ABSTRACTS 191 Keep US Forces in Korea after Reunification Michael O’Hanlon Today’s US force posture in Korea has a simple purpose: helping stop, and if need be reverse and retaliate against, an attack by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). If that mission be- comes obsolete, either because of Korean reunification or a major reduction in the magnitude of the military competition between North and South, any continuing US military presence on the peninsula would require a fundamentally new rationale. This paper develops such a rationale, and considers various options for corresponding US force postures. My principal conclusions are that a continued and substantial US military presence on the peninsula makes sense for the United States, Korea, and the region as a whole. It might consist of roughly 20,000 to 30,000 troops, and be oriented to a broad range of security tasks including nontraditional missions such as counterterrorism and peace operations. The US presence would ideally consist of fewer army forces than are now based in the Republic of Korea today, but potentially more marines and navy sailors. In short, this proposal might be termed a “liberal vision” for the US-Korea alliance. It envisages an alliance that focuses less on tradi- tional deterrence of nearby major powers-without abandoning that mission-but that emphasizes a much broader array of security goals as well. Pursuit of those other goals could potentially allow for the inclusion of other countries, perhaps someday even China, in a broader collective security framework. Strong arguments for this type of approach can be found in international relations theory, in post-World War I1 history, and in the specific security needs of the northeast Asia region today. MICHAEL O’HANLON 5 Keep US Forces in Korea after Reunification Michael O’Hanlon Today’s US force posture in Korea has a simple purpose: helping stop, and if need be reverse and retaliate against, an attack by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). If that mission be- comes obsolete, either because of Korean reunification or a major reduction in the magnitude of the military competition between North and South, any continuing US military presence on the peninsula would require a fundamentally new rationale. This paper develops such a rationale, and considers various options for corresponding US force postures. My principal conclusions are that a continued and substantial US military presence on the peninsula makes sense for the United States, Korea, and the region as a whole. It might consist of roughly 20,000 to 30,000 troops, and be oriented to a broad range of security tasks including nontraditional missions such as counterterrorism and peace operations. The US presence would ideally consist of fewer army forces than are based in the Republic of Korea today, but potentially more marines and navy sailors. Assuming that governments in Seoul and Washington come to agree with this analysis, they should start laying the political and diplomatic groundwork-with their own legislatures and publics on the one hand, and with other countries in Northeast Asia on the other. The views of China should be solicited and considered, but only up to a point: if Korea and the United States see such forward basing of American troops to be in their fundamental interest, they should stand firm. They should explain why they think such US forward basing would serve China’s interests too, possibly helping to serve as a foundation for a broader 6 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS regional collective security arrangement that could eventually include the PRC if circumstances so warranted. But they should also be prepared to sustain the US presence unapologetically, regardless of the reception the idea engendered in Beijing. The stakes involved in this issue are very large. Korea, a relatively small country geographically, is nevertheless the third largest economy in Asia and the eleventh largest in the world.’ Perhaps even more importantly, it is the only focal point in Northeast Asia where all large regional countries have a keen interest in the prevailing local balance of power.2 The urgency of this issue is unclear, but potentially considerable. North Korea may find ways to adapt from its current crisis, and survive many years.3 It also may prove willing to gradually demilitarize its differences with South Korea and promote a policy of “one country, two systems” over a protracted transition period toward eventual merger. Or it may collapse in a few months. We simply do not know. For that reason, it behooves policymakers to begin focusing on this subject without further delay, at least in a preliminary fashion. The Republic of Korea and the United States should first forge a common position, at least in its rough contours, between themselves and then begin articulat- ing their thinking to Japan, China, and other countries in the region. The two specific questions addressed in this paper are as follows. What would be the overarching purposes of the US-ROK alliance, and associated American military presence on the peninsula, after an end to the ROK-DPRK conflict? In addition, what specific types and numbers of US forces would best serve those purposes? 1 World Bank, World Development Report 1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 210-1 1. 2 See Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), p. 46. 3 See Marcus Noland, “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, NO. 4 (July/August 1997), pp. 105-18. MICHAEL O’HANLON 7 Purposes of US Forces in Korea after Reunification The basic rationales for keeping US forces in Korea after resolution of the current military standoff are of two types: deterring specific threats or dangers on the one hand, and helping provide a pillar for an eventual regional collective security system on the other. Deterring Threats A US military presence on a reunified Korean peninsula could help deter any untoward Chinese actions against Korea, dampen tensions in the Japan-Korea relationship, and provide a regional hub for military activities against other threats such as pirates, terrorists, and possible instability in the waterways of Southeast Asia. In each case, stationing US forces in Korea would produce a much more credible form of deterrence than simply retaining a formal alliance agreement between the two countries. Only the presence of US forces would guarantee that Americans would be immediately involved in any conflict, and demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the seriousness and military readiness of the alliance. As for the first concern, a major overland Chinese threat to Korea appears quite improbable. To the extent it causes other countries in the region concern in the future, China seems less likely to put direct military pressure on Korea-a longstanding independent country with a clear ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identity that makes it a poor candidate for invasion-than to use force to gain resources or territory it considers its own. Taiwan and the South China Sea are the most notable examples of where China might use force, though disputes over overlapping economic zones could also arise with Korea and with Japan. In other words, to the extent it may pose a threat to its neighbors, China seems more likely to act as an irredentist power seeking to back up claims to specific localized regions, most of them at sea, than to pursue empire or regional hegem~ny.~This conclusion is reinforced by the fact 4 See Robert Ross, “Assessing the China Challenge,” Henry Stimson Center. Washington, DC, May 14, 1997. 8 THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS that China has resolved a number of territorial disputes with neighbors and demilitarized several borders in recent years.’ However, sovereign countries being what they are, it is not im- plausible that someday China could appear seriously threatening to Korea’s core interests. Having US forces in Korea would give future Chinese leaders who contemplated making any such threats further reason for pause. Knowing in advance that this dynamic might operate, Korean leaders would probably be less inclined to develop a nuclear arsenal as a hedge against Chinese pressure.‘ A US force presence in Korea would also be beneficial for Japan- Korea relations. First, it could reassure the Koreans, who would not have to wonder if they were a second-class ally of the United States in the event of a major dispute with Japan over disputed territories or maritime resources. Second, the Japanese government might also prefer this arrangement. With US military facilities also in Korea, Japan would avoid becoming what Richard Haass calls “singularized” as the only country in the region hosting US forces, and Tokyo would probably find it easier to sustain the support of the Japanese people for the security alliance.’ Both Japan and Korea are small, mountainous, and heavily populated countries where land, airspace, ports, and other necessary ingredients for military bases and operations are at a premium. Also, although both countries recognize the importance of having a deterrent in place against instability in the region, both are also appropriately sensitive to the need to cultivate good relations with their neighbors and avoid creating the perception that they are trying to contain China or any other specific country. Under these circumstances, asking either 5 See David Shambaugh, “China’s Security and Military Policy and the Potential for CBMs in the Region,” Henry Stimson Center. Washington, DC, December 17, 1996. 6 See Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” Internationul Security Vol. 2 1, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp.