GAZA’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS Middle East Report N°85 – 23 April 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. WAR IN GAZA ................................................................................................................. 1 A. THE WAR’S TOLL ........................................................................................................................1 B. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ............................................................................................................6 C. THE POLITICS OF AID...................................................................................................................8 D. THE QUESTION OF HAMAS DIVISIONS – AGAIN..........................................................................11 II. FALLOUT IN THE WEST BANK................................................................................ 13 A. JUDGING THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ....................................................................................13 B. JUDGING FATAH.........................................................................................................................16 III. ISRAEL AND THE WAR .............................................................................................. 18 A. ASSESSING THE OUTCOME .........................................................................................................18 B. ELECTIONS: A JOLT TO THE RIGHT.............................................................................................21 C. WHAT MIGHT THE NEW GOVERNMENT DO?..............................................................................22 IV. THE WAR’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS...................................................................... 27 A. CEASEFIRE.................................................................................................................................27 B. RECONSTRUCTION .....................................................................................................................28 C. PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION..................................................................................................31 1. Government................................................................................................................................34 2. Elections.....................................................................................................................................34 3. Security reform ..........................................................................................................................34 4. PLO reform ................................................................................................................................35 5. Reconciliation ............................................................................................................................35 V. THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE PARTIES .......................................................................... 36 A. EGYPT .......................................................................................................................................36 1. Background................................................................................................................................36 2. Egypt, Hamas and the war .........................................................................................................38 3. The Sinai question......................................................................................................................40 4. The regional cold war ................................................................................................................42 B. THE UNITED STATES..................................................................................................................45 C. THE EUROPEAN UNION ..............................................................................................................46 VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT?................................................................................... 47 APPENDICES A. MAP OF GAZA STRIP........................................................................................................................50 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................51 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ............................52 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................54 Middle East Report N°85 23 April 2009 GAZA’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Israel-Hamas war has ended but none of the fac- The deadlock has many explanations, but a principal tors that triggered it have been addressed. Three months one is reluctance by the Ramallah-based Palestinian after unilateral ceasefires, Gaza’s crossings are largely Authority (PA), the U.S. and Israel to grant Hamas shut; reconstruction and rehabilitation have yet to begin; anything resembling a reward for provoking the war. rockets periodically are fired into Israel; weapons That is understandable but makes sense only if one smuggling persists; Corporal Shalit remains captive; believes the previous policy of seeking to weaken and Palestinians are deeply divided. It is not as if the Hamas by isolating it and to bolster Abbas by focus- war changed nothing. Many hundreds lost their lives, ing on the West Bank worked. It did not, and the cor- tens of thousands their livelihood and a new political rection of misguided policies should not be mistaken landscape has emerged. But the war changed nothing for weakness or pointless concessions. The challenge for the better. The status quo is unsustainable, and Gaza is not humanitarian – though opening Gaza to commerce once again is an explosion waiting to happen. Genu- would do wonders for its people. It is, as it has always ine Palestinian reconciliation and a fully satisfactory been, political, so political choices – about how to arrangement in Gaza may not be on the cards, but lesser deal with Gaza, Hamas and the possibility of a new steps may be feasible to lessen the risk of escalation, Palestinian government – will have to be made. address Gaza’s most pressing needs and achieve some inter-Palestinian understanding. That would take far The formula for a ceasefire has always been straight- greater flexibility from local actors – and far greater forward. Hamas must stop firing rockets and stop others political courage from outside ones. from doing the same, while Israel must lift the block- ade. A prisoner exchange also is overdue, but Israel’s There is good reason for concern. If the siege is not insistence that it be part of a ceasefire package com- lifted, Hamas risks launching large-scale attacks. If plicated both matters and made resolution of neither weapons transfers are not halted and rocket fire per- more likely. Breaking this linkage will be politically sists, Israel could mount a new offensive. Without some costly for Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s new prime form of Palestinian understanding, the international minister, who will be loath to appear softer on Hamas community is unlikely to permit Gaza’s recovery for than his predecessor. But it is essential, as the U.S. fear it will benefit Hamas. As tensions surrounding and Israel’s other allies must make plain. Evidence from Gaza persist, the regional cold war could heat up. Gaza suggests anger is rising, as residents realise their Without a stable ceasefire and broadly representative conditions are not about to improve. Some might Palestinian leadership, prospects for peace – already hope they will turn their anger toward Hamas. More made difficult by the nature of the new Israeli govern- likely, Hamas will turn its anger toward Israel. ment – will prove more elusive still. On reconstruction, if a middle ground cannot be found In the conflict’s immediate aftermath, many in the region between Hamas’s insistence on being involved and and further afield seemed at last to comprehend these much of the donor community’s desire to bypass it, and stakes. Egypt mediated between Israel and Hamas for if Israel is not persuaded to open the crossings, lofty a more specific and clear ceasefire. In Sharm al-Sheikh, commitments will remain essentially theoretical. Here, donors pledged vast amounts of money to help rebuild too, is need for collective compromise. The Islamists Gaza. Prodded by the same Western countries that control the situation on the ground for access, security, in 2007 had pulled the rug from underneath the last land use and construction permits. They thus should unity government, Palestinians discussed a new Fatah- not fear a mechanism directed by others – whether the Hamas understanding. Yet, with time elapsing and no PA or some other entity – as long as they are con- results in sight, urgency has given way to complacency sulted. Likewise, donors and the PA must accept that and complacency to neglect. The result is that Gaza if reconstruction is contingent on barring all contact once again is an explosion waiting to happen. with Hamas and denying it all credit for the recovery, Gaza’s Unfinished Business Crisis Group Middle East Report N°85, 23 April 2009 Page ii it is better not to think of it at all. And while Israel has the price for international legitimacy, insists that it must. legitimate security concerns about Hamas