careful examination of John McDowell’s deeper analysis, and finishing with the core arguments for this work where I develop phronesis and define a slightly modified ethical system based on Aristotle’s grand idea. Finally, I will critique the conception of Stoic virtue ethics as a possible soldierly virtue, ultimately showing the superiority of the Aristotelian approach to the Stoic. This chapter in particular will provide a quick overview of my argument