SYNTHESIS 11 FEBRUARY 2013 THE COMMUNITY METHOD, THE EU’S “DEFAULT” OPERATING SYSTEM Renaud Dehousse | Adviser to Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute and director of the Center for European studies of Sciences Po Paris T his synthesis takes a fresh look at an issue addressed in a number of articles published by Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute on the Community method and the development of Europe’s institutional sys- tem. After discussing the reasons frequently put forward for arguing that the Community model is in a critical condition, it offers an alternative interpretation of the situation, viewing the Community method as a form of governance “by default” to which member states regularly resort, however many reservations they may har- bour in its regard, when they find themselves forced to cooperate. Over twenty years ago the then British Prime Minister To gain an overview the state of play as it stands today, John Major was (already!) calling the Community Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute asked a number method “an outdated idea” as part of a drive to stress of experts to review the main aspects of the Union’s the need to experiment with new forms of coop- current governance and the issues that it needs to eration among member states. It was the era of the address. This paper endeavours to provide an initial Maastricht Treaty, a source of major debate regard- summary of their comments. ing the extent and boundaries of political union. Over two decades rich in new developments have gone 1. The essence of the Community method by since then, yet the debate has barely moved on from that point. Heads of state and government occa- One of the first difficulties which we need to address is sionally stick their necks out to theorise new forms of conceptual in nature. What exactly do we mean when governance – as Mrs. Merkel did in a major address in we use the term “Community method”? In the absence Bruges1 –, to which the representatives of the institu- of any widely accepted definition, analysts often have tions respond by defending the merits of the Community recourse to conflicting notions, thus it is obviously dif- model2. This model continues to be an unavoidable focal ficult in such a context to determine what it is that com- point of every debate on Europe’s future: when the “con- plies with the initial model3. stitutional treaty” was being negotiated, for instance, a group of European Convention members, most of them One of the most frequently cited definitions was from the smaller member states, chose to call them- provided by the Commission in its White Paper on selves “friends of the Community method”. By the same European Governance: token, even though a great deal has been made of the “The Community method guarantees both the diversity fact that the sovereign debt crisis has witnessed a boost and effectiveness of the Union. It ensures the fair treat- to the role played by the European Council, whose lead- ment of all Member States from the largest to the small- ership no one any longer calls into question at this junc- est. It provides a means to arbitrate between different ture, one of the crucial factors in Europe’s response to interests by passing them through two successive fil- this crisis has been an outright strengthening of the ters: the general interest at the level of the Commission; powers enjoyed by the Union’s supranational insti- and democratic representation, European and national, tutions: the European Central Bank has been called at the level of the Council and European Parliament, on to play a role greatly resembling that of a lender of together the Union’s legislature. last resort, the Commission’s supervisory powers have • The European Commission alone makes leg- been considerably strengthened by the “fiscal com- islative and policy proposals. Its independence pact”, and had it not been for the British veto, we could strengthens its ability to execute policy, act as have said the same about the Court of Justice. So it has the guardian of the Treaty and represent the not only been a one-way affair… Community in international negotiations. 1 / 4 The Community Method, the EU’S “Default” Operating System • Legislative and budgetary acts are adopted by proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the “permis- the Council of Ministers (representing Member sive consensus”7 which had accompanied the start of States) and the European Parliament (represent- the European construction process was nothing but ing citizens). The use of qualified majority voting a distant memory. Even though integration continues in the Council is an essential element in ensuring to enjoy a fairly positive image today, the citizens of the effectiveness of this method. Execution of pol- Europe frequently display a certain amount of impa- icy is entrusted to the Commission and national tience with decision-making processes which they authorities. do not understand or with decisions which appear • The European Court of Justice guarantees to threaten their way of life. Their disenchantment respect for the rule of law.”4. becomes obvious during European elections, where turnout is falling off in a seemingly inexorable fashion. This definition sheds light on the Community model’s two most critical aspects: Secondly, at about the same time governments began • on the one hand, the delegation of powers to inde- to show signs of impatience with what many of them pendent bodies (the Commission and the Court of saw as an unlimited expansion of Europe’s powers Justice, to which we would add today the European as symbolised by the Commission. So they tended Central Bank), a principle which unquestionably to multiply their own counterbalancing powers. constitutes the keystone of Europe’s institutional The Maastricht Treaty’s pillar-based structure was in system, and indeed the Schuman Declaration many ways the first sign of this trend: while accepting already assigned enormous importance to it back the need for European discipline in the spheres fall- in its day; ing within the realm of their sovereign powers such • and on the other hand, its corollary, the curbing as foreign policy, security or justice, member states of sovereign powers for member states, which refused to watch the supranational institutions play accept the eventuality of ending up in a minority a role akin to the role traditionally assigned to them when a vote is taken and which submit to EU law5. in connection with “Community” matters. Each time any pro-European impulse came to the fore, they It also highlights the two sources of legitimacy used responded by setting up ad hoc structures with pow- to prop up the entire system: the representation of the ers only parsimoniously allocated to it: for instance, governments on intergovernmental bodies and the the high representative for foreign policy, or the representation of the citizens in an elected parliament. Eurogroup and its president, and finally the establish- ment of a stable president of the European Council While it is possible to find equivalents for each of who could only interfere with the functions of initia- these elements on the international scene, we have to tive and mediation which fall to the Commission under admit that they are resorted to in a far more system- the Community model. This growth in intergovern- atic manner in the European Union6. And it is precisely mentalism has clearly been to the advantage of the this that accounts for the originality of the institu- European Council. Raised to the rank of an institution tional model which the European Union embodies. of the Union by the Lisbon Treaty, it is now part and parcel of the Community institution system8. 2. A model in crisis? We can detect a development of the same kind taking place in European policy instruments. The wave of After the major progress made in the 1980s, a decade harmonisation that had marked the programme relat- marked by the imparting of a fresh boost to the inte- ing to the achievement of the internal market was fol- gration process, the Community method hit a tur- lowed by a phase characterised by the search for meth- bulent patch. Without going into too much detail, we ods designed to cut back on the constraints enforced on will take a look here at the four main factors in this national administrations such as result-targeted man- development which are crucial for us to understand the agement, benchmarking, peer supervision and so on. debate today. This approach, which kicked in with monetary union, was then raised by the Lisbon strategy to the rank of First of all, the difficulties surrounding the ratifica- founding principle underlying the strategies devised to tion of the Maastricht Treaty highlighted the fact reform the welfare state and to improve competitive- that the debates on the “ democratic deficit “ were not ness. It exemplifies the wave of “new modes of gover- merely academic in nature but that they were shared nance” in which the Commission is relegated to playing by broad swathes of Europe’s citizens. Opinion polls a back-seat role while the European Council is supposed 2 / 4 The Community Method, the EU’S “Default” Operating System to play a steering role. All of these developments sug- of the whole13. The doubling of the number of member gest that there was a deliberate political will to consign states through the enlargement processes of 2004 and to the archives the idea of delegating powers, which lies 2007 does not appear to have had the negative impact at the heart of the Community method, in favour of what on the legislative body’s productivity that many feared has been called “intensive transgovernmentalism”9.