Document generated on 09/29/2021 12:53 a.m. Atlantis Critical Studies in Gender, Culture & Social Justice Études critiques sur le genre, la culture, et la justice The Benefits and Burdens of Engaging in Argumentation: Trans*feminist Reflections on Tuvel’s “In Defense of Transracialism” Stephanie Kapusta Volume 39, Number 2, 2018 Article abstract After considering some ways of assessing argumentation, I present an ethical URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1064073ar assessment of Tuvel's argument in her article “In Defense of Transracialism.” DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1064073ar My claim is that some transgender women engaging with Tuvel are exposed to certain kinds of injustice associated with argumentational work, namely, See table of contents disproportionate burdens and risk of psychological harm. Publisher(s) Mount Saint Vincent University ISSN 1715-0698 (digital) Explore this journal Cite this article Kapusta, S. (2018). The Benefits and Burdens of Engaging in Argumentation: Trans*feminist Reflections on Tuvel’s “In Defense of Transracialism”. Atlantis, 39(2), 61–73. https://doi.org/10.7202/1064073ar All Rights Reserved © Mount Saint Vincent University, 2018 This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research. https://www.erudit.org/en/ Special Section: Research The Benefits and Burdens ofEngaging in Argumentation: Trans*feminist Reflections on Tuvel’s “In Defense ofTransracialism” Stephanie Kapusta is a Visiting Assistant Professor he Hypatia controversy surrounding Rebecca in the philosophy department, and Interim Coordin- TTuvel’s article “In Defence of Transracialism” eli- ator of the Law, Justice and Society Program in the cited a flurry of responses on social media and in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Dalhousie Uni- press (Bettcher 2017a; Dutta 2017; Oliver 2017; versity, Nova Scotia. Her principal research interests Schuessler 2017; Singal 2017; Winnubst 2017). In lie in feminist philosophy, and social and political her article, Tuvel defended a rather strict analogy philosophy, with an emphasis on trans* studies. She between gender transition and “transition to another has published, among other pieces, articles on mis- race” (Tuvel 2017a, 272). Many scholars have denied gendering in Hypatia ("Misgendering and its Moral the validity of that analogy, either on philosophical Contestability") and on the indeterminacy of sex grounds or sociological ones (for example see Borck predicates in Topoi ("Imposing Sex Predicate Inde- 2017; Sealey 2018). Despite the fact that a whole terminacy"). She has also written a forthcoming philosophy journal issue has been dedicated to the entry in the International Encyclopedia of Ethics controversy (Philosophy Today 2018, 62.1), both in (Wiley) on “Transgender Rights,” and a soon-to-ap- journal articles and on social media there has been re- pear article in the Australasian Philosophical Review latively little philosophical assessment of the trans-ex- on “The Social Practise of Cognitive Estrangement.” clusionary implications of the content and method of Stephanie gave a recent interview (“Trans*feminism: Tuvel’s argumentation, particularly for transgender How Trans Issues and Feminism Overlap”) for the women.1 This may not be surprising, for two reasons. Blog of the American Philosophical Association (APA First, Tuvel’s claims concerning race and racial “trans- Blog Interview). She loves trees and fall colours, good itions” are the focus and most prominent (as well as Sci-Fi movies, and singing. controversial) aspects of the article. Second, Tuvel ad- opts an explicitly trans-positive approach, especially in Abstract: After considering some ways of assessing her express commitment to respect transgender iden- argumentation, I present an ethical assessment of tifications, and to regard them as legitimate (Tuvel Tuvel’s argument in her article “In Defense of Trans- 2017a). It might then appear that the article is un- racialism.” My claim is that some transgender women equivocally trans(gender)-inclusive. engaging with Tuvel are exposed to certain kinds of injustice associated with argumentational work, My goal in this contribution is to engage with Tuvel’s namely, disproportionate burdens and risk of psycho- article on the question of the trans-exclusionary and logical harm. marginalizing implications of some of her assump- tions. Much of that trans-exclusionary thrust emerges Keywords: argumentation; argumentational in- from Tuvel’s use of Haslanger’s definition of woman justice; transgender; Rebecca Tuvel; misgendering (Haslanger 2012). After the controversy her article generated, Tuvel admitted that she “could have spent more time grappling with the criticisms of Haslanger’s view” (Tuvel 2017b), so the present article might ap- pear as nitpicking, an attempt to dwell on a matter that has already been addressed. However, an essential Atlantis Journal Issue 39.2 /2018 61 and original part of my project is to locate Tuvel’s pa- The Logical-epistemic Perspective and the per within a broader context of much traditional Ethical Perspective on Argumentation philosophical practice that creates conditions of in- justice for professional philosophers who belong to At some risk of over-simplification, I think one can marginalized groups. I can second—and wish to ex- locate several broad responses to Tuvel’s article ac- pand upon—Talia Bettcher’s (2017a) sentiment that cording to whether a more “logical-epistemic” or a the controversy is not just about Tuvel’s article, but more “ethical” assessment of her argumentation is ad- presents a broader issue for philosophy, particularly a opted. The former type of assessment has been the certain traditional way of doing philosophy which fo- more traditional approach within Anglo-American cusses on the logical-epistemic goals of argumenta- analytic philosophy. It considers arguments from the tion, and on the subsequent assessment of perspective of such measures as justification, rational- argumentation in light of these goals. In contrast, an ity, and convergence upon truth. In his New York ethical assessment of argumentation reveals that at Magazine article, for example, Jesse Singal writes: least some practices of professional philosophy expose Anyone who has read an academic philosophy members of marginalized groups to injustices. More paper will be familiar with this sort of argu- specifically, I illustrate how Tuvel’s article instantiates ment. The goal, often, is to provoke a little—to this type of injustice with respect to at least some probe what we think and why we think it, and transgender women who engage professionally with to highlight logical inconsistencies that might her argument. I do not contend that this is because of help us better understand our values and Tuvel’s analytic approach in her article, nor that ana- thought processes. This sort of article is ab- lytic argumentation generally leads to injustices with- stract and laden with hypotheticals—the idea is in argumentational exchanges (Botts 2018; cf. Tuvel to pull up one level from the real world and 2018). In fact, I employ analytic methods myself in force people to grapple with principles and this article. The problems lie elsewhere, as I hope will claims on their own merits, rather than—in the become clear.2 case of Dolezal—baser instincts like disgust and outrage. This is what many philosophers In the next section, I briefly discuss two main ways in do. (Singal 2017) which we can assess philosophical argumentation: lo- In a similar vein, Justin Weinberg, editor of the gical-epistemic assessment, and ethical assessment. I philosophy blog Daily Nous, says of Tuvel’s article, then set up a framework in which to understand pro- “in terms of quality, it’s a very normal paper” (quoted fessional argumentation as work with associated in Schuessler 2017). goods and burdens. Just as in any work, there are “bads’” to be avoided in the content and in the way In contrast, in a Chronicle ofHigher Education piece, the work is structured, and goods that are legitim- Shannon Winnubst adopts an “ethical” assessment. ately expected by those who undertake the work. I She focusses far more on the social position of the then argue that the burdens of argumentation con- potential addressees ofTuvel’s reflections. She states: sidered as work may be relatively greater in some After all, the methodological insularity evid- cases for professional arguers with particular identit- enced in Tuvel’s article and its publication ef- ies or who are members of particular marginalized fectively render ignored and disrespected black, groups. Tuvel’s article then serves as an example of trans, and other minority scholars who work in how this additional burdening can happen. After an- these fields doubly marginalized. The inequal- ticipating some objections to my view, I end with ities perpetuated are both conceptual and prac- some general remarks regarding the eradication of in- tical. (Winnubst 2017) justices within professional argumentation. I will consider these two ways of normatively assess- Atlantis Journal Issue 39.2 /2018 62 ing argumentation more closely. They are not mutu-