Al R U N I VE R S ITY rcvicwSEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1977 à from the editors aerie Thirty years ago, the United States Army Air Forces published the first issue of the A ir University Quârter/y Review. The original charter for the Review was Major General Muir S. Fairchild's memorandum of 27 February 1947, which read in part: "This journal of Air Power will not be just another news-magazine, nor is it intended as a periodical of interest only to the Air University. Rather, it will be a professional publication in the highest sense of the word and will reflect not only the high scholastic standards and educational accomplishments of the Air University, but also—and more important, perhaps— the best professional thought concerning global concepts and doctrines of air strategy and tactics." The first editorial presented a statement of policy: “ The Editor and the Editorial Board wish to encourage new thinking. Consequently, if the appearance here of articles which may not agree with accepted policy, or even with majority opinion, will stimulate discussion and provoke controversy, an important part of this journaFs mission will have been accomplished: to induce airmen to have original thoughts on these matters and to give these thoughts expression." Thirty years later, our editorial policy is essentially unchanged. (See statement at the bottom of next page.) That our pages have not completely achieved the announced editorial goals is perhaps more painfully evident to the Review staff than to the casual reader. But we remain fully committed to the encouragement of original thinking and will actively seek to eliminate whatever restraints inhibit the free exchange of ideas. The lead article by Dr. Paul J. Nahin contrasts the capability of our long-range antiaircraft missiles with the lagging ability to identify enemy aircraft positively. Our cover depicts reliance on the human eye as “ the only truly positive technique avaiiable today for distinguishing between friend and foe. " General F. Michael Rogers enunciates the logistician's view of readiness in our Air Force Review department, reminding the operational specialists that " . without a responsive logistical support capability, our first line weapon systems would become little more than static displays." From the Editor’s Aerie........................................................................................................... Facing Page IFFN: A Technological Challenge for the ’80s ... Dr. Paul J. Nahin SLBM—The Navy’s Contribution to Triad............ Lt. Col. William D. Siuru, Jr., USAF The Micros Are Corning, The Micros Are Corning Capt. Frank J. Derfler, Jr., USAF Air Force Review Readiness: A Logistician’s View........................................................................................................ 36 Gen. F. Michael Rogers, USAF Industrial Democracy and the Future Management of the United States Armed Forces........................................................................................................... 42 Dr. Laurie A. Broedling Military Affairs Abroad Negotiating with the Enemy.............................................................................................................. 53 Lt. Col. Karl P. Piotrowski, USA Lebanon, Syria, and the Crisis of Soviet Policy in the Middle E a st........................................................................................................................................ 62 Annette E. Stiefbold PSYOP Is a Nasty Term—Too Bad............................................................................................................ 71 Maj. Fred W. Walker, USAF In My Opinion Specialized Air-to-Air Combat Training......................................................................................... 77 Maj. Robert A. Heston, USAF Books and Ideas Watching the Pendulum Swing........................................................................................................ 85 Lt. Col. David R. Mets, USAF Potpourri................................................................................................................................................. 100 The Contributors ............................................................................................................................................103 ATTENTION The Air University Review is the professional joumal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking and stimulate dialogue conceming Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air Uni­ versity. Rather, the contente reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed. IFFN a technological châllenge for the '80s " Dr P aul J. N ahin ANY modem weapon systems have a large mismatch between their maximum performance capability and the performance they are actually allowed to achieve. Because current rules of combat engagement normally call for visual identification of a Mtarget as hostile before weapon firing can be initiated, many weapon systems do not operate at anything approaching their design capability. A particular and dramatic case in point is a currently operational long-range missile and control system. With multiple target acquisition and tracking and engagement capability at stand-off ranges of up to one hundred miles, this is a potentially potent weapon system. IFFN 3 Under the visual rule, however, where it is each equipped with “long” range acquisition difficult to see even large aircraft at more radars and “long” range air-to-air missiles.3 If than two miles in good weather (identifica- “long” means 50 miles to one side but 52 tion can probably occur at no more than half miles to the other, this four percent advan- this range),1 there is a serious question as to tage could mean that one fighter will be de- how the user will realistically capitalize on tected, acquired, and destroyed before its this capability. piiot is aware that he is not alone in the sky. A solution to this and related weapon utili- Of course, this is overly dramatic because a zation problems is through the development 52-mile missile launch would not be per- of automated IFFN (Identification, Friend, formed on the mere basis of a radar track Foe, Neutral) systems. Indeed, with sensors (presumably both sides have the same IFFN in satellites, aircraft, ships, and on land and problem). An example of this “detection but sea floors combining to form a single network no identification” problem resulted from the of enormous connectivity, the military Ser- similar appearance on a radar display of the vices of the United States are moving toward F-4 and the French-British Concorde Super- a total real-time command, control, and com- sonic Transport. On test runs between Lon- munication capability on a planet-wide basis. don and Bahrein, Iraq sent up fighter The reason for this is that the Services have interceptors to visually identify the Con- come to realize that it is becoming increas- corde because only Israel flies the F-4 in that ingly difiBcult, due to weapon proliferation, to part of the world.4 answer their most basic question: Where is We can understand, then, the necessity for the enemy? the visual rule. The only truly positive tech- Korea was probably the last war in which nique available today for distinguishing be- there was anything that might be called a tween friend and foe (and maybe neutrals, forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), a too) is to look at them. To do otherwise is to reasonably well-defined line between oppos- risk fratricide.5 This is not to say there are no ing forces. With a FEBA, your friends are alternatives to visual identification. One can those on the same side of the line as you, and use the correlation of the location of an un- your foes are those on the other side. Neu- known target with the known locations of all trals or noncombatants can occur on either friends. The lack of a match might be taken side. If a FEBA exists, IFFN of unknown tar- as an indication of foe. Not only is this con- gets can be made on the basis of geographic cept relatively slow, with its implication of location or point of origin. However, the ex- the existence of a high-level command and periences of the United States in Southeast control system that “knows all,” but it is not Asia and observations of the recurring Arab- really a positive identification of a foe. There Israeli Middle East conflicts have driven are, however, plans for more responsive home a reality of modem warfare. It is no identification systems using sophisticated longer a set piece, move/countermove, versions of this concept; they go under the majestic sequence of operations. It is a swirl- generic name of time division multiple ac- ing, lightning-fast, explosive mixture of cess (TDMA). These systems will require friends and foes alike, each trying to sort the large expenditures of money and significant other out.2 The side that does so first will changes in procedural operations, however, have the advantage, possibly a decisive one. and do not easily allow autonomous opera- Even small advantages can be extremely tion of individual weapon systems.6 important, as Possony and Pournelle point Another alternative to visual identification out with their example of two fighter aircraft, relies on explicit procedural