Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 7-1965 Great Britain and the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878 Carol Zainfeld Becker Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Becker, Carol Zainfeld, "Great Britain and the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878" (1965). Master's Theses. 3854. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3854 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE BALKAN CRISIS OF 1875-1878 by Carol Zainteld Becker A Thesis aubmitted to the FaoultJ of the School ot Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment ot the Degree of Master of Arts Western Michigan Univeraity Kalamazoo, Michigan Jul,- 1965 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply indebted to Dr. Niobolaa Hamner, Professor or Historr, Western Michigan Univerait7, tor his invaluable advice and encouragement; and tor the manr bours be gave in kind and careful criticism with­ out which this thesis could not have been written. Deepest appreciation is also expressed to my husband, Bernard Becker, and m1 sons, Marc, David and William, tor their encour gement, consideration and patience. Carol Zainfeld Becker 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ACKBOWLEDGMENTS • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • ii INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • iv CHAPTER I THE EASTERN QUESTION: Treat7 of London to the Treat1 or Parisi 1815-1856 •••••••••••• 1 II PRELUDE TO CHAOS: 1856-1875 • • • • 31 III CHAOS: 1875-1677 • • • • • • • • • • 44 IV FROM SAN STEFANO TO BERLIN March to June, 1876 , •• • • • • • 74 V DISRAELI, SALISBURY AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN • • • • • • • • 87 BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 105 111 INTRODUCTION For 7ears Great Britain bad followed tbe time­ honored doctrine in foreign affairs or maintaining the balance or power which meant to resist by diplomacy or arms the growth or any European State at once ao formidable and so potentially hos­ tile as to threaten our national liber­ ties, the security of our shores, the safet7 or our commerce or t�e integrity of our foreign possessions. With the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and tbe establishment or the Metternichian concept or the con­ cert of Europe, Britain's historic determination to preserve the balance of power gave war to a new attitude in foreign affairs that became known ae "splendid iso­ lationism." This new approach to international relations was based on her desire to be free from continental en­ tanglements in order to devote all ber energies to devel­ oping ber industry and commerce; and at the same time to protect her economic and political "interests" by dip­ lomacy or the use or force whenever and wherever they were threatened. Throughout the nineteenth century the policy or nsplendid isolationism" was followed, regardless 1oeorge Peabody Gooch, Studies In Diplomac and Statecraft (London: Longmana, Green and Co., 194.3l, p. 87. iv V or the changing· definition of British "interests," by all ministries whether they were Whig or Tory, Liberal or Conservative. The policy was sorely tested on numer­ ous oocasions when conrronted with the challenges to her aims by other states, both large and small. One or the most serious and longlasting threat� was known as the "Eastern Question." In the nineteenth century the Eastern Question was a problem that confronted not only Great Britain but moat or Europe as well. The tottering, disintegrating Ottoman Empire, the demise or which had been expected and anticipated for at least a century, was the prize that certain European powers were waiting to grasp. It was an empire which at this time not only extended to the borders or Austria, taking in the lands of the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgars, but also controlled the vital passage into the Black Sea, the Dardanelles. Tbe Ottoman Turk in Europe was an alien aubstanoe, having no link either in religion, race or social customs witb the Balkan peoples. For Russia tbe death ot tbe empire would mean a long-sougbt tootbold in tbe eastern Mediterranean and an extension or her "protectorate" over all Slavs in the Balkans. To France the dismemberment or tbe once-strong Turk would make possible gains in lands and influence in North Africa as well as in the Near East, plus a boost to vi her prestige, wbich always figured in French thinking. Austrian interest in the Balkans stemmed from the desire to contain any mounting feeling• of nationalism among the Slavs which might in the long run weaken the Hap burg empire. The most complex concern over the downfall of the Ottoman Empire was the one exhibited by Prince Otto Von Bismarck, chancellor or Germany. He was dedicated not only to the maintenance of a Bismarckian peace in Europe, meaning a peace dictated by German aims, but also