Illocutionary logic and normative pragmatics: a different approach Berislav Zarniˇ c´ University of Split Dubrovnik 2012 Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 1 / 32 Russell on the purposes of langauge 3+? purposes Three actors on the stage: Language serves three purposes: (1) to indicate facts, 1 the speaker (expresses himself), (2) to express the state of the 2 the hearer (subject to alteration of his speaker, (3) to alter the state of psychological state), the hearer. These three 3 the world (inert). purposes are not always all It was one of the great discoveries of present. contemporary philosophy to notice that the Bertrand Russell. world is not an inert element in the play. An inquiry into meaning Russell’s dictum needs an Austinian and truth. amendment: Routledge, London, 1995. 4 Language serves four purposes . (4) to The William James change the social world. lectures for 1940 delivered at Harvard University. First published in 1950. Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 2 / 32 A social fact is conceived as a kind of collective intentionality that projected from normative source to individual minds. As it was famously put, social facts “consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him” (Durkheim). Let us try to extract the elements from this model: normative source Ps (external “manners of acting, thinking and feeling”) requires of individual i to conform to it; what possibly gets realized (“control” success). Our translation for Durkheim’s definition: P requires conformation from i iff Requires(P , i, ') iff s J s ' 2 Ps (i) and i 2 s iff ', where Ps (i) is union of mental Ps J states and acts ' having a deontic value (forbidden, obligatory, or permitted). According to the definition a social fact can be described by the schema: ‘[deontic operator][intentionality or action operator][proposition]’ E.g. O i stit : ' represents social fact that i’s action of seeing it that ' has deontic value of obligation; P i : \'00 for social fact that i’s utterance of string \'00 is permitted; FBi' for social fact that i’s believing that ' is forbidden. Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 3 / 32 Words that can change the world It may seem tha t that deontic states of affairs can be changed only by specific speech acts, Example namely those having world to word direction of 1 (directive: request) Please fit. According to classification given by Searle do not do it! and Vanderveken [1] there are five types of 2 (commissive: promise) I “illocutionary points”: assertive, commissive, will come. directive, declarative, and expressive point. 3 (directive: permissive) You Three of these have world-to-word direction of may come. fit: 4 (directive: suggestion) It 1 “The commissive point is to commit the might be good to go there. speaker to doing something.” 5 (declarative for 1) I request 2 “The directive point is to try to get other that you do not do it . people to do things. ” 6 (declarative for 2) I 3 “The declarative point is to change the promise to come. world by saying so. ” Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 4 / 32 Do only "-speech acts change social reality? Thesis Any speech act can change some deontic Sellars principle state of affairs. What, then does it mean to say It is probably the type of action whose deontic of one sentence, B, that it is status is being changed that makes us derivable from another, A? overlook this universal deontic power of Roughly, that it is permissible speech acts. Indeed there are acts whose to assert B, given that one has deontic status cannot be changed by speech asserted A, whereas it is not acts having solely word-to-world direction of fit permissible to assert not-B, (assertives) or lacking any direction of fit given that one has asserted A. (expressives): the deontic status of acts from Wilfrid Sellars. non-speech category is not subjected to Inference and meaning. change by a speech act that does not have Mind, 62(247):313–338, world-to-word direction of fit. On the other 1953. hand, the deontic status of any speech act can by altered by some speech act. Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 5 / 32 An example Example Let: Pi says to j: “Open the window!” K Q1 j opens the window. [i : \'"] Q2 i prevents the window from being opened by j. stand for sentence form: (i) change in the deontic status of non-linguistic acts After i utters [P](O Q1 ^ F Q2) sentence ', state R1 i says to j: “It is impossible to open the acquires deontic window.” status J R2 i says to j: “You are not allowed to open the 2 fO, P, Fg. window.” Letters O, P, F stand (ii) change in the deontic status of linguistic acts for ‘obligatory’, [P]F(R _ R ) ‘permitted’ and 1 2 ‘forbidden’. Ad (i) It is assumed that j is subordinated to i’s authority and that no conflicting requirement is in force. Ad (ii) It is assumed that i did not change his mind, i.e., no retractive act is performed by uttering R1 and R2. Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 6 / 32 A possible objection An objection can be raised against the deontic power of speech acts. If the communication is not cooperative, the objection goes, then no commitments will arise either for the speaker or the hearer. The objection can be easily refuted. ‘If something is obligatory, then it is the case’ (0 O' ! ') is not an axiom of deontic logic. The language use is subjected to normative requirements but it need not conform to them. Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 7 / 32 Parallelism between normative and logical structure There is a remarkable feature of deontic changes accompanying language use: the structure of linguistic commitments Robert B. Brandom. (speech act commitments) is parallel to Making It Explicit: Reasoning, the logic of sentences being used. Representing, and Discursive Probably, this great discovery can be Commitment. 1994. attributed to Sellars. J.R. Searle and Robert Brandom (1994) has worked out a D. Vanderveken. grandiose philosophical theory which Foundations of Illocutionary takes the dynamics of deontic dimension Logic. 1985. of language use as the basic Douglas N. Walton and phenomenon. He has summarized the Erik C. Krabbe. theory as “normative pragmatics” (using Commitment in Dialogue: language means shaping social deontic Basic Concepts of reality) and “inferential semantics” Interpersonal Reasoning. (“discursive commitments are 1995. distinguished by their . inferential articulation”) . Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 8 / 32 Psychological or social sources? Normative struc- Logical structure Logical structure ture of communi- of language of intentionality cation Searle- Vanderveken Brandom Logical structu- ralism Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 9 / 32 A different approach I will argue that there is a third theoretical possibility to understand the logical structure of Brandom’s division of speech act commitments and entitlements: possible stances It is not identical to a normative discursive The difference lies in whether social reality (“constellations of the locus of authority and of commitments and entitlements on the part commitment is viewed as of various interlocutors”). internal and psychological or It is not a manifestation of (horizontal) as constituted by public social rationality of the underlying psychological practice. structure expressed in speech-acts. Robert Brandom. Instead—the logical structure of language Asserting. Nousˆ , is the fundamental, irreducible structure. 17(4):637–650, 1983. Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 10 / 32 Illocutionary logic and it psychological base Searle and Vanderveken (1985) have developed an elaborated system for capturing the logic of speech acts. I Speech act can be decomposed into two components: illocutionary force F and propositional content P. Illocutionary force is determined by seven parameters: (i) illocutionary point P (which can be assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, or expressive), (ii) degree of strength of the illocutionary point k, (iii) mode of achievement of the illocutionary point µ, (iv) propositional content conditions θ, (v) preparatory conditions S, (vi) sincerity conditions Y, (vii) degree of strength of the sincerity conditions η. I It is assumed that within a given illocutionary point each illocutionary force is constructible from the primitive force by modification of some of its components. E.g., the directive force is the primitive force within the directive point; modification of its mode of achievement to polite mode results with the request force; the force of asking yes no question results from modification of the propositional content conditions of the request force to those propositions whose truth conditions are that the hearer performs a specific speech act. Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 11 / 32 Two types of commitment transmission There are relations of commitment transfer (preservation, inheritance) between speech acts. Searle and Vanderveken analyze two kinds of commitment preservations: 1 Illocutionary entailment or commitment preservation within the same illocutionary point P over the same propositional content P: P P F1 (P) B F2 (P). 2 Pk Commitment transfer from a speech act F1 (P) with illocutionary point P over the content P to another illocutionary point P∗ over the content Q: ∗ Pk Pk F1 (P) B F2 (Q). Berislav Zarniˇ c´ (University of Split) A different approach Dubrovnik 2012 12 / 32 Commitment inheritance within illocutionary point 2.3 A completeness theorem.