DOClD: 356"6827I,' , •! "-_:/ tr?'~ 't::':::: By Authority of the 't.: ., ;~: 'Commanding'General JaitiaJa ' 'Date I' '''ash1ngton" Doe Q eelassifi efj and apprO'v'efj fCH­ elease bV r\JSA. on 06-01-2009 ")ursuant tel E.O. 12958, as ~. ~ ~I'- ~ - tTIf::::! r11._'-j f::::!1._.-. '-j . C'I ec i:.i._,~c l=°n·.Jc'._. "17• ,i ", .. .. (~.UROPEAN ft..xIS SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE, IN WORlJ)' WAR 11-) " , . AS REVEALED BY f!·'IIICOM.!~ I~5TIGATIONS Al~D·Bl. OTHER PRISOrmR OF WAH INTERROGATIONS AND CAPTUaED MATERIAL" PR'INCIPALLY GERl4AN . ' , (VOLUME 3;'-THE SIG~AL INTELLIGENC~ AGENCY ... '. OF Tllli. SUPREME' COMIMND D ~D '2FORCES » ,I / I prepared under the direction of the 'L ; CHIEF I ,ARMY SECURITY AGENCY ,; 1 May 1946 •I '1 . .",,--' \ WDGi\S-14 , ' -_. -- - ... __ - __. '. ';"L_ ' /. ---._---- --- ----- --- - -- ---'- ----:-- -" - ------ •__ ---:>.._- ---.-_._----',---. --- l DocrD: ·3560827 VOLUME " The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht/Ch1ffrierabtellung, abbreviated OXW/Chi) Chapter I. Introduction Chapter II. Organization Chapter III. Intercept Chapter IV. Operations Chapter V. Relations with other Cryptologic Agencies Tab A. Tab B. \ DocrD: 3560827 VOLUME ,: OKW/Ch1 Chapte1' I. Introduction Paragraph Sources of information. • •• • . 1 Notes on OKW/Ch1 before the war •• • •• • . • 2 1. Sources ot Information. Befpre tile TICOM teams began theIr InvestIgation Iii aermanYI it was known t11at the Supreme Command ot the German Armed Forces (Oberkom­ mando del' Wehrmacht, abbreviated OKW) contained a signal intelligence section (Ch1tf'rierabte1ll1ng, abbreviated Chi, hence OKW/Ch1).1 Pre-TICOM knowledge at the activities ot OKW/Chi was vel'j limited, but it was assumed that, as the highest echelon signal intelligence service, it would co­ ordinate and perhaps direct the signal intelligence work of the Army, Davy and Air Force and would probably assemble the ablest cryptanalysts tor attacks on systems with which the si!D&l intelligence services ot the separate branches were unable to cope. Consequently, OKW/Chi vas ·given first p~iority among the TIC~~ targets. By the time tl19 TICOlt1 teams began operations, OKW/Chi had lef't Berlin and had separated, as was learned later, into a northern and southern group. Shortly afterwards, most of' their documents had been disposed of and most of the personnel had been swallowed up by one or another of the large prison camps hastily set up to.receive the defeated German armed f'orc~s. Thence they were released into civil­ ian lUe, of't~n witllout leav1n6 a trace in the records of the C8.lllJ>8. lWithin the organization of' the OKW, t~ Signal Intelligence Section was subordinated to.the Armed Forces Group (Amts­ gru:ppe Wehrmachtnachr1chtenverb1ndl,Ulgen•.abbreviated AB. Wl'iV) • This department was in tum under the ·Armed Forces Operations staft (Wehrmachtrue1lrungssta,b, abbreviated WFSt). The rull abbreViation f'or the SigDal Intelligence Section . of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forcos is, there.tore, OlJi{/'tIFSt.ZAg. \mv/Ch1. The Germans ordinar1ly used the short form, OKW/Ch1. For the sake of' b~vity, this form is used throughout the present paper. ,.... 20n TICGM's attempt to find some of' these people in August 1945, see IF 167, p. 8. DocrD: 3560827 There was no question, theretore, ot capturing OKW/chi as a group. A number ot individual prisoners were taken wbo had once 'belonged to the organization or who knew something about its activities~ ot these, three proved to be ot out­ standing importance:~ 'a. Col. lIugo Kettler was chief ot OKW/chi (Chet OKW/Chi) trom the late summer ot 194} until the evacua­ tion ot Berlin by, the unit in March 1945. Kettler impressed interrogators as an alert, intelligent officer. He had persuaded himself' that, in view ot the o~lete collapse of' Ge1'lll8on a1"ll1s, he could best serve his country by cooperating with the Western allies in an effort to rebuild Ge1'lll8ony on a different basis. He was, therefore, willing to give an~ information desired, as far as he was able. His task at OKW/Ch1 was purely adm1n1stratlve. A.. Ii consequence, he was well informed on matters of charter, organization, number ot personnel engaged, ehannels tor commands and directives, liaison With al11es and other Ge1'lll8on cryptological &.bencies. He , was almost compl~tely ignorant of the t~chn1cal 8id~ . ot his unit's cryptological operations. b. Lt. Col. Mettig was second in command of OR-W/Chi trom J;ecember 194} until immediately before the end of the war, When, as 'nominal head ot the organization, he accomp­ anied the Geman surrender party first to Flensburg and then to 8HAEF lIeadquarters at Rheims. There he was taken into custody. Like Kettler, ll1ettig was a regular signal otticer, Who had occupied important posts in command of intercept and cryptological,un1ts. From Bovember 1941 unti.i. June 194:; he commanded ;J.nspectorate 7/V1 ot the Army IIigh Command (oXH/In 7/V1),. Between June 194} and his arrival as second in command ot OKW/chi in December 194}, he had commanded the signal batta110n ot an armored co~s on the eastern, front (Armored Corps Signal Batta110n 448). ' In adci'1tion to his duties as second in command, 3T,be most complete acqount of' the finding of' Kettler and Mettig and their reaction to interrogation will be tound in Lt. Kirby's supplement to the report of Ticom Team 6,'1F-165. 