Rachelle Alterman. Planning in the Face of Crisis: Housing, Land Use and Mass Immigration in Israel pre-publication version of a book published by Routledge (London), 2002. Introduction Critics of urban and regional planning argue that planning is geared mainly to regulate and manage the small, incremental types of change typical of most cities, towns, and regions. Indeed, most of the academic and professional literature for the guidance of planners is targeted to everyday situations. But what of unexpected, large-scale changes? Can planning also then be of use? Will the theories and kit of tools available to urban, regional, or national planners be effective in a major crisis? Purpose and rationale My interest in the role of planning in a time of crisis did not arise “out of the blue”. It stemmed from a craving to understand the unique story of a major crisis in Israel, in order to learn from it how better to deal with a future crisis and to educe useful lessons for planners working in other countries and in other contexts. The crisis was generated by the unexpected and massive influx of immigrants to Israel that started in 1990, stabilized in 1992- 3, and challenged the basic tenets of existing planning and public policy for the entire decade. I attempt to analyze the ways in which professional planners and high level political leaders represented the crisis and responded to it The Israeli saga is one of the more distinct large-scale "laboratories" of recent times which allows for the study of a major crisis situation in a democratic polity and developed economy where the crisis is not a product of war or of a natural disaster. Crises brought about by disasters have been the dominant focus for public-policy researchers interested in studying decision making in times of crisis and uncertainty. But disasters are quite different from “positive” crises in terms of the expected planning and legal response. When disasters occur, drastic emergency legal powers come into force along with rules of conduct that cannot teach us much about non-emergency situations. Planners should learn how to prepare for and deal not only with disasters, but also with crises that may hold positive opportunities for cities and regions. The immigrant-absorption crisis in Israel is an especially convenient case study because it enables one to observe planners' responses "before", "during", and “after” the crisis – vantage points that other major national crises rarely offer. The relatively short and well-bounded period of time when the crisis was at its peak enables me to examine how the crisis unfolded in “real time”, as well as some of its outputs and likely outcomes as they appeared by 1999. Readers are invited to draw lessons or insights that could be applicable to less encompassing crises that might occur in their planning environment. My personal experience in doing this research was unlike any other I have experienced hitherto. Sensing that I was immersed in something that might be important for planners and which might never to be repeated in its magnitude, I found myself taking notes profusely and collecting material. But at the time, I had no hypotheses or theory to explain what was occurring. For that I needed some distance. After the crisis ebbed in 1993, I sat down to review the large set of materials that I had collected in real-time, and to write the first round of my analysis. This analysis included an interpretation of the phases of the crisis, planners’ responses to them, and the 1 Rachelle Alterman. Planning in the Face of Crisis: Housing, Land Use and Mass Immigration in Israel pre-publication version of a book published by Routledge (London), 2002. roles planners played1. More time had to pass before I could reasonably assess some of the outcomes and impacts of the crisis on planners and planning. This book is the result of these two rounds of analysis. As I unfold the story of how Israeli planners and decision-makers coped with the mass- immigration challenge, I shall not hide my feelings of excitement at having had the opportunity to observe and participate in a once-in-a-planner's-lifetime event.. Information base The information for this book comes from a variety of sources and research methods. Much of the information on the decision-making during the crisis was obtained through the participant- observer technique. I was personally involved in some of the national and local decision forums that were set up to deal with the crisis, participated in the conferences of professionals that were convened to search for solutions, and had conversations in real-time with leading planners and decision-makers. In addition, I was involved in the two national planning initiatives that took place during the crisis (as a member of the steering committee of National Plan 31, and as an active team member of Project “Israel 2020”). Needless to say, the circumstance that a single researcher would have personal knowledge of major aspects of national-level planning as well as of some aspects of local planning is a luxury that only a small country such as Israel could provide. To supplement the first-hand information, I relied on various official publications2 and media reports. In addition, a series of ex-post interviews were conducted with key national-level and local-level decision-makers and planners during 1994-1996. They were asked to provide a retrospective – though close-to-events – view of decision-making during the height of the crisis, and to compare it with the periods of time before and after. The time that had elapsed between the crisis and the interviews was short enough to allow for reasonably accurate recollection, yet it was long enough to allow for some initial assessment and evaluation of outcomes. My own assessment of the outcomes, as they manifest themselves 9 years after the crisis began, is based on statistical information published by the Israel Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Housing. I have also used published research and reports in the mass media on various aspects of immigrant absorption and have drawn on the experience gained from my continued involvement in planning decision bodies. While focusing mostly on the national level, this book also deals with local-level responses to the crisis. Two case studies were selected - Carmiel and Nazareth Illit – towns the Galilee, Israel’s northern region (see the map in Chapter 4). These towns had some of the highest immigrant- intake rates in the country, relative to population size. They had a population of 20-30,000 before the crisis, and grew by more than 50% within a few years through immigrant intake. Both welcomed new immigrants, saying “yes” to growth. I gathered the information through a set of interviews with local politicians, planners, and administrators3. The purpose of the case studies was to see how local elected officials and citizens reacted to the avalanche of new immigrants who landed on their doorstep every day and night during the height of the crisis. How did the local planners view the goals and value-dilemmas posed by the unexpected challenge? How did this challenge fit their vision of their town’s future? I was particularly interested in how planners and other personnel handled the uncertainties, the burdens, and the potential conflicts with the central government that this new situation presented. The 2 Rachelle Alterman. Planning in the Face of Crisis: Housing, Land Use and Mass Immigration in Israel pre-publication version of a book published by Routledge (London), 2002. local planners in these two towns exhibited different responses in their handling of the crisis and, for the most part, in their reactions to the central-government initiatives. A Preview A solid grounding in theory is necessary if this book is to fulfill its goals. I therefore devote Part I to a review of the theoretical underpinnings of the study of crises and how they influence decision-making. This part opens with a chapter that establishes the extent of immigration to Israel during 1990-1992 and compares it to immigration rates in other advanced-economy countries in order to argue that so large an immigrant intake constitutes a potential crisis and has wide repercussions. The second chapter scans the theoretical basis for analyzing crises and asks two questions: What are the attributes of crisis situations, and what do planning theorists tell us about the capacity of planning to handle crises? The third chapter applies the list of attributes to the crisis under study. Part II draws the “base line” of land-use planning, land policy, and housing policy in Israel on the eve of the crisis. In order to assess the changes in process and outcomes that the crisis produced, it is necessary to understand Israel’s land policy, statutory planning system, and housing policy. Chapter 4 presents an introduction to Israel’s land and housing policies, and Chapter 5 is an introduction to the land-use planning and development control system. Part III, with its seven chapters (6-12), is the heart of the book. It analyzes the government decision-making process during the crisis, as it unfolded at the national level, with occasional reference to the local level. The emphasis is on the housing and urban-development decisions. In order to understand this process, I first develop a theoretical framework, formed inductively rather than through deduction from theory, to serve as our scaffolding for analyzing the phases that the crisis actually went through. This framework identifies five phases of decision making during the crisis, and looks at the modes of planning and decision-making at each phase.