SEPTEMBER 25, 2012 AUDIT REPORT OFFICE OF AUDITS NASA’S PLANS TO MODIFY THE ARES I MOBILE LAUNCHER IN SUPPORT OF THE SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL National Aeronautics and Space Administration REPORT NO. IG-12-022 (ASSIGNMENT NO. A-12-007-00) Final report released by: Paul K. Martin Inspector General Acronyms GSDO Ground Systems Development and Operations MPCV Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle OMB Office of Management and Budget RS&H Reynolds, Smith, and Hill SLS Space Launch System REPORT NO. IG-12-022 SEPTEMBER 25, 2012 OVERVIEW NASA’S PLANS TO MODIFY THE ARES I MOBILE LAUNCHER IN SUPPORT OF THE SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM The Issue NASA’s newest Mobile Launcher was designed and built at Kennedy Space Center to support assembly, testing, transportation, and launch of the Constellation Program’s Ares I launch vehicle.1 The Mobile Launcher, completed in August 2010 at a cost of $234 million, consists of a two-story base, a 355-foot-tall launch umbilical tower, and facility ground support systems that include power, communications, and water. In February 2010 – before the Mobile Launcher could be used – the President proposed cancellation of the Constellation Program and unveiled a new direction for NASA’s space program.2 The subsequently enacted NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (the Act) directed NASA to design the Space Launch System (SLS), a new heavy-lift rocket capable of deep space exploration. The Act required NASA to design the SLS with an initial capability of lifting payloads weighing between 70 and 100 tons and a fully evolved capability of lifting 130 tons or more.3 As a result, NASA is designing a family of SLS launch vehicles that will be heavier, larger, and more powerful than the Ares I. The Act also directed NASA to use, to the extent practicable, existing investments and infrastructure in Figure 1. The Ares I Mobile Launcher at Kennedy Space developing and operating the SLS. Center on November 30, 2011. (Source: Mr. Neil Berger, Mobile By August 2011, two NASA-sponsored trade studies Launcher Deputy Project Manager) concluded that the Agency could strengthen and modify the 1 NASA established the Constellation Program in response to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Public Law 109-155, December 30, 2005, which called for development of a crew launch vehicle, heavy launch vehicle, and crew exploration vehicle to return to the Moon and serve as a stepping-stone to future exploration of Mars and other destinations. 2 In place of Constellation, the President’s budget proposed a program that focused on leveraging advanced technology, international partnerships, and commercial capabilities to set the stage for a revitalized human space flight program. 3 As a comparison, the Satern V rockets used to launch the Apollo missions to the Moon were capable of launching 130 tons into low Earth orbit while the Space Shuttle was capable of launching 30 tons into low Earth orbit. REPORT NO. IG-12-022 OVERVIEW Mobile Launcher to support the heavier weight and additional thrust of the SLS. According to NASA, not only are the necessary modifications technically feasible, but using the Mobile Launcher to support the SLS Program is the most cost-effective approach to launching the SLS when compared to modifying one of the three existing Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platforms or building a new launch platform.4 Specifically, preliminary cost estimates found that modifying the Mobile Launcher would cost $54 million, modifying the Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platforms would cost $93 million, and constructing a new mobile launch platform would cost $122 million. The SLS Program is in the early stages of design during which NASA officials are identifying how the Program will accomplish its goals.5 Technical details about the vehicle’s design are still under development; therefore, the configuration of the launch vehicle will evolve as the Program progresses. In designing the Mobile Launcher, NASA used $25 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act).6 The Office of Inspector General initiated this audit to determine whether NASA sufficiently evaluated all possible alternatives to ensure that modifying the Mobile Launcher in support of the SLS is in the best interest of the Government. We also reviewed NASA’s use of and accounting for the $25 million in Recovery Act funds. Results The OIG found that NASA’s decision to modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher is technically feasible and the most cost-effective option for launching at least the initial versions of the SLS vehicles. However, further assessment of planned modifications to the Mobile Launcher will be needed as the SLS continues to evolve and its design solidifies. While NASA performed two trade studies that supported its decision to modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher, both studies were based on preliminary assumptions and limited information about the configuration of the SLS. Because SLS vehicles will increase in size as they evolve, these early studies may not have addressed all the challenges or costs associated with launching the larger vehicles. Additionally, the SLS, the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), and the Ground Systems 4 The three Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platforms were originally designed and used for the Apollo Program and were later modified for the Space Shuttle. 