287 Appendix Homage to Georg Henrik von Wright Precisely the fact that in this book I have frequently criticized von Wright's theses and have been trying to present a norm-logical and action theory which in various respects can be regarded as an alternative to von Wright's theory induces me to emphasize, in this appendix, not only the extraordinary merits of this thinker for the development of the philosophical analysis of action-related thinking and of the field of practical philosophy; I also wish to explicitly call attention to the highly important conformities existing between our respective objectives and attitudes in our research, while furthermore it will be my concern to show where our respective approaches differ and from this divergence between our methodological conceptions to explain the differences between our research results. In my eyes there is no doubt that no other modern philosopher has achieved so much for the development of logical and methodological analysis in practical philosophy (in the broadest sense), nor has set so much into motion spiritually, as this author has. All of us who are interested in this field of practical philosophy have learned a great deal from him and - even more important in my eyes - have been stimulated to reflect about problems of logical and philosophical analysis in the field of the practice (i.e. of the action-related disciplines). For all this we owe him highest recognition and profound thanks. I do not intend to present and to evaluate at this place the en­ tire philosophical achievements of this famous author. Instead, I shall 288 HOMAGE TO GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT confine myself to his works in the domain which approximately since 1951 has been his central topic: the philosophy of the practice, and the logic and rational-analytical methodology of the practical fields. And here I feel a profound affinity of von Wright's philosophical in­ terests with my own endeavors. My personal reflections, my critical analyses and my contributions pursued (albeit with modest strength) exactly the same goal: to bring the logical-philosophical theory ahead - as far as possible - in the field of the practice. l On the whole - except for a brief period2 - von Wright proceeded from the indepen­ dence of action-related thinking and emphasized the explanation of action in an intentionalistic conception. In the fields of the logic of norms (deontic logic), axiology and action theory he has presented an abundance of ingenious analyses and systematic treatises which, more than the works of any other thinker, have contributed to making such investigations and corresponding logical systems an established discipline of logical and philosophical research. In view of our pursuit of identical research interests and of certain common basic tendencies in our attitudes on practical philosophy the question deserves to be asked why we nevertheless have arrived at such different views in some essential questions of the logic of norms and of action theory. 1 My interest in this direction was not primarily awakened by von Wright, but by the recognition that the structure-theory of law presupposes the clarification of the underlying logical questions. In addition, the desire probably also played a part to be able to treat moral problems with the means of rational analysis. I was interested in particular in the structure of justifications, without expecting that the value problems of ethics could be solved by logical analyses. I have been a non-cognitivist all my life . 21 am referring here to the works from the period that von Wright - evi­ dently under the suggestive influence of Kelsen's theory from his latest period - doubted the possibility of a logic of norms. Cf. in particular his address at the 1983 Helsinki World Congress of the IVR on "Is and Ought" (published in: E. Bulygin et al. (eds.), Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life, D. Reidel, Dor­ drecht/Boston/Lancaster 1985, p.263-281), and the article "Bedingungsnormen­ ein Prufstein fur die Normenlogik" (Conditional Norms - A Touchstone for the Logic of Norms) in the festschrift in my honor 1984. HOMAGE TO GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT 289 I believe that the chief difference between our respective ap­ proaches is to be found in our different views on the role of language in philosophical investigation, while furthermore there is the influence, apparently a quite radical one, Ludwig Wittgenstein has had on his pupil and friend von Wright. If my interpretation is right, von Wright deviates in his views from Wittgenstein in that he regards philosophical problems not only as linguistic ones, but also, at least sometimes, as genuine material problems. In addition he is closer to logical positivism - without trying to make philosophy a specific branch of science - and he strives for attaining systematic rational reconstructions (the construction of specific logical systems). Philosophy is the explanation of our conceptual intuitions, says von Wright in his Intellectual Autobiography in the Schilp-Hahn volume "The Philosophy of George Henrik von Wright" (1987).3 My standpoint with regard to Wittgenstein and his conception about philosophizing - and indirectly with regard to von Wright's ap­ proach - is expressed in my address at the Wittgenstein symposiun, which I will now cite below, together with an appendix added subse­ quently.4 3This view does not strike me as wholly unproblematical inasmuch as our intuition (and the evidence connected with it) is partly a result of rational reconstruction. Intuition by and for itself cannot be grasped, so to speak. It becomes apparent, in my opinion, only from the analysis of the problem situation and from the subsequent constructive or reconstructive thinking. 40. Weinberger, Tiefengrammatik und Problemsituation. Eine Untersuchung tiber den Charakter der philosophischen Analyse (Depth Grammar and Problem Situation. An Investigation into the Nature of Philosophical Analysis), in: Proceedings of the 2nd International Wittgenstein Symposium 1977, "Wittgenstein und sein EinfiufJ auf die gegenwiirtige Philosophie!! (Wittgenstein and his influence on present-day philosophy), Vienna 1978, p.290-297. 290 HOMAGE TO GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT 1. Philosophical analysis and philosophical cog­ nition What is philosophy? A system of assertions expressing specific insights, or an intellectual activity of a special kind? In the spirit of Wittgenstein it can be said that it is mainly a matter here of seeing and analyzing philosophically, i.e. that emphasis should be put on the activity of philosophizing. ['Philosophy is not a theory, but an activity.' TLP (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) 4.112] While I would agree that philosophy is above all investigating activity, the nature of philosophy can in my opinion only then be grasped correctly if one understands by 'philosophy' both: the activity of philosophizing as well as the systems of theses or recognitions resulting from such philosophizing. The activity of philosophizing is traditionally called 'philosophical reflection'. The terms 'philosophizing', 'philosophical reflection' and 'philosophical analysis' desginate one and the same activity. Objects of philosophical analysis are intellectual and other human activities as well as their products. Through philosophical reflection, philosophical theses are gained which in relation to the analyzed activity are to be regarded as meta-propositions. If the question is asked just what philosophizing is, just how philo­ sophical analyses are conducted and just on what basis philosophical theses are justified, then one is moving, with regard to the analyzed object, on a meta-level of the second grade. Then one will be dealing with the theory of philosophizing, which I call 'metaphilosophy'. It is important to pay attention to this stratification into analyzed activity - philosophical reflection - metaphilosophy, since one may be successful to varying degrees, on each level. It is possible to correctly perform the analyzed activity, while describing it incorrectly in one's reflection, and vice versa: one can perform the activity badly, but reflect upon it correctly and in this reflection even develop adequate methods for performing these activities. This applies analogously to the relation between philosophizing and metaphilosophy. One may HOMAGE TO GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT 291 present sound philosophical analyses, while inadequately describing the character of this philosophical analysis, with the reverse likewise being possible: one may know correct methods of philosophizing, but perform poor philosophical analyses. No modern-age philosopher has influenced philosophical analysis more profoundly than Ludwig Wittgenstein. His main achievement lies in the perseverance and subtility of his investigations, which are exemplary. No less influential was his metaphilosophy. I contend, however, that his theses about the nature of philosophizing (r) do not conform to what he did himself, and (II) do not represent adequately what philosophy is and what it means. 2. Countertheses against Wittgenstein's meta­ philosophy I contrast Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical conceptions with the fol­ lowing countertheses: 1. his opinion that philosophy is merely a clarifying linguistic analysis with my contention that philosophy has its own specific material problems; 2. his view that philosophical analysis, as an investigation using the tools of depth-grammar, is a method of looking at language which I contrast with the epistemological and structural analysis of problem situations