Cleveland State Law Review Volume 50 Issue 4 Article 3 2003 Disarming the Confirmation Process Michael M. Gallagher Law Clerk, United States District Court, Eastern District of Texas Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Judges Commons How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! Recommended Citation Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming the Confirmation Process, 50 Clev. St. L. Rev. 513 (2002-2003) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DISARMING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS MICHAEL M. GALLAGHER1 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 515 II. BACKGROUND...................................................................... 520 A. The Constitutional Meaning of “Advice and Consent”................................................. 520 B. A [More Recent] History of the Confirmation Process ............................................ 522 1. The Bork Nomination........................................... 524 2. President George H.W. Bush................................ 526 3. President Bill Clinton ........................................... 526 4. President George W. Bush ................................... 529 a. Defining the Rules of the Game ....................................................... 529 b. The Pickering Nomination ............................ 532 c. The Owen Nomination................................... 534 d. The 2002 Midterm Elections ......................... 539 e. The Estrada Nomination ............................... 539 III. WHY IDEOLOGICAL SCRUTINY MUST END .......................... 542 A. Ideological Scrutiny Violates Principles of Separation of Powers ............................. 542 1. A Concentration of Constitutional Powers in the Presidency...................................... 542 2. Mandating a Political Mandate............................. 544 3. Institutionalized Presidential Discretion............... 546 4. Pre-Appointment Senate Prerogatives.................. 547 5. Burdening a Judicial Nominee with the Burden of Proof ...................................... 548 B. Ideological Scrutiny Lacks Historical Support ....................................................... 550 1. The Past ................................................................ 550 1Law Clerk to The Honorable Richard A. Schell, United States District Judge, Eastern District of Texas, 2003-2004. B.A., 2000, Georgetown University; J.D., 2003, University of Houston Law Center. Many thanks go to David Van Slyke and the editors of the Cleveland State Law Review for their thorough, meticulous editing of this Article. I am also grateful to Professor Sidney Buchanan for his sage advice and commentary, to Brett Young for spirited political commentary, and to Rajesh Sharma for unyielding friendship. The views and opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author alone. 513 Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003 1 514 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:513 2. The Recent Past .................................................... 551 3. The Future ............................................................ 551 C. Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Ensure an Endless Cycle of Political Retribution ................................................................... 552 D. Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Worsen the Confirmation Process Even Further......................................................................... 557 1. Failed “National Referenda” ................................ 557 2. A Regrettable Fusion of Law and Politics ........................................................... 558 3. Senators as Law Professors .................................. 559 4. Result-Oriented Confirmation Hearings............... 560 a. Results Instead of Rational Analysis ......................................................... 560 b. An Illustration ............................................... 562 5. Return of the “Stealth Nominee”.......................... 563 E. Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Harm the Federal Judiciary ........................................ 564 1. The Myth of the “Mainstream” ............................ 564 2. The Myth of Predicting a Judge’s Votes........................................................ 571 3. The Myth of Judicial Omnipotence...................... 580 IV. WHY IDEOLOGICAL SCRUTINY MUST CONTINUE—AND A REPLY.................................................. 583 A. The Senate Is Better Suited Than the President to Represent the People’s Interests in the Confirmation Process ......................... 583 B. Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Lead to Ideological Balance in the Federal Judiciary......................................................... 584 C. Continued Ideological Scrutiny Will Depoliticize the Confirmation Process....................... 586 V. DISARMING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS .......................... 588 A. Reforming Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings .................................................... 588 1. Ideological Abstention.......................................... 588 2. Moral Evaluation of Judicial Nominees ............... 589 3. Senators Instead of Law Professors...................... 591 B. Sending Each Nomination to the Senate Floor................................................................. 591 https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss4/3 2 2002-03] DISARMING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 515 C. Presidential Consultation with the Senate................... 592 VI. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 593 I. INTRODUCTION In his second term of office, the President nominates a Circuit Court judge to fill a recent vacancy on the Supreme Court. The nominee, respected by practitioners and jurists alike, quickly receives a rating of “Well Qualified” from the American Bar Association. In announcing the nomination, the President praises the nominee’s qualifications, temperament, and character. Regrettably, the announcement of the nomination is the high point for the nominee. Almost immediately, interest groups mobilize against the nominee. The nominee’s previous decisions are scoured, scorned, and misrepresented. Charges are leveled that the nominee is an ideologue. Heeding the call to battle, many Senators in the opposition party quickly criticize the nominee’s ideology, and announce their intentions to vote against the nominee. Interest groups quickly release reports charging that the nominee’s views are “outside the mainstream” of legal thought. The confirmation hearing turns bitter; the nominee’s stock continues to decline. Senators demand that the nominee comment on hypothetical questions of constitutional law, and they label the nominee’s judicial philosophy as politically driven. After much mudslinging and overturning of stones by Senators, the Senate rejects the nomination by a significant margin. The President immediately criticizes the Senate and laments the current state of the confirmation process. In response, Senators assert that the Senate should have an equal role in the confirmation process. For some, the previous two paragraphs might conjure up images of the confirmation hearing of Judge Robert Bork.2 Given the recent, pervasive use of ideology3 as a relevant factor in judicial confirmations, the previous two paragraphs would plainly describe the confirmation hearings of Justices Antonin Scalia4 or Ruth 2Nominated by President Ronald Reagan for Justice Lewis Powell’s seat on the Supreme Court, Judge Robert Bork experienced a very controversial and contentious hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. In the end, the Senate rejected his nomination by a vote of 58- 42. Edward Walsh & Ruth Marcus, Bork Rejected for High Court; Senate’s 58-42 Vote Sets Record for Margin of Defeat, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1987, at A1. 3One can define ideology as “[t]he body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an individual, group, class, or culture.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 343 (2d ed. 1983). One commentator defines ideology as “a systemic body of concepts especially about human life or culture.” Stephen B. Presser, Should Ideology of Judicial Nominees Matter? Is the Senate’s Current Reconsideration of the Confirmation Process Justified?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 245, 246 & n.1 (2001) (quoting MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 575 (10th ed. 1996)). Whatever the wisdom of labeling judges as “liberal,” “conservative” or “moderate” may be, it is fair to say that “conservative” judges believe “that the Constitution should be interpreted in a textualist and originalist manner,” while “liberal” judges “accept a more open-ended, interpretive methodology.” John O. McGinnis, The President, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 634 n.6 (1993) [hereinafter McGinnis, A Reply]. 4 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY (1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, MATTER OF INTERPRETATION] (offering a detailed explanation of Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law]. Published