5 The SLS Program is in the formulation phase as outlined by NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,” August 14, 2012. Project formulation consists of developing and defining the project requirements and cost/schedule basis, and designing a plan for implementation including an acquisition strategy, contractor selection, and long-lead procurement. 6 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, February 17, 2009. The Act provided funds for job preservation and creation, infrastructure investment, energy efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal stabilization. ii REPORT NO. IG-12-022 OVERVIEW Development and Operations (GSDO) programs – the three components of NASA’s planned deep space exploration missions – are in relatively early stages of development. Successful integration of the three elements will require an interdependent management structure (known as an Exploration Systems Integration Strategy) to ensure the programs are effectively communicating their individual and collective requirements. Lastly, we determined that NASA properly tracked and accounted for its use of Recovery Act funds in designing the Mobile Launcher. Two Trade Studies Support Decision to Modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher. Two NASA-sponsored trade studies compared three mobile launcher options to support the SLS: modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher, modify one of the Agency’s three Mobile Launcher Platforms previously used by the Space Shuttle Program, or build a new mobile launcher. Based on the studies, the Agency concluded that modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher was the most cost-effective alternative. The two studies’ cost estimates for modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher – $54 million and $74 million – are not directly comparable due in part to differences in assumptions about the launch vehicles that would use the Mobile Launcher and whether the Mobile Launcher would include a tower to support the launch vehicles. NASA’s Decision to Modify the Mobile Launcher Was Based on Limited Information and Preliminary Assumptions. The two trade studies that NASA relied on to support its decision to modify the Mobile Launcher were based on limited information and preliminary assumptions that may not address all challenges or costs associated with launching the larger evolved version of the SLS.7 Both studies relied on information available at the time and, because the SLS vehicle configurations are still being formulated, some technical details have changed since the studies were performed while other details have not yet been decided. The scope of the two studies also varied in that one study did not evaluate modifications that may need to be made to the tower, while the other included tower modifications that it concluded will be necessary for the Mobile Launcher to launch the SLS. In addition to the unknown cost and schedule impact of tower modifications that may be needed to launch the fully evolved 130-ton SLS, NASA plans to use new, advanced booster technology currently under development for the 130-ton vehicle. Neither study included the possible impacts to the Mobile Launcher that such new technology might pose. As such, the potential exists that the requirements to support the new booster may exceed the capabilities of the Mobile Launcher and require NASA to construct an entirely new launch platform. Because additional modifications to the Mobile Launcher may be required as the SLS Program matures and the vehicle’s design changes, it is imperative that NASA routinely update the planned modifications and corresponding cost estimates throughout the life 7 The studies found that all three options are equally technically feasible. As a result, cost and schedule were the primary determining factors. REPORT NO. IG-12-022 iii OVERVIEW cycle of the SLS Program. Such an ongoing review will help identify technical risks and enable the Agency to better understand the full life-cycle costs of necessary modifications to the Mobile Launcher. Continued Development of an Exploration Systems Integration Strategy Is Needed to Ensure the Mobile Launcher’s Success. The evolving configuration requirements for the SLS require ongoing coordination among three programs – SLS, Orion MPCV, and GSDO.8 The three programs are in different stages of development and the necessity of an interdependent management structure is a significant change for most NASA employees assigned to the programs, many of whom previously worked for the Space Shuttle Program while it was in operations mode for the past 30 years. Moreover, the three programs are managed from three different NASA Centers, further complicating integration efforts.