City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 6-2016 Art as Display Frank M. Boardman Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1222 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] ART AS DISPLAY by FRANK BOARDMAN A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2016 © 2016 FRANK BOARDMAN All Rights Reserved ii ART AS DISPLAY by FRANK BOARDMAN This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Professor Noël Carroll_______________________ ______________ __________________________________________ Date Chair of Examining Committee Professor Iakovos Vasiliou____________________ ______________ __________________________________________ Date Executive Officer Professor Noël Carroll______________________________________ Professor Nickolas Pappas___________________________________ Professor Jonathan Gilmore__________________________________ Professor Jesse Prinz_______________________________________ Professor Peter Godfrey-Smith_______________________________ Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Art as Display Abstract Art is essentially a type of display. As an activity, art is what we do when we display objects with certain intentions. As a set of objects, art is all of those things that are displayed for those purposes. The artworld is the social atmosphere that surrounds this particular activity of display. And a history of art is an evolving narrative of change in the practice of this sort of display. Specifically, to focus for convenience on art as a set of objects, this is what we can call the “displayed-object thesis”: x is a work of art iff: (a) x is presented to a public audience for the purpose of their appreciation or contemplation of x and (b) a proper understanding of x requires recognition of (a). This dissertation is an attempt to articulate, explain and justify the displayed-object thesis. At the moment, there is probably an air of temerity about offering another definitional theory, much less an essential one. The last fifty or so years have seen less disagreement about the (dis)value of such an ambition than about the reasons for it’s retrograde status. In the first few chapters, then, I offer a number of defenses of the project itself against claims that a successful essential definition is impossible, improbable, or redundant. I then turn to the displayed-object thesis itself, explaining and arguing for its key components as well as responding to objections to it. In the final chapters, I turn our attention forward, toward certain practical and theoretical benefits of the theory. iv Acknowledgements Were I to try to thank everyone who had some part in helping me formulate, craft or complete this dissertation, I would undoubtedly leave out half the deserving. But there are many without whom this thing would not be possible - I leave it to them to decide if this is praise or blame. So I’ll adopt these criteria: the following people have knowingly played a significant role in the creation of this dissertation (or at least its content), this dissertation would be substantially different were it not for their involvement, and it is better for their contributions. Noël Carroll has been with this project since its beginning, providing more excellent advice, suggestions, objections, help and inspiration than I can name or even recall. Nick Pappas too has played a significant part in making each part of this dissertation better. I can’t thank them enough for all of their time, patience, kindness, attention and skill. Jesse Prinz, Iakovos Vasiliou, Peter Godfrey-Smith, and Alan Hausman have all made invaluable comments and criticisms on the dissertation in one form or another. A few arguments I make here have appeared or been delivered elsewhere, and I thank the editors and anonymous reviewers as well as the organizers and commenters at those journals and conferences. None of this would be possible without all sorts of help from my wife Samantha – most notably long meandering conversations wherein a number of the central ideas of this dissertation were worked out. And finally thanks to my daughter Eleanor, for reminding me of the pleasure, amazement and joy art can produce as well as the (sometimes pressing) need to find and figure out – all of which constitute the only decent motivations for this whole endeavor. v Table of Contents Chapter One: Introduction 1 Confessing and wagering 1 Why a philosophy of art? 2 Plan of the dissertation 5 Chapter Two: Challenges to the Definitional Project 8 A successful definition of “art” is impossible 9 A successful (essential) definition of “art” is improbable 28 We don’t know what we want from a definition of “art” 31 Chapter Three: Prior Definitional Theories 38 Representational (mimetic) theories 38 Art as the beautiful or revelatory 39 Expresssivist theories 46 Art as language 48 Aesthetic theories 54 Institutional theories 61 Historical theories 65 Alternative-structure theories 73 Chapter Four: Art as Display, Art as Displayed Object 83 Motivation 84 Articulating the theory 103 Chapter Five: The Case for the Theory 114 Meeting skeptical challenges 114 Preserving advantages over prior theories 119 Satisfying the proper criteria 125 Chapter Six: The Displayed Object In… 140 Plastic arts 141 Performing arts 146 Film and photography 150 Literary arts 152 Architecture, furniture, and design 153 Anticipating the avant-garde 155 The value of displayed objects to art research 159 Chapter Seven: Art, Display, and Evaluation 167 Wollheim’s “Art and Evaluation” 168 Aesthetic and artistic value 169 Identifying the proper object of aesthetic evaluation 175 The justification of aesthetic judgments: four options 181 Objections 184 Another type of aesthetic relativism 193 Conclusion: Where We Are, Why I Brought Us Here 197 A very fast look behind 197 A very fast personal history: art 198 A very fast personal history: the philosophy of art 199 A very fast look ahead 200 Bibliography 202 vi Chapter One: Introduction I. Confessing and wagering Let’s begin in the middle, work our way back to it, and see where we can go from there. This is a definition of art, and the one I think is correct: x is a work of art iff: (a) x is presented to a public audience for the purpose of their appreciation or contemplation of x and (b) a proper understanding of x requires recognition of (a). There is a kind of confessional relief in having that out and in the open, in there being no secrets between us. It feels like a good confession because it sounds absurd once it’s said. What right do I have, after so many others’ failed attempts to define art and so many attempts to show that we cannot define art, to offer one more? None, except that I think it is the right one. And if there’s some hubris in offering such a theory, there’s something Quixotic about trying to convince you that it’s the right one. But I’m going to do that too. A lot has to happen between now and then. I’m going to have to argue that a definitional theory of art is possible, that we don’t have the right one yet, that this one is explainable and plausible, that there is at least one good justification for it, and that we can do something useful with it. We’ll have to see, of course, about the logical and truthful quality of these arguments - but at least these qualities have soundness as a clear and obvious (if likely unattainable) standard. I want the arguments to be not just sound but convincing as well, and rhetorical success does not have such a clear standard. So what will count as a victory for me? As at the track, “winning” is relative to the wager. On the win ticket, I convince you that the definition above uniquely captures necessary 1 and sufficient conditions for art status, and also that this is a valuable thing to know. No other theory succeeds in this way. On the place ticket, I win or you’re convinced that the theory provides a valuable contribution to an evolving conversation about what constitutes art status. Some other theories do this. On the show ticket, I win, place, or you’re convinced that the theory brings to light certain under-appreciated features of art, and that doing so is valuable. More theories do this. A placing or strong showing would be enough to warrant our efforts and time. But a horse shows by trying to win, so let’s aim for a win. II. Why a philosophy of art? We will come to the question of whether or not a definitional theory of art specifically can be warranted or useful.1 But there may be two forms of resistance to any philosophy of art, to engaging with art philosophically. The first form asks why we should philosophize about art as opposed to other things? I get the sense, for instance, that it is often assumed that there is an extra burden on the aesthetic theorist to justify himself even above that which falls on all philosophers. Perhaps the kind of “dreariness” J.A. Passmore ascribed to many theories of art criticism is thought to infect all of aesthetics. Passmore’s concern, though, was explicitly with those theories that expressed a certain “wooliness” of thought, especially that they “fail to reveal with any sharpness the characteristics of [their] subject matter.”2 It sounds as though a rigorous attempt at a philosophically illuminating theory of art is just what was needed in 1951.