AFTER MECCA: ENGAGING HAMAS Middle East Report N°62 – 28 February 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................i I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 II. THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY................................................................2 A. HAMAS AND GOVERNANCE...................................................................................................2 1. Budget constraints and social crisis...........................................................................2 2. Resilience...................................................................................................................4 3. Public sector rebellion ...............................................................................................7 4. Society and culture ....................................................................................................8 B. HAMAS AND SECURITY .........................................................................................................9 1. Lawlessness ...............................................................................................................9 2. The executive support force and the security sector................................................11 3. Internecine battles....................................................................................................13 III. THE MECCA AGREEMENT.....................................................................................16 A. THE ROAD TO MECCA.........................................................................................................16 B. AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE ON WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED ................................................18 C. INITIAL INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES ..................................................................................21 IV. INSIDE HAMAS ...........................................................................................................24 A. HAMAS VERSUS HAMAS? ...................................................................................................24 B. HAS PRESSURE WORKED? ..................................................................................................27 1. Hamas and the Palestinian public............................................................................28 2. Hamas and Israel .....................................................................................................29 V. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD..................................................................31 A. THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ...........................................................................................32 1. Restoring law and order...........................................................................................32 2. Power sharing ..........................................................................................................32 3. Relations with Israel ................................................................................................33 B. ISRAEL................................................................................................................................33 C. THE QUARTET AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS .........................................................33 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES .................................................................................35 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................36 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ........37 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................39 Middle East Report N°62 28 February 2007 AFTER MECCA: ENGAGING HAMAS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS It has been a year since Hamas formed its government – have gone down the drain. Western commitment to and what a dismal year it has been. The Islamists democracy in the Middle East has been roundly thought they could govern without paying an discredited. Hamas, weakened but still strong, is not ideological price, Fatah that it could swiftly push going away. Diplomacy has been non-existent, them aside and regain power. By imposing sanctions violence between Israelis and Palestinians continues, and boycotting the government, the Quartet (U.S., and there has been no movement on prisoner European Union (EU), Russia and UN) and Israel exchanges. By almost every conceivable standard – hoped to force Hamas to change or persuade the governance, security, economics, institution-building Palestinians to oust it. Washington promised security and the peace process – there has been only and economic aid to encourage Fatah to confront regression. Hamas and help defeat it. The illusions have brought only grief. The 8 February 2007 Saudi-brokered The Mecca Agreement and the prospect it offers for a Mecca Agreement between the Palestinian rivals national unity government represent a chance to arrest offers the chance of a fresh start: for Hamas and Fatah the catastrophic slide toward civil war. The accord to restore law and order and rein in militias; for reflects basic conclusions reached by Hamas and Israelis and Palestinians to establish a comprehensive Fatah: that neither can defeat the other; the public was ceasefire and start a credible peace process; and for turning against both; and continued strife could the Quartet (or at least those of its members inclined rapidly spin out of control. The opportunity is fragile: to do so) to adopt a more pragmatic attitude that the two movements will have to show far more judges a government of national unity by deeds, not political flexibility and humility than either has rhetoric. The adjustment will not be comfortable for evinced to date; tackle issues (Hamas’s integration anyone. But the alternative is much worse. into the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the militias’ integration into the security services) the That Palestinians have wasted the past twelve months accord barely mentions; and find ways to suppress is difficult to contest. Treated as an international deep resentment and a thirst for revenge experienced outcast and an intruder by much of the Fatah-aligned by many families and clans throughout the occupied civil service and security forces, Hamas has been territories. unable to govern. It has survived, and under these conditions survival is an impressive achievement. But International responsibility is equally heavy. The it arguably is the only one. Fatah, obsessed with Quartet’s first reaction has been cautious. The recovering power, has done virtually nothing to agreement does not embrace the three Quartet restore popular credibility and reform itself. Its conditions for resumption of aid and diplomatic periodic threats to call early elections or a referendum contact: the new government will “respect” past to unseat the Islamists exacerbated tensions without Israeli-Palestinian accords, not abide by them; it will offering a way out of the stalemate. Palestinian not recognise Israel; and it has not renounced violence Authority (PA) institutions are collapsing, law and – yet another reminder of how little a year of pressure order vanishing; relations between Hamas and Fatah and sanctions has extracted from Hamas. But what deteriorated to near civil war. really matters is whether it will agree to and impose a mutual cease-fire; deal with Israel on day-to-day Israel and the Quartet also squandered the year. matters; acquiesce in negotiations between President Sanctions did not achieve their objectives. The EU – Abbas, as leader of the PLO, and Israel; and, if a justifiably reluctant to starve the Palestinian people – permanent status agreement were reached, allow it to pumped more money into the PA but more be put to a popular referendum and pledge to honour ineffectively and less transparently. Years of its results. investment in now decrepit Palestinian institutions After Mecca: Engaging Hamas Crisis Group Middle East Report N°62, 28 February 2007 Page ii Those standards should now apply to a government of (a) political negotiations with Israel are the national unity. The political and economic boycott preserve of the PLO chairman; should immediately be eased to allow discussions (b) any agreement produced by such with the government as a whole and give Hamas an negotiations will be submitted to a incentive to further moderate its stance; over time – referendum; and based on PA performance, including release of Corporal Shalit in a prisoner exchange and adherence (c) the movement will respect the outcome to a ceasefire – sanctions should be lifted in a of such a referendum. calibrated manner. This is a course the U.S., politically and legally hamstrung, is unlikely to take. To the Palestinian National Liberation But it is one that Arab states and other Quartet Movement (Fatah) and the PA Presidency: members, principally the EU, should embrace. Maintaining sanctions and shunning a government 3. Activate the Palestinian National Security expected to comprise some of the most pragmatic Council, with the participation of all relevant Palestinians would not bring the international officials, agencies and political organisations, community any closer to its goals. It would strengthen as the supreme arbiter of security policy. hardliners in Hamas, discredit Fatah further