to the pacification or Austria and Russia over the issue or Pan-Slaviam. Thus, tbe Eastern Question was basically the problem of what sbould be done about the declining Ottoman Empire. Two alternatives presented themselves during the nineteenth century: regenerate the Empire through internal reform and international protection of tbe status quo; or partition its European poaseaaions. While moat or the major powers chose the second course, Great Britain, in ber determination to maintain a "Pax Britannica," obose the first. Paramount in her consi­ deration was the necessity to uphold the dictum so ably stated bJ Gooch that "Britain bas no eternal friendships and no eternal enmities, only eternal interesta."2 Her "eternal interests" demanded that Constantinople and the Straits be controlled b7 a pro-British and independent Turkish government. Thus, the naval status quo in the 2Ibid., P• 88. vii eastern Mediterranean and the British lifeline to India would be protected against Russian encroachment. Britain's commitment to the continued existence or the Ottoman Empire thus brought about her involvement in the Eastern Question which finally erupted with great severity in 1875 after having smoldered tor over fifty years. It is the purpose or this paper to follow in some detail the course of British diplomatic policy in the Near East up to 1878 when an attempt to solve the Eastern Question was made in the Congress of Berlin. The major emphasis is on tbe events just prior to the Congress from 1875 to 1878. CHAPTER I THE EASTERN QUESTION: Treaty of London to the Treaty of Paris: 1815-1856 To Lord John Morley, a late nineteenth century liberal statesman and Gladstone's renowned biographer, it was "that shifting, intractable, and interwoven tan- gle or conflicting interests, rival peoples and antagon­ istic faiths that !:,,art.I veiled under the easy name of the Eastern Question."1 Within the Ottoman Empire the rising tide of nationalism, coupled with growing rivalry among the Slav themselves, was running bead on against absolutism. In addition, there were major religious problems caused by the fact that not only Moslem.a, but also Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox, inhabited the area. Pol­ itically the Empire was racked by corruption, ineffi- ciency, and ruled by a government unable and often un­ willing to effect reforms or promote unity. A few Sultans had seen the necesaity to Europeanize Turkey, but most had fallen victim to "Moslem indulgence and Christian alcohol," or found that "effective regeneration of the 1 J. A. R. Marriott, _T�b�e_,,E_as_ _te_ r_ _n.....,..,......,.__,._....._ ...... Historical Studr In European Diplomacy Clarendon Presa, 1930), p. 1. 1 2 country was made impossible by the dead hand of Islamic law and by the sullen resistance or a fanatical popula­ tion."2 What little retorm that had taken place was mainlJ unenlightened and capricious. Extensive court expenditures, neglect of tbe e111pire, excessive bureau­ cracy, and discrimination against non-Moslems were noth­ ing novel in Turke7. Thus the increasing problems with­ in the Moslem 'l'llrkisb state were generallJ acknowledged, and the term "the Eastern Question" soon enters the European diplomatic vocabular1.3 Great Britain bad been involved in the Near East for rears because or the danger to ber trade route to India inherent in the expansion of Russian influence to- ward the sphorus, the Dardanelles and Constantinople. It bad been known for a century and a half that Russia had three main objectives: (1) to reestablish her naval and commercial supremacy in the Black Sea; (2) to secure a tree outlet to the Mediterranean; and (3) to obtain from the Porte an acknowledgement of ber position aa D id r 8 0 th Crisis o� �8 -�8 8� •T!e st!:.}!�� University Press, 193 ii;�• i;-i;!rH1s�:?o��: 3William L. Langer, European Alliances and Align­ ments, 1871-18&0 (2d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 60- 1. 3 champion or the liberties, political and ecclesiastical, or the Christian aubjecta or tbe 8ultan.4 Following the defeat or Bapoleon, the orticial policy of tbe British government was dominated by tbe Tory foreign minister, Lord Castlereagh, wbo, until his death in 1822, felt that it was necessary to maintain the status quo guaranteed by the Quadruple Alliance or 1815 at the Congress or Vienna in order to allow Britain to consolidate gains made in her increasing overseas empire. At times his attitude was in opposition to British pub­ lic opinion which was generally &JDlPathetio to rising nationalism everywhere. In defense of Castlereagh whose successtul conduct of foreign affairs during the closing years ot the Napoleonic Wars bad won him gratitude and respect, it should be noted that in bis desire to res­ tore Europe to normalit1 be bad to concur in repressive policies toward nationalistic outbreaks or stand aside and otter no opposition.