CHAPTER 10 / How Properties Hold Together in Substances Essays in the Philosophy TOSEPH E. EARLEY, SR. of Chemistry 1 What Has Chemistry to Do with Philosophy? Edited by ERIC SCERRI AND GRANT FISHER A main aim of chemical research is to understand how the characteristicproper­ ties of specificchemical substances relate to the composition and to the strnctureof OXFORD those materials.Such investigations assume a broad consensus regarding basic UNIVERSITY PRESS aspects of chemistry. Philosophers generally regard widespread agreement on basic.principles as a remote goal, not something already achieved. They do not agree on how properties stay together in ordinary objects. Some follow John Locke [1632-1704] and maintain that properties of entitiesinhere in substrates.The item that this approach considers to underlie characteristicsis often called "a bare Introduction particular"(Sider 2006). However, others reject this understandingand hold that 7 substances are bundles of properties-an approach advocated by David Hume ERIC SCERRI AND GRANT FISHER [r7rr-1776J. Some supporters of Hume's theory hold that entities are collec­ tions of"tropes" (property-instances) held together in a "compresence relation­ ship" (Simons 1994). Recentlyseveral authors have pointed out the importance of "structures"for the coherenceof substances, but serious questionshave been raised about those proposals. Philosophers generally use a time-independent The chapter by Joseph E. Earley Sr. (chap. 10) can only be described as a tour (synchronic} approach and do not consider how chemists understand proper­ de forcein every sense of the term. Earley's writing, perhaps more thanthat of ties of chemical substances and of dynamic networks of chemical reactions. any other currently activeauthor, displays a complete mastery of both the phil­ This chapter aims to clarify how current chemical understanding relates to osophical and the chemical literature. Nothing that could be said briefly here aspects of contemporary philosophy. The first section introduces philosophical would do justice to his essay, which ranges across a diverse set of topics in­ debates, the second considers properties of chemical systems, the third part cluding the nature of substance, properties and relations, bundles, molecular deals with theories of wholes and parts, the fourth segment argues that closure properties, onticity, wholes and parts and much more. grounds properties of coherences, the fifthsection introduces structural realism (SR}, thesixth partconsiders contextual emergenceand concludes that dynamic structures of processes may qualify as determinants ("causes") of specific out­ comes, and the final sectionsuggests that ordinary items are based on closure of relationships among constituents additionally determined by selection for integrationinto more-extensive coherences. \ individ ily asserted concerning an considered that whatever can be Substances Russell (attribute) of that particular. Hila 1.1 whatsoever) is a property ual (any predicate broad understand that philosophers who use such Ruth Garrett Millikan discussed the concept of substance in philosophy: Putnam (1969) pointed out would that use of narrower properrconce?ts often run into difficulties properties . ings those Substances are whatever one can learn from given only one or a few encoun conceded real existence only to avoid. D. H. Mellor (2006) and argued ters, various skills or information that will appiy to other encounters,. Further, in causal laws science discovers to be involved and relations that not exist— this possibility must be grounded in some kind of natural necessity,.. .The func properties (including redness) do that many generallyaccePt them. tion of a substance concept is to make possible this sort of learning and use of dealt with without recognizing any causal rerlarity can be knowledge for a specific substance, because of property which was described generally use a restricted notion (MILUKAN 2000,33) Chemists Peirce 1839_i9i4j_that is, and philosopher Charles S. by American chemist specified operation (CP behaves, or would behave, in a Substances necessarily persist through time and thus are distinguished from a prope is how a thing what effects, Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim: “Consider events. Chemists, however, define chemical substances as materials of con 8.o8).’ This usage exemplifies of our bearings, we conceive the object stant composition and definite properties—and also consider all systems to might conceivably have practical that these effects is the whole of our composed of smaller hold that macroscopic samples are made Then our conception of be items. They conception to have. practice of chemists 5.402). We follow the usual up of molecules and that molecules have atomic nuclei and electrons as com conception of the object” (CP of property. ponents. All of these bits are in incessant motion, and in continual interac and use Peirce’s concept (including pow or Peirce’s property-concePts tion with other items. The long-term stability of composite chemical entities Properties filling either Mellor’s prop affordances) are classed as dispositional implies that internal motions are somehow constrained so that the composites capacitieS rnlnerabilities, and ers, designated as categorial or substantive retain integrity over time and through interaction. Paul Weiss described this NondispOsiti0n properties are erties. from stntctu rat properties situation in terms of the philosophers’ concept of substance: properties are distinguished properties. Intrinsic involve two or more on relationship(s). Relations features of entities that depend can be hold whatever it contains, pro (polyadic) relations Each actuality is a substance. It maintains a on retata. Some claim that many-place individuals as argued that un’m duces, and intrudes upon. It persists and it acts. It has an irreducible, indepen (monadic) properties. But Russell reduced to single-place monadic properties. an reduced to dent core, and receives determinaons from insistent, intrusive forces... If such as greater than cannot be metrical relations problems could be under actuality were not a substance, its parts would not belong to it, and it would dis centu’r some held that all In the mid twentieth with intrinsic perse itself in the very act of making its presence evident. The very items which entities (elementa particles) stood in terms of noncomPo5ite derives continue apparentlyintrmflsic prope it dominates, it would not control; nor would it 10 be despite an involve alternative view is that every properties. An mass of the proton ment in change and motion. It would be inert and solely in itself or it would be extensive components—as the from interaction of less not from a mere event. In either case, it would not be a source of action. its three component quarks, arises from the combination of (WEIss t959, 109) mainly Hoffmann, Katz, et al. (Dun, Fodor, ison,Hoelbliflg, their intrinsic masses and stt,cthral intrinsic properties are prima The well-established dynamic aspect of nature requires attention to how prop zooS). On the former view, properties the alternative basis structural er-ties of chemical entities are maintained through time, and how they maintain (relational) properties secondary: on integrity during interaction. Failure to consider factors involving time (use of are fundamental. synchronic rather than diachronic approaches) is not acceptable (Humphrys SubstanceAttribute Approach 2008, ‘997; Earley 2o12b). 1.3 AlternativeS to the round the “All modern philosophy hinges Alfred North Whitehead held that: 1.2 and predicate substance Properties and Relations the world in terms of subject difficulty of describing Whitehead rejected universal” (Whitehead 1978,49). Natural human languages funchon as f all items fall into one or the other of and quality, particular and termed ‘ac asserted: “Actual entities’—also two great classes: subjects (substances, particulars, or individuals) and predi Locke’s category of substance and which the world is made up” (18). cates (attributes or universals—including properties and relations). Aristotle’s the final real things of tual occasions—are of actual occasions. all of a single sort_self-creation early definition: “A substance. is that which is neither said of a subject nor (is] Process for Whitehead is in a subject” (Categories 13—14), Barnes 1984, is similar to Bertrand , (, 4) Russell’s characterization: “An ‘individual’ is anything that can be the subject of Charlei Sanders electronic version of The Collected Papers • Paragraph zo8 of volume $ of the of an atomic proposition” (Russell’s “Introduction” in Whitehead and Russell will fol1o this style. Pierce. F uer citations to this work 1970, xix). SUBSTANcES 201 HOLD TOGETHER IN HOW PRoPERTIES 200 Metaphysical Issues ‘Actual entities perish, but do not change; they are what they are” Actual merely bundles of properties. Not only must a being be some way or other. it is OCCasions are not substances_they (35). come to be and, in so doing, by ways of being. Donald perish. exhausted W Mertz (1996, 2003) avoids the substance-prope distinction in a different way. Mertz’s “Instance Ontology” holds that an object (such as Alpha) “is a unified, persisting, indepen operates with a single ontological Robb category—called property instance, state of dent being” (468) but does not examine the basis of such unity, persistence, affairs, or fact of relationship By recognition ofintensiontypes (universals), and independence. Although lie considers that