3. Some Consequences of Four Incapacities Our focus is on the following pages: EP1:28-33, 38-42, 51-55, 56-57 3.1. Modern Philosophy and Scholasticism The beginning of the essay contrasts four features of Cartesianism with Scholasticism. 1 Cartesianism begins with a methodological commitment to universal doubt, while scholasticism accepts certain beliefs as fundamental. 2 Cartesianism locates the ultimate test of the truth or falsity of a statement in individual consciousness, while scholasticism regards the testimony of the church and various prophets to be certain. 3 Cartesianism argues from foundational premises by deduction, while scholasticism allows for multiform argumentation. 4 Cartesianism renders a variety of facts absolutely inexplicable (except those that are determined by God), while scholasticism undertook to explain all created things while retaining certain mysterious elements of faith. In the previous essay, we saw that Peirce argued against two principal tenets of Cartesianism (no intuition of the private self, no introspection). In this essay Peirce argues for a new platform for philosophy. He writes that “modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform” (W2:212; EP1:28). 3.2. The New Platform of Modern Science and Logic Peirce articulates four principal tenets of his new platform for philosophy. We’ll focus on three of these and try to draw out criticisms of Cartesianism and foundationalism more broadly. 1. Methodological Skepticism: We cannot begin with complete doubt. Classical foundationalism is thought to rest on infallible first premises. Descartes argues that we can only obtain these through methodological skepticism. Peirce gives two arguments against Descartes’s use of methodological doubt. What are they? Peirce’s maxim against Cartesian doubt is the following: “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts” and that we “must begin with all of our prejudices” (EP1:28, 29). What do you think Peirce’s response would be to Descartes claim that it is possible for there to be an evil demon that causes us to err? Given Peirce’s rejection of the infallibility requirement for foundationalism, what does this mean for the epistemic status of foundational beliefs in academic beliefs? 2. Individual Judges. We cannot make individuals absolute judges of the truth. 1 Instead of making single individuals absolute judges of truth, what does Peirce suggest instead? How does this contrast with Descartes ‘s method? How plausible is this suggestion? 3. Deductive Method and Foundational Beliefs Consider the two starting points for Descartes and Peirce. Descartes and classical foundationalism claims that justified basic beliefs should be infallible and derived beliefs should be derived by a deductive method. How does Peirce’s suggestion for the starting point differ? How does his method for derivation differ? 4. We ought not to suppose that there are any truths that are absolutely inexplicable. The fourth tenet is that philosophy should not suppose any unanalyzable facts that are absolutely inexplicable. Peirce argues that to claim that there is anything inexplicable can only be known by reasoning from signs. However, any inference from signs is justified by whether the conclusions inferred from the facts explain those facts. For example, it is a fact that when I dropped this ball in front of me it fell to the floor, and this is to be explained by gravitational law, the attraction of mass, or the curvature of space-time. But, Peirce argues, to “suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable, is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable” (W2:213). That is, to suppose that the fact of the ball falling to the floor is ultimate or inexplicable is to reason from the sign of the ball falling to the conclusion that the falling ball admits of no explanation. This, Peirce claims, is self-defeating since to justify a reason from signs is to give an explanation, but to reason that there cannot be an explanation is not to reason from signs. 3.3 Final Remarks & Points of Contrast Peirce defines ‘the real’ in contrast to ‘unreal’ as that belief that would stand in the long run (see EP1:52). He writes that [T]he real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. [...] [A] proposition whose falsity can never be discovered, and the error of which therefore is absolutely incognizable, contains, upon our principle, absolutely no error. (EP1:52) 2 .