Estudios bizantinos 2 (2014) 125-141 ISSN: 2014-9999. DOI: 10.1344/EBizantinos2014.2.5 License: Creative Commons BYZANTIUM AND THE FIRST CRUSADE: THREE AVENUES OF APPROACH Jonathan Harris Department of History Royal Holloway, University of London Egham Hill, Egham TW20 0EX [email protected] ABSTRACT A recurring theme in the historiography of the First Crusade is that of the Byzantine emperor asking Pope Urban to send a small contingent against the Turks and receiving instead vast armies over which he had no control. The crusade was thus completely unexpected and the emperor played no part in its genesis. Recent work has challenged that thesis and further approaches have emerged. A second theory argues that this was a novel departure in foreign policy. The emperor was in fact deeply involved in the origins of the First Crusade and played a leading role in shaping its ideals and goals. The third approach is more modest in scope: it argues that he was certainly involved but this was no unprecedented innovation, simply the extension of a tried and tested response to crisis. This response involved seeking outside allies, providing them with a financial incentive and even bringing a spiritual element into the agreement. It was the use of the last of these standard tactics that was to lead to misunderstandings between the Byzantine emperor and the crusaders. Metadata: Crusades, Byzantine history, Imperial politics, Komnenoi RESUMEN Un tema recurrente en la historiografía de la Primera Cruzada es el del emperador bizantino pi- diendo al papa Urbano que envíe un pequeño contingente contra los turcos y recibiendo a cambio vastos ejércitos sobre los que no tenía control alguno. La cruzada sería así completamente inespe- rada y el emperador no habría tenido papel alguno en su génesis. Algunas publicaciones recientes han puesto en tela de juicio esta tesis y propuesto nuevas interpretaciones. Una segunda teoría defiende que esta iniciativa supuso la puesta en marcha de una nueva política exterior: el empera- dor estaba, de hecho, muy implicado en los orígenes de la Primera Cruzada y jugó un papel vital en la formación de sus ideales y objetivos. La tercera explicación tiene un alcance más modesto: defiende que, sin duda, el emperador estuvo implicado, pero que no existió ninguna innovación sin precedentes, sino simplemente la extensión de una respuesta a la crisis ya ensayada antes con éxito. Tal reacción implicaba ir en busca de aliados exteriores, proporcionarles un incenti- vo financiero e incluso llevar un elemento espiritual al acuerdo. Fue el uso de la última de estas tácticas habituales la que condujo al desacuerdo entre el emperador de Bizancio y los cruzados. Metadata: Cruzadas, Bizancio, política imperial, Comnenos BYZANTIUM AND THE FIRST CRUSADE: THREE AVENUES OF APPROACH Jonathan Harris In his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) re- counts the fable of a shepherd who, feeling thirsty in the Indian sun, prayed to the gods for water. The obliging deities answered his request but not in the way he expected. They diverted the river Ganges and the flood waters swept away the shepherd’s flock and his home. Gibbon tells the story in order to compare the Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118) with the luckless she- pherd. Alexios had sent envoys to Pope Urban II at the council of Piacenza in 1095 to ask if he would encourage some western knights to enter Byzantine service and fight against the Seljuk Turks. Instead of this useful addition to his forces, he got the veritable flood of the First Crusade.1 This idea of Alexios asking for one thing and getting another has remai- ned a feature of the historiography of the First Crusade for literally centuries. One prominent exponent of it was the ardent philhellene Sir Steven Runciman (1903-2000). Writing about Alexios’s reaction to the news of the approach of the crusade, Runciman claimed that the emperor was surprised and horrified: ‘Instead of the individual knights or small companies that he expected to join his forces, whole Frankish armies were now on the move. He was not pleased […].’2 The view is by no means restricted to Anglophone historiography. For 1 E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. by D. Wo- mersley, London 1994, vol. 3, 582-583. 2 S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, Cambridge 1951-54, vol. 1, 116. Some more examples are: W. Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society, Stanford (CA) 1997, 619-620; C. Tyerman, Fighting for Christendom: Holy War and the Crusades, Oxford 2004, 38-39; E. Sakellariou, “Byzantine and modern Greek perceptions of the cru- sades”, in H. J. Nicholson (ed.), Palgrave Advances in the Crusades, Basingstoke and New [ 126] Estudios bizantinos 2 (2014) 125-141. ISSN: 2014-9999. DOI: 10.1344/EBizantinos2014.2.5 Byzantium and the First Crusade: Three Avenues of Approach Paul Lemerle (1903-1989) as regards the Byzantine emperor: ‘[il] ne s’agissait dans son esprit que de quelques contingents d’élite, peu nombreaux, qu’il pren- drait à sa solde contre les Musulmans…’3 Ralph-Johannes Lilie says much the same thing, that Alexios I was aiming only at ‘die Anwerbung von einzelnen Söldnern oder kleineren Abteilungen […] die unter byzantinischem Oberbefehl gegen die Seldschuken kämpfen sollten […]’.4 Universal though this theme is, it has not lacked its critics and in recent years it has come increasingly under scrutiny. Its great weakness is that it re- flects almost exactly what Alexios I’s daughter and biographer Anna Komnene says about his reaction to the arrival of the First Crusade, namely complete surprise and dread.5 Not surprisingly then, some historians have suspected that Anna could have been concealing a much more active role that her father might have played to shield him from being blamed for the unwelcome outcome of the crusade.6 The question remains, however, of just how far the emperor’s role might have gone. This short article will explore two possible ways in which the traditional understanding of Alexios I’s role in the origin of the First Crusade York 2005, 245-68, at 246; J. Phillips, Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades, London – New York 2009, 7-8; C. Wright, “On the margins of Christendom: The impact of the Crusades on Byzantium”, in C. Kostick (ed.), The Crusades and the Near East: Cultural Histories, Abingdon – New York 2011, 55-82, at 56-7. 3 P. Lemerle, “Byzance et la croisade”, in Relazioni del X congresso di scienze stori- che, Florence 1955, vol. 3, 595-620, at 600-601 (reprint in P. Lemerle, Le monde de Byzance: histoire et institutions, London 1978, No. VIII). 4 R.-J. Lilie, Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge, Stuttgart 2004, 35; idem, “The crusades and Byzantium during the twelfth century”, in K.I. Semaan (ed.),The Crusades: Other Experien- ces, Alternate Perspectives, Binghampton (NY) 2003, 27-46, at 27. 5 Anna Komnene, 297 (=X.5) [trans. E.R.A. Sewter – P. Frankopan, 274]. 6 J. France, “Anna Comnena, the Alexiad and the First Crusade”, Reading Medieval Studies 10 (1984) 20-38, at 21; R.D. Thomas, “Anna Comnena’s account of the First Crusa- de”, BMGS 15 (1991) 269-312, at 274-275; M. Angold, The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204: A Political History, London – New York 19972, 159; J. Shepard, “Cross-purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade”, in J. Phillips (ed.), The First Crusade Origins and Impact, Manchester 1997, 107-29, at 118. [ 127] Byzantium and the First Crusade: Three Avenues of Approach might be modified. The first is the radical one: that Alexios was in fact deeply involved in the genesis of the First Crusade and played a leading part in shaping its ideals and goals. The second is rather more modest in scope: that Alexios was certainly involved but he was simply using a tried and tested response to crisis that the Byzantines had used in the past and extending it to the Latin West. The difference may seem minor but when the arguments are scrutinised closely, two very different avenues of approach emerge. The most recent exponent of the first and more radical view is Peter Frankopan. In his own words: ‘The catalyst for the expedition to Jerusalem was not the pope, but another figure entirely: the call to arms issued by Urban was the result of a direct appeal for help from the emperor of Constantinople, Alexios I […]’.7 For Frankopan, Alexios was prompted to make his appeal by the rapid deterioration of the situation in Asia Minor after 1089 when the control that the Byzantines had exercised over the Turkish tribes in the region had broken down. Particularly unwelcome was the occupation of Smyrna by Emir Tza- chas since he mustered a fleet in the port with which to attack Constantino- ple. To remedy the situation, Alexios set out deliberately to encourage and to organise a huge Christian expedition to come to the aid of his empire. Frankopan’s approach is clear enough but, like all historians of the origins of the First Crusade, he has to deal with the paucity of specific evidence. The- re are texts that historians can draw on but they are all very problematic. The near-contemporary Byzantine historians who give an account of the crusade, Anna Komnene and John Zonaras, do not mention any prior contact with the pope at all.8 There is an alternative Byzantine source in the chronicle attributed to Theodore Skoutariotes which does mention Alexios’ involvement and even 7 P. Frankopan, The First Crusade: The Call from the East, London 2012, 6.