Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 7-18-2018 3:00 PM A Pluralism Worth Having: Feyerabend's Well-Ordered Science Jamie Shaw The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Kathleen Okruhlik The University of Western Ontario Gillian Barker The University of Western Ontario Chris Smeenk The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Jamie Shaw 2018 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons, Science and Technology Policy Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons Recommended Citation Shaw, Jamie, "A Pluralism Worth Having: Feyerabend's Well-Ordered Science" (2018). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 5599. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/5599 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. i Abstract The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of Paul Feyerabend. I conclude by suggesting future points of contact between Feyerabend’s pluralism and topics of interest in contemporary philosophy of science. I begin, in Chapter 1, by reconstructing Feyerabend’s critical philosophy. I show how his published works from 1948 until 1970 show a remarkably consistent argumentative strategy which becomes more refined and general as Feyerabend’s thought matures. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend develops a persuasive case against rationalism, or the thesis that there exist normative and exclusive rules of scientific rationality. In Chapter 2, I reconstruct Feyerabend’s pluralism and detail its relationship to his humanitarianism and epistemological anarchism. I understand Feyerabend’s pluralism as the combination of the principles of proliferation and tenacity. I show the evolution and justification of these principles from Feyerabend’s early papers until the late 1970s. In Chapter 3, I defend Feyerabend’s pluralism from its most prominent criticisms. I then clarify that Feyerabend’s pluralism amounts to a conception of the logic of theory pursuit and modify his view using insights from C.S. Peirce, Pierre Duhem, and Michael Polanyi. From Peirce, I show how economic, sociological, and value-laden features of theory pursuit may be used to constrain proliferation and tenacity. From Duhem and Polanyi, I try to show the proper role of tacit knowledge within a Feyerabendian framework. Finally, I show what implications Feyerabend’s pluralism has for models of distributing funds within scientific communities. I contend that it provides a more promising model that the ‘well-ordered science’ proposal advanced by numerous philosophers and social scientists. Specifically, I aim to understand what taking Feyerabend’s pluralism seriously entails for principles of balancing funding allocation decisions and the role of peer-review in evaluating the potential success of research proposals. I conclude by suggesting future lines of research for further analyzing and applying Feyerabend’s pluralism. Keywords: Feyerabend; theoretical pluralism; methodological pluralism; theory pursuit; economics of discovery; tacit knowledge; well-ordered science; funding distribution models; peer review. ii Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible if it weren’t for the help of innumerable people’s support from various different parts of my life. First and foremost, I owe everything to my parents, John Shaw and Diane Purdie, who supported me in every conceivable way. I would not have completed this thesis if it weren’t for them. Every page has been inspired by what I have learned from them throughout my life. Every positive trait in these pages is a direct result of their influence and every negative trait was the result of me not paying close enough attention to their wisdom. I also appreciate the phenomenal faculty at Western for their seemingly endless supply of constructive feedback, encouragement, and compassion. Most of all, my eternal gratitude to Kathleen Okruhlik for not only supervising such a ridiculous project, but for her constant guidance and emotional support. Throughout the roller coaster of dissertation writing, she kept me sane with her delightful sense of humor and sincere positivity. Gillian Barker made sure that my philosophy not only maintained expected levels of rigor, but consistently empowered me in more ways than I can express. She was my epitome of intellectual honesty and passion. Chris Smeenk’s apparently limitless knowledge and cerebral tenacity always kept me on my toes and taught me how to balance intellectual fortitude with openness and humility. Robert DiSalle spent countless hours challenging me on every corner of my thought while, somehow, always left me feeling motivated and somewhat tipsy. I also learned many other things, about philosophy and life, from conversations with Eric Desjardins, Stathis Psillos, and John Thorp that I hope I never forget. Rob Stainton deserves credit for doing the impossible: making Wittgenstein make sense, and Anthony Skelton made sure the sections of my thesis on ethics maintained plausibility in a field I know too little about. Many faculty abroad also helped me out with various parts of the thesis, including Hakob Barseghyan, Karim Bschir, and Josh Mozersky. Sergio Sismondo deserves special mention not just for getting me into philosophy in the first place, but introducing me to Feyerabend. Any suffering I unleash on the world as a result of his influence is entirely his fault. I also could not have become a sensible person, capable of writing a dissertation at all, if it weren’t for my friends and colleagues. I wish I could detail all the ways they’ve influenced me and helped me, but such would require another hundred pages. I will just list a few of my iii amazing and brilliant friends at Western who got me to where I am: Marie Gueguen, Adam Koberinski, Melissa Jacquart, Adam Woodcox, Matt Small, Michael Cuffaro, Justin Donhauser, Justin Bzovy, Philipos Papagreek, Molly Kao, Tom DeSaegher, Erlantz Etxeberria, Yousuf Hasan, John Lehman, Brandon Murray, Emerson Doyle, Sona Ghosh, Jarred Richards, and Craig Fox. My old friends from Queens, especially Torin Doppelt, Tim Juvshik, and Ryan McSheffrey, gave me all I needed in my early days to succeed in this business. Finally, though too countless to mention, even though I love making long lists, I must thank my friends and family outside of academia. I hope they know who they are so that they may understand my profound gratitude for their love and companionship. iv Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ i Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 1: The Revolt Against Rationalism: Feyerabend’s Critical Philosophy ....................7 1.1 The Acceptance and Rejection of Empiricism .....................................................................10 1.1.1: Feyerabend’s Defense of Positivism ............................................................................10 1.1.2: Feyerabend and Quantum Mechanics ..........................................................................13 1.1.3: Feyerabend on Observation Statements .......................................................................15 1.1.4: Feyerabend on Instrumentalism ...................................................................................20 1.1.5: Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................................23 1.2: Feyerabend on Falsificationism ..........................................................................................24 1.2.1: Feyerabend’s ‘Fall’ for Falsificationism ......................................................................24 1.2.2: Comparing Feyerabend to Popper on Methodology ....................................................26 1.2.3: Feyerabend’s Realism and Fallibilism .........................................................................35 1.2.4: Feyerabend versus Popper on Quantum Theory ..........................................................37 1.2.5: Abandoning Falsificationism .......................................................................................40 1.2.6: Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................................45 1.3: Against Rationalism ............................................................................................................45 Chapter Summary .......................................................................................................................50