CHAPTER 13 The Marines Leave Da Nan g Operations in Southern Quang Nam, 1-13 April 197 1 Activation and Operations of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade —The End of Keystone Robin Charli e Keystone Oriole Alpha: The Final Stand-Down — Quang Nam after the Marines Left Operations in Southern Quang Nam, 1-13 April 1971 Loc District, sweeping the area after the artillery bom - bardment, reported finding 30 dead Viet Cong .2 By the beginning of April, the war in I Corps wa s reverting to its pre-Lam Son 719 pattern. Allied force s In these final days before it redeployed, the 1st Ma- in Quang Tri and Thua Thien had resumed satura- rine Division made one last drive into Base Area 11 2 tion patrolling of the populated lowlands . The allies west of An Hoa. The division conducted this opera- also mounted occasional large-scale sweeps of enemy tion at the direction of MACV, which had received in - base areas, notably Operation Lam Son 720, a com- formation indicating that U.S. and allied prisoners bined offensive in the A Shau and Da Krong Valleys were being held in a camp hidden in the hills of by the 101st Airborne and 1st ARVN Divisions . In western Quang Nam . III MAF intelligence officers Quang Nam, as the first phase of the Communists' doubted the accuracy of these reports, but the pligh t K-850 Campaign came to an end, the 51st ARVN of American POWs had become a major political an d Regiment and the South Vietnamese RFs and PFs be- diplomatic issue and the authorities in Saigon want- gan another in the Hoang Dieu series of operations . ed to exploit even the slimmest chance of a spectacu- lar rescue*3 The new offensive, Operation Hoang Dieu 107, was aimed at destroying enemy local forces and protect- Accordingly, III MAF on 7 April issued orders for ing the rice harvest. the attack, codenamed Operation Scott Orchard . Un- der the plan, a provisional composite battery of The 1st Marines, now the only active infantry uni t 105mm and 155mm howitzers from the 1st Battalion of III MAF, kept up small-unit warfare within its TAOI . , 11th Marines was to reopen FSB Dagger, used th e The regiment's 3d Battalion maintained its defens e previous autumn for Operation Catawba Falls . Then of the Hai Van Pass and patrolled and ambushed in the 1st Marines, employing a reinforced infantry bat- the northwestern quadrant of the Rocket Belt . This talion, was to make a helicopter assault on the hill battalion had a forward command post and one pla- s west of Dagger, where the POW camp was supposed toon on Hill 510 in the Que Sons, securing an artiller y to be located. The infantry were to search the area and , firebase and a haven for reconnaissance elements i n if they found an enemy prison compound, try to fre Operation Imperial Lake. Also participating in Imperi- e the inmates . III MAF alerted Company A, 1st Medi- al Lake, the 1st Battalion used a platoon to protec t cal Battalion to receive and care for diseased, dehydrat a reconnaissance patrol base on western Charlie Ridge , - ed, and debilitated former prisoners and ordered tha while continuing to defend its portion of the Rocke t t the attacking infantry be equipped with bolt cutters Belt. The 2d Battalion coordinated the defense of Di - . Advance information about the operation was to b vision Ridge and kept Marines in the field in pursuit e closely restricted and aerial reconnaissance of Dagge of the VCI in the hamlets south of Da Nang .' r With the enemy regrouping after the initial surg e *Since the beginning of major American involvement in the war, of the K-850 offensive, the Marines had few contacts the Communists had refused to follow the Geneva Convention pro - during the first two weeks of April, although visions governing accounting for and communicating with prisoner s boobytraps remained a threat . Marine artillery ac- of war. By mid-1970, under increasing pressure from families of cap- tured servicemen, the Nixon administration had begun making a counted for most of the casualties inflicted on the ene- public issue of the problem, using the Paris peace talks and othe r my. On 10 April, for example, Marines manning th e diplomatic channels to press the Communists for information about Integrated Observation Device on Hill 65 spotted a prisoners. The administration also tried forceable rescue . In late substantial group of VC and NVA with packs and ri- November 1970, a force of Army Rangers and Special Forces troop s made a heliborne raid on Son Tay POW camp about 20 miles fro fles in the Arizona Territory south of the Vu Gia Rive r m the center of Hanoi . The raiders got in and out without casualties , and called for a fire mission by howitzers of Battery but found the camp empty. For a discussion of the Son Tay raid A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines . RFs and PFs from Dai and the POW issue in general, see Time, 7Dec70, pp . 