4Col• Kettler was interroga.ted'15 June 1945 and released(I-47) • 2 DOClD: 3560827 MettiG had served in OKW/Chi as officer .in charge of intercept. After the re"'organ1zation in Noveluber 1944, he became head of the cryptographic division. In general, Mettis's knowledge of the work of his organi­ za.tion was, l1ke that of Kettler. the knowledge of an admSnistratlve officer. The interrogations of Mettis. however, were more nUll1erous and more thorOUgh than. those of Kettler. Unlike Kettler. he was brought to the United Kingdom for detailed interrogation. Besides con­ firming what had already been obtained from Kettler, there­ fore, Mettig supplied. on matters of organization and of specific tasks accomplished or attempted, a great many details omitted by Kettler. His knowledge, however, like Kettler's, was principally of a non-technical sort. Mettig was truthful in so far as his statements could be verified, and many of the~ could be,5 b~t he seemed to feel that his dignity as an officer would be compromised by over-eage~ess to volunteer 1ntormation.b c. Specialist Dr. ~rich Huettenhain was the chief cryptanalyst of OKW/Chi. lIuettenha1n haCl been 'With the organization from 1937 and had himself built up the sec­ tion which he headed, personall:y selecting most of those employed in it. Huettenha1n's sect~on may be Clescribed &s the cryptanalytic research section of the organization. It had a Clual task. First. it attacked the more difficult enemy and neutral systems. those which were beyonQ the capacity .of the routine breaking section which consisted mainly of linguists whose primary tasks were the breaking of unenciphered codes and translation.· Second. it investigated the security 'of ·~rman systems and made suggestions to the cryptographers. Huettenha1n was primarily not an administrator but a working cryptanalyst who had a detailed technical knowledge of the work of his section. He was. therefore, a valuable source of informa­ tion on cryptanalytic techniques both manual and machine SBelo'W some instances are pointed out 'Where Mettig's account fails to agree in minor details with certain 1Dtormat1on from other sources. Here it is a question ot Mettig'a memory rather than his veracity. ~st1mate of interro&&tors in 1-78 and 1-121; life history in 1-78. details on OKW/Chi in 1-96. j DOClO: 3560827 known to the org&n1zation. His position also lD&kes his _ negative testimony of considerable value, since it is inconceivable that helhJuld not have known of any consider­ able cryptanalytic accomplishment of the.organ1zation. Hu~ttenhain was captured with Kettler, had discussed With him the ethical aspects of the question of revealing in­ formation to the western allies, and was in agreement with him that Germany could best be served by an attitude of complete co-operation. The interrogators considered him an honn'able and truthrul man. In addition, they came to have a high regard tor his technical ability.7 Before he Vas employed by OKW/Chi, Huettenhain was an academic I118.thelll8.t1cian whose interest in the problems of Mayan chronology led to an interest in cryptography and finally to OKW/Chi. In answering the interrogators and in writing papers tor them, Huettenhain was always assisted by Technician (Lieutenant Grade) Dr. Walther Fricke. Fricke was a I118.thematician of some distinction who had been drafte~ into the Signal Corps and assigned to the Signal Intelli­ gence Service of the Army. Here he came to specialize in the development of Gernfan Army ciphers. With his unit, Inspectorate 7/VI of the ArrIry R1.gh Command, (OKB/In 7/vr) he was taken into OKW/Chi in n~~ember 1944 where he con­ tinued his former york on German ArmY ciphers, but added to it the broader task of assisting Huettenhain and others in the work of revising the security of the German Armed Forces -- a work which had become the primary task of .OKW/Chi.8 In many of the interrogation reports it is impossible to distinguish between the contribution of Fricke and that of Huettenha1n. It is a pretty sate assumption however, that in regard to the work of OKW/Chi, Fricke contributed little or nothing that Huettenha1n could not have supplied. 7This estimate is based on oral statements of the interrogators.