POLICY BRIEFING / SEPTEMBER 2019 Beijing Calling: Assessing China’s Growing Footprint in North Africa Adel Abdel Ghafar and Anna Jacobs1 s the United States disengages from the Middle East, and Eu- rope faces internal challenges, Aa new actor is exerting greater influence across North Africa. China has been ramping up engagement with countries such as Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, which lie at the intersection of the Middle East, Africa, and the Mediterranean. This policy briefing argues that China’s grow- ing role in North Africa should be cau- tiously welcomed, but also closely moni- tored, by governments in North Africa, Europe, and the United States. North Af- rican governments should be wary of Chinese “debtbook diplomacy” and surveillance, while Western governments should be wary of potential security consequences. Overall, China, North Africa, Europe, and the United States should seek win-win modalities of engagement that bring prosperity and stability to the Mediterranean. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS • Transparency is Key: Negotiations for integration would go a long way toward Chinese funding should be conducted ensuring better regional coordination on in a transparent manner, given the poor trade, investment, diplomacy, and defense precedent set by several Chinese projects cooperation with China. in South Asia and Latin America. Avoid- • Disengagement is Not the Answer: U.S. ing the debt traps that have overwhelmed and European policymakers should un- other countries will become increasingly derstand that the gaps left by their retreat important as Chinese financing grows in from North Africa will be filled by rising North Africa and as major infrastructure powers like China, which are seeking to projects take off. further develop patron-client relations with • Strength in Unity: North African govern- states in the region. Europe, in particular, ments will be more likely to achieve posi- should be wary of the security risks posed tive outcomes from their engagement with by an increased Chinese presence in the China if they are able to speak in a unified region and should work more quickly to voice with the Chinese. Greater regional implement proposed trade agreements. Copyright © 2019 Brookings Institution The Brookings Institution is a private nonprofit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommenda- tions of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institution, its man- agement, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. INTRODUCTION and hard power elements of Chinese influence in North Africa, with a particular emphasis on soft As the United States slowly disengages from the power.3 Lastly, it will offer a set of policy recom- Middle East, and as Europe faces internal chal- mendations aimed at North African, European, lenges, a new actor is quietly exerting greater in- and U.S. policymakers. fluence across North Africa. China has been stra- tegically ramping up engagement with countries As part of these policy recommendations, this such as Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, which lie at briefing argues that China’s engagement should be the intersection of three key regions: the Middle cautiously welcomed, but also closely monitored, East, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Beijing’s by governments in North Africa, Europe, and growing footprint in these countries encom- the United States. North African governments passes, but is not limited to, trade, infrastructure should be wary of Chinese “debtbook diploma- development, ports, shipping, financial coopera- cy” and surveillance, while Western governments tion, tourism, and manufacturing. should be wary of the security consequences of an increased Chinese presence in the Mediterranean. Through this engagement, China is setting up Moving forward, China, North Africa, Europe, North Africa to play an integral role in con- and the United States should seek win-win mo- necting Asia, Africa, and Europe—a key aim of dalities of engagement that bring prosperity and President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative stability to the Mediterranean basin. (BRI). Previous analyses of the BRI’s role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT have emphasized that the initiative is difficult to define, with its exact scope subject to much de- China’s relationship with the countries of North bate.2 While the current BRI map only officially Africa, especially Algeria and Egypt, began dur- includes Egypt, BRI Memorandums of Under- ing the anticolonial struggle, stemming from an standing (MoUs) have been signed between Chi- ideological support for national liberation move- na and every state in North Africa, demonstrating ments. Notably, China was the first non-Arab that it is expanding its foothold in the region. country to recognize Algeria and provided po- litical and military support for its revolutionary China is expanding its cooperation with North struggle. However, the basis of China’s interest African countries, not only in the economic and in North Africa shifted away from “revolutionary cultural spheres, but also those of diplomacy and romanticism,” and toward economic and strate- defense. Furthermore, it is showcasing a develop- gic concerns, at the end of the twentieth century.4 ment model that seeks to combine authoritarian- ism with economic growth—a model that has an In the wake of the 2008 recession and the Eu- eager audience among regimes across the MENA rozone crisis, North African states, which have region. As such, China’s growing role in North historically relied on trade and investment from Africa is likely to have far-reaching economic and Europe and the United States, worked to diversi- geopolitical consequences for countries in the re- fy their markets and economic partners.5 During gion and around the world. the same period, China’s economy maintained impressive momentum, boasting a 9.5 percent This policy briefing seeks to analyze China’s grow- GDP growth rate in 2011.6 Despite slower eco- ing role in North Africa. It will begin by provid- nomic growth in recent years,7 China has pro- ing background and context on China’s relations moted its economic and soft power through the with Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Lib- BRI, which is the principle foreign policy initia- ya. Then, it will provide an overview of the soft tive of the Xi Jinping era. 1 Policy Brief • September 2019 Launched in 2013, this initiative is set to cost As the table below illustrates, China has estab- around $1 trillion, according to some estimates, lished CSPs with Algeria and Egypt and an SP and to include over 80 countries, which are re- with Morocco. These include dozens of MoUs sponsible for around 36 percent of global GDP and promises for major infrastructure and devel- and 41 percent of global trade.8 South Asia has opment projects. It is worth noting that, while so far received the majority of BRI projects, but China has signed BRI MoUs with Libya and Tu- the initiative’s expansion west, toward Europe nisia, it has yet to establish a formal partnership and the MENA region, is well underway. While with either North African state.12 China’s economic presence in Africa and Asia has been the subject of much study and scru- CHINA’S PARTNER COUNTRIES IN THE tiny, the relationship between China and North MENA REGION, 2012–JULY 2016 13 Africa deserves more attention. This developing relationship reveals key trends and sheds light Country Year Partnership on China’s strategic priorities, as well as on how countries like Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria 2014 CSP and Egypt are increasing cooperation with new foreign partners. Egypt 2014 CSP China engages in two main types of “partner- Iran 2016 CSP ship diplomacy” in the MENA region: strategic Iraq 2015 SP partnerships (SPs) and comprehensive strate- gic partnerships (CSPs).9 According to Strüver’s Jordan 2015 SP study of Chinese partnership diplomacy, relations between partner countries under an SP have the Morocco 2016 SP following four characteristics: Qatar 2014 SP 1. They go beyond typical diplomatic relations, involving consistent meetings between gov- Saudi Arabia 2016 CSP ernment officials and agencies to develop communication and trust. United Arab Emirates 2012 SP 2. They do not fall within the confines of treaty- based alliances or coalitions. 3. They are more ‘goal-driven’ than ‘threat-driv- These partnerships demonstrate how China and en,’ typically focusing on areas of mutual co- North African states have strengthened their dip- operation in economics, culture, security, and lomatic, economic, and cultural relations in re- technology. cent years, especially since the BRI was launched. 4. They are characterized by an emphasis on be- Across the region, Chinese Cultural Centers and havior and institutional processes.10 Confucius Institutes have been opened, while visa restrictions and travel advisories for Chinese tour- In comparison with SPs, CSPs involve a higher ists have been lifted, causing tourism to expand level of institutional communication, including rapidly. Chinese diplomats at both the Rabat regular high-level