15-21 . 234 THE MARINES LEAVE DA NANG 235 and the objective area kept to a minimum to avoi d ger. They found a scattering of small abandoned camps warning the enemy4 and caches and a number of old trails, but no prison Despite the restriction on conducting an extensiv e compounds . Except for a few patrols and stragglers , reconnaissance of the target area, Lieutenant Colone l the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had left long Roy E. Moss, then battalion commander of 2d Battal- before the Marines arrived . The Marines did catch a ion, 1st Marines, recalled that he got permission fro m few enemy. On 9 April, for example, a patrol from Colonel Kelley to make a quick aerial reconnaissance : Company F encountered a lone Viet Cong in an open field and killed him . The following day, Marines from Major Connie Silard and Major Jim Clark, the pilots o f the helicopter, and my S-3, Major Tom Campbell, depart- Company K spotted 15-30 North Vietnamese regu- ed the afternoon of the 6th in a UH-1E to have a look a t lars wearing new-looking green utilities . In the ensu- the area . We knew we would have the opportunity to mak e ing exchange of fire, neither side suffered any only one pass over the objective area, locate the LZs, an d casualties, and the NVA quickly withdrew. The artillery plot them on our maps . The area near Fire Support Base on FSB Dagger fired 235 missions during the opera- Dagger was extremely dense and suitable LZs were extremely difficult to spot, even from the air. We quickly pinpointed tion, only two of them against observed enemy troops. six suitable landing zones and then exited the area quickl y On 11 April, helicopters lifted the infantry compa- in order not to give away our future intentions .s nies back to their battalion TAOI and extracted the reconnaissance teams. The artillery evacuated FSB Following an intensive A-4 preparation of LZ Dag- Dagger the next day. In this, their last search and des - ger, the operation began at 1045 on 7 April, whe n troy operation of the war, the Marines suffered no helicopters from MAG-16 inserted two teams fro m casualties. They killed four enemy, three of them by Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, a total o f artillery; took one prisoner; and captured 12 weapon s 14 Marines and two Navy corpsmen, on FSB Dagger . and miscellaneous ammunition, food, clothing, an d The teams searched the firebase for boobytraps an d equipment . While establishing that Base Area 112 was found two old ones. They had a brief firefight with still a very active line of communication, the Marine s three to five enemy, who quickly fled. A provisional found no evidence of a prison camp ? platoon from Headquarters and Service Company o f the 1st Battalion landed in trace of the reconnaissanc e East of the area of Operation Scott Orchard, ele- units. At 1100, helicopters began bringing in two ments of the 196th Brigade began moving into th e 105mm and four 155mm howitzers, with their crew s Que Sons as the last Marine units cleared out of th e and an infantry platoon. The infantry relieved the mountains. On 6 April, part of Company B, 3d Bat- reconnaissance Marines in defense of the firebase . One talion, 21st U.S. Infantry arrived by helicopter on Hill of the reconnaissance teams was then lifted by helicop- 510. The next day, Company C from the same battal- ter to Hill 37, while the other remained at Dagger. ion occupied Hill 65 to protect the Army artillery al- By 1800, the artillery pieces were in position and ready ready stationed there . On 7 and 8 April, the forward to fire. command post, an infantry platoon from the 3d Bat- On the 8th, MAG-16 helicopters inserted five in- talion, 1st Marines, and a 105mm howitzer detach- fantry companies (three from the 2d Battalion and one ment from Battery C, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines lef t each from the 1st and 3d Battalions) under the oper- Hill 510, the infantry elements returning to their bat- ational control of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines int o talion TAOI and the artillery going to the Northern six landing zones . The helicopters also brought in four Artillery Cantonment (NAC) . On the 11th, the Ma- more reconnaissance teams. This complicated lift into rine mortar detachment displaced from Hill 425 t o six widely separated landing zones, which involved 2 4 NAC.