TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND THE CALL OF METAPHYSICS by BRYAN NEAL BAIRD (Under the Direction of O. Bradley Bassler) ABSTRACT Transcendental arguments have been a topic of considerable debate in philosophy during the last several decades. Most of the debate surrounding transcendental arguments has centered on their failure to accomplish what their advocates intend them to accomplish. They are typically called upon to settle decisively the philosophical difficulties they address by establishing necessary metaphysical claims through a consideration of the conditions of the possibility of epistemological premises. That is, transcendental arguments make a claim about reality, what is actually the case, based upon appearance, what is believed to be the case or how things seem. In Chapters One and Two, I will give an account of the chief characteristics and structure of transcendental arguments and provide several canonical exemplars, which will exhibit not only different manifestations that transcendental arguments can take but also the issues they have been used to address. The most common criticism of transcendental arguments is that they are not able to span the justificatory gap between appearance and reality or to accomplish the seemingly impossible task of moving from mind to world. In Chapter Three, I will consider criticisms of transcendental arguments, focusing on the most common criticism given by Barry Stroud. In light of Stroud’s trenchant criticism, recent work reveals an optimistic undertone by some philosophers who would promote a more moderate use of transcendental arguments. Rather than establish necessary claims about reality, transcendental arguments reveal necessary epistemological connections. I will argue that although these moderate versions are indeed legitimate as transcendental arguments, there is no need to discard the more ambitious version. Through the work of John McDowell, I will show how Stroud’s criticism can be overcome, thereby removing the incentive to endorse moderate versions as substitutes for ambitious versions and placing renewed confidence in transcendental argumentation. In Chapter Three, I will present and offer a critique of these moderate versions. In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, I will consider McDowell’s work in my defense of transcendental arguments against the criticisms previously noted. INDEX WORDS: Transcendental argument, John McDowell, Presupposition, Stroud, Genova, Verification principle, Metaphysics, Epistemology TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND THE CALL OF METAPHYSICS by BRYAN NEAL BAIRD B.A., Mississippi State University, 1992 M.S., Mississippi State University, 1996 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ATHENS, GEORGIA 2003 © 2003 Bryan Neal Baird All Rights Reserved TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND THE CALL OF METAPHYSICS by BRYAN NEAL BAIRD Major Professor: O. Bradley Bassler Committee: Randy Clarke Scott Kleiner Donald Nute Beth Preston Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2003 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks goes to Dr. Scott Kleiner for his willingness to sound out the rough beginnings of this project and for his interest in serving on my committee. I have valued his confidence in my abilities and his encouragement to me in my philosophical endeavors. I would also like to thank Drs. Randy Clarke, Donald Nute, and Beth Preston for their time and effort serving on my committee and for the aid they have provided during my tenure at the University of Georgia. Thanks is also due Anthony C. Genova, whose correspondence has been valuable in introducing me to further fruitful research and in confirming to me that I am not alone. My utmost and very special thanks goes to Dr. O. Bradley Bassler, advisor and confidant, for his willingness to continue with this project and his determination to help me see it through. Our discussions of topics both inside and outside of the philosophical sphere have been invaluable, as has been his probing and insightful critiques of and comments on my work and the work of others. A very special thanks goes to the amazing support staff of the philosophy department: Ellen, April, Heather, and Cathy, without whom the peripheral necessities would not have been met with nearly the ease in which they were. Finally, thanks to all those unfortunate non-philosophical souls who asked the crucial and harrowing question, “So, what’s your dissertation about?” Struggling to provide a succinct and sensible answer helped me in many ways to provide succinct and sensible formulations of difficult issues in this dissertation. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................... iv CHAPTER 1 WHAT ARE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS?......................................1 1.1. Features of Transcendental Arguments .................................................2 1.2. Kant’s Thoughts on Transcendental Proofs.........................................32 1.3. Conclusion ...........................................................................................40 2 A FORMAL ACCOUNT OF TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS............43 2.1. Statement Form: Premises and Conclusions in Transcendental Arguments............................................................................................44 2.2. Argument Form: “Transcendental Inference”?....................................52 2.3. Conclusion ...........................................................................................65 3 OBJECTIONS TO TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS ............................68 3.1. Transcendental Arguments as Uniqueness-Proofs...............................71 3.2. The Verification Principle....................................................................73 3.3. Objectively or Subjectively Necessary Conclusions?: Recent Responses to Stroud’s Criticism ..........................................................79 3.4. Conclusion ...........................................................................................92 4 JOHN MCDOWELL AND PRESUPPOSITION.............................................97 4.1. “Truth Value-Gaps” and Presupposition .............................................98 vi 4.2. “Singular Thought” and Conditions of Possibility ............................112 4.3. Conclusion .........................................................................................123 5 JOHN MCDOWELL: MIND AND WORLD ..................................................126 5.1. Dispelling the Tension: McDowell’s Motivation ..............................128 5.2. Overcoming the Oscillation ...............................................................133 5.3. Escape From Idealism........................................................................141 5.4. The Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience ...........................146 5.5. Rethinking Nature..............................................................................153 5.6. Conclusion .........................................................................................156 6 THE CALL OF METAPHYSICS ..................................................................158 6.1. McDowell’s Transcendental Argument.............................................161 6.2. McDowell’s Transcendental Argument and Stroud’s Criticism........171 6.3. Concluding Remarks..........................................................................178 WORKS CITED ..............................................................................................................186 CHAPTER 1 WHAT ARE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS? Introduction Transcendental arguments have been a topic of considerable debate in philosophy during the last several decades. A more detailed account of the purposes to which transcendental arguments have been put will follow, but it suffices here to say that they are typically called upon to settle decisively the philosophical difficulties they address. Given the enormity of and (perhaps) a general antipathy toward undertaking such a task, it is easy to see why transcendental arguments would be met with considerable opposition and doubt. In Chapters One and Two, I will give an account of the chief characteristics and structure of transcendental arguments and provide several canonical exemplars, which will exhibit not only different manifestations that transcendental arguments can take but also the issues they have been used to address. Most of the debate surrounding transcendental arguments has centered on a certain type of transcendental argument, “ambitious” transcendental arguments, and their failure to accomplish what their advocates intend them to accomplish. For detractors and defenders alike, transcendental arguments are supposed to establish metaphysical claims based upon epistemological premises. That is, they make a claim about reality, what is actually the case, based upon appearance, what is believed to be the case or how things seem. The detractors, most notably Barry Stroud, argue that on this conception of transcendental arguments, they are not able to span the justificatory gap between 2 appearance and reality or accomplish the task of moving from mind to world. In Chapter Three, I will consider common criticisms of transcendental arguments, focusing on the principal criticisms given by such early detractors as Stroud and Stephan Körner.1 As a response to the general long-standing