BERTRAND RUSSELL’S NEUTRAL MONISM By MAFIZUDDIN AHI-ZD Thesis presented for the Ph.D. Degree in Arts in the University of London, 1968. ProQuest Number: 10098146 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10098146 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ABSTRACT This work is a study of Russell's neutral monism with special emphasis on the stages of its development# Two distinct phases are recognised; these are called 'partial neutralism' and 'complete neutral monism'* The first is advocated in 'The Analysis of Mind' and the second in his later works# The work is mainly interpretative# This involves comparison and criticism of the views expressed at different stages and the interpretations given by critics and commentators and Russell's replies to them, as also clearing up certain ambiguities and misunderstandings. In this respect it is a critical exposition of Russell's theory. The discussions begin with a historical sketch of the development of neutral monism in general with brief reproduction of the views of its early propounders (Chapter I)* Russell's theory is discussed in several chapters. First, a preliminary account is given showing how he comes to adopt it at first partially and then completely from the position of logical atomism (Chapter II). The theories of the neutral stuff, matter, and mind are then discussed separately in some detail indicating in each case the important changes made at different stages (Chapters III, IV, V)# Finally, some questions concerning body, mind and person are considered, and reference is made to the modern 'Identity Hypothesis* and Strawson's views on persons (Chapter VI)• The final version of Russell's theory seems to attain a sort of theoretical completeness and to avoid certain difficulties involved in the earlier theory of partial neutralism. The Identity Hypothesis is found to be originally Russell's idea, and to be tenable as an aspect of neutral monism rather than in its present physicalist form. Strawson's arguments for the 'primitiveness' of the concept of a person seem unsatisfactory; Russell's theory may be wrong, but Strawson's position does not prove that it is so. H- ACKNOViXEDGEHEHTS I wish to express my gratitude and deep appreciation to my supervisor, Professor B. A, 0. Williams, for his encouragement, patience and guidance in the preparation of this work. I am also thankful to the Government of Pakistan for financing the major part of my studies here, and to the University of Rajshahi, East Pakistan, where I am employed, for granting me leave in order to enable me to come to this country for higher studies. M. Ahmed. CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT 2 ACOOVJLEDGEMENTS 4 INTRODUCTION 7 CHAPTER I ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEUTRAL MONISM 16 1* Neutral Monism in General 16 2. Ernst Mach 20 3» William James 2k 4. The New Realists 29 CHAPTER II DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSELL'S NEUTRAL MONISM 35 1. An Outline of the Development 33 2. Russell's Earlier Objections to Neutral Monism 41 3. Two Phases of Russell's Neutralism 51 4. Logical Atomism and Neutral Monism 61 CHAPTER III THE THEORY OF NEUTRAL PARTICULARS ?8 1. Psycho-physical Dualism in Sensation 78 2. Abolition of Dualism : Identification of Sensation and Sense-datum 82 3# Sensations as Neutral Particulars 87 4# Events as Neutral Particulars 95 5. Sensations and Organism 105 Page 6. Location of Percepts in the Brain 114 7* Subjectivity of Percepts 121 8, Images as Particulars 126 9* Unperceived Particulars 132 10. Monads and Neutral Particulars 143 CHAPTER IV THE THEORY OF MATTER 130 1. Simples versus Constructs 130 2. MaterisuL Objects as Classes of Appearances I63 3. Material Objects as Structures of Events I87 CHAPTER V THE THEORY OF MIND 213 1. Rejection of the Dualistic Criteria of Mind 213 2. Analysis of Mental Phenomena 228 3. The Definition of Mind 269 CHAPTER VI BODY, MIND AND PERSON 291 1. Is Mind an Emergent fromMatter ? 291 2. Mind-Body Relation : The Identity Hypothesis 298 3. The Concept of a Person 303 BIBLIOGRAPHY 349 INTRODUCTION Bertrand Russell in his long career as a philosopher has produced a large number of works covering a wide variety of subjects.. He has made important contributions to various fields, has developed many new ideas and has suggested instructive hypotheses. His influence on contemporary philosophy, especially in logic, logical analysis, the philosophy of science, epistemo- logy and metaphysics, cannot perhaps be exaggerated. There are few books written on philosophy during the last few decades, which do not in some way refer to Russell's works or make use of some of his ideas. This is perhaps the reason why Allan Wood remarked a few years ago that "there is little of importance in present-day philosophizing which is not derived from him. The post-Russellians are all propter-Russellians." In the course of the development of his thought, Russell's views on many topics have undergone changes, sometimes resulting in opposite ideas at different stages. In spite of this, there is throughout a unity of purpose and constancy of method. The purpose has always been to attain as much certainty in knowledge as possible, a passionate search for truth. The method is that of logical analysis, developed in his mathematical 1. My Philosophical Development, p.237. 2. M.Weitÿ, 'Analysis and the Unity of Russell's Philosophy*, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp.35ff. 8 logic and employed in every branch, of philosophy. For him, every philosophical problem is a problem of analysis, and the business of philosophy is essentially that of logical analysis followed by logical synthesis. Truth, Russell believes, can only be obtained from the understanding of the world as a whole, not simply the little world of human mind and experience. He has often complained against philosophers of "cosmic impiety" , of being too much concerned with this petty planet and with "the different ways in which silly people can say silly things"^, and not trying to understand the. world. He finds little satisfaction "in contemplating the human 4 race and its follies". He says, "Those who attempt to make a religion of humanism which recognises nothing greater than man, do not satisfy my emotions. And yet I am unable to believe that, in the world as known, there is anything that I can value outside human b e i n g s This conflict shows the attitude he has taken to philosophy in general. He has tried to obtain a philosophy of the world in which man and other things are seen in their proper places.His attempts, like those of any other philosopher, have been a failure in the sense that he has not been able to get the 1. 'Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Logic', Monist, October, 1913; Logic and Knowledge, p.341. 2. History of Western Philosophy, p.yBzONew Edition,1961). 3. My Philosophical Development, p.230. 4. Ibid., p.131. 3. 'My Mental Development', The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp. 19-20. certain impersonal truth which he set out to find.^ But they are also a success in the sense that he has been able to show that such impersonal absolute truth is not attainable, at any rate on purely empirical grounds. And in his search for truth he has developed a philosophical method which gives valuable knowledge, though not absolute certainty, and which enables the philosophers employing it to argue and concur in respect of 2 exact hypotheses, all compatible with the existing evidence. The philosophical study of the world involves a vast range of topics, and Russell's works cover them generally. The wide variety of his philosophical interests makes it difficult to obtain, with justice to them all, a systematic account of his philosophy within a short space. It is, however, possible to recognise some aspects which have engaged his attention more or less permanently, and to produce an account of the relevant issues with special reference to the development of his ideas about them. One of such aspects concerns the metaphysical problem of the ultimate nature of the reality of the world with the question of the relation of mind and matter as an important aspect of it. This problem is in some sense basic in philosophy, and any system of philosophy must offer some explanation of it. As in many other cases, Russell's views on this particular subject have undergone changes; but we find that in his later 1. Russell recognises this in retrospect ; see 'My Mental Development', The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp.19-20. 2. Ibid, p.20. 10 writings he has constantly maintained a theory called 'neutral monism'. According to it, mind and matter are not the ultimate realities of the world; the world consists of something more primitive and fundamental; and mind and matter are composed of the primitive 'stuff arranged in different ways. Thus, the theory holds that there is no fundamental dualism between mind and matter, but only a difference of arrangement, relation or context. Neutral monism had been maintained by some philoso­ phers before Russell. He accepted it in 1919 and has since then advocated it continuously.