MODERN UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM: NATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES IN UKRAINE, 1988-1992. by Andrew Wilson Thesis submitted for the partial fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD degree at the University of London, autumn 1993. UMI Number: U056278 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U056278 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ( MtEtS £ 1S F 7 0 8 2 2 CONTENTS Preface 3 list of abbreviations 6 Chapter 1: Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine; The Intelligentsia, Political Parties and the State 8 Chapter 2: The Development of Party Politics in Ukraine, 1988-1992 60 Chapter 3: The Prisoners’ Party: From the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, 1988-1990, to the Ukrainian Republican Party, 1990-1992 110 Chapter 4: Rukh : Ukraine's Popular Front 176 Chapter 5: The Party of the Intelligentsia: The Democrats 221 Chapter 6: The Street Party: The Ukrainian National Assembly 258 Chapter 7: Smaller Groups: Ethnic Nationalists and Others 292 Chapter 8: Nationalist Splits and Coalitions 325 Conclusion 344 Notes and references 352 Map: Ukraine’s regions 16 3 PREFACE This work studies the nature of nationalism in a country whose stability is of vital concern to Western Europe. Apart from Russia herself, Ukraine is the largest country to emerge from the break-up of the USSR, and its size, population, economic potential and military power mean that the stability, or even survival, of most other states in the region is dependent on what happens in Ukraine. Moreover, relations between Ukraine and Russia are the key to the politics of the whole region. Ukraine's attitude to Russia is complicated, however. On the one hand, many Ukrainian nationalists are deeply hostile to Russia as their traditional imperial enemy, but on the other hand they are in a minority within their own country. Many ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Eastern and Southern Ukraine would prefer to see the maintenance of close links with Russia. The Ukrainian nationalist movement has therefore historically been weak, unable to command a natural majority in its own country. In response to this weakness, some Ukrainian nationalists have in the past sought to build bridges with Eastern and Southern Ukraine by constructing a broad-based civic nationalism, whilst others have reacted in frustration and embraced an authoritarian ethnic nationalism of the type which has caused so much trouble elsewhere in Europe after the collapse of communism. This work therefore examines the nature of the modem Ukrainian nationalist movement since its emergence in 1988. It demonstrates that the movement was unable to fully overcome its historical weaknesses, and that Ukrainian independence was only achieved in August 1991 with the help of the former imperial elite in Ukraine, that is with those 'national communists' who embraced the national cause in 1990-1. After independence, in 1991-2, the nationalists were able to push their agenda on the national communists, but were unable to expand their overall appeal. The nationalists were therefore not in a strong position to prevent the national communists backsliding on their agenda, as leftist and regional lobbies began to grow in Eastern and Southern Ukraine from the summer of 1992 onwards. The work also demonstrates that, although most Ukrainian nationalists emphasised civic nationalism in 1988-90, most had moved to the right by the end of 1992. Ethnic nationalism, only a minority concern in 1988, was growing strongly in popularity by the end of the period. The work is based on original sources collected in Ukraine during a series of visits in 1991-2, including party press and publications, party archives, interviews with leading figures, and the Ukrainian press, both central and local. The limited range of secondary literature available was also consulted. Chapter 1 uses the ideal-type distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism to examine the development of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the twentieth century. Chapter 2 surveys the development of political parties in Ukraine, and then Chapters 3-7 look at the main nationalist parties individually. Chapter 8 then looks at the key split in the nationalist movement in early 1992, and at various attempts to bind the nationalist camp back together. Transliteration is based on the Library of Congress system. However, in a common modification of the system, words beginning with 'iu' or 'ia' begin with a 'y' (therefore 'Yurii' instead of Turn'). A soft sign is transliterated as an apostrophe (Nezalezhnist ' ), and a Ukrainian apostrophe as a speech mark Luk"ianenko( ). Ukrainian and Russian words are in italics, except those which have passed into common usage such as perestroika and glasnost (no apostrophe), as excessive italicisation is ugly. Ukrainian place names are used throughout, therefore 'Odesa' is used instead of 'Odessa', the 'Donbas' instead of the 'Donbass', and so on. 'Kiev', rather than 'Kyiv' is retained as a common Anglicism. I have innumerable people to thank, but the following are most worthy of mention. Jonathon Aves, Dominique Arel and Brendan O'Leary contributed invaluable comments on the text; and my secretaries Jenny and Marion help in practical matters. My supervisor Dominic Lieven provided patient and constructive guidance, and was always around when I needed advice. Taras Kuzio has helped me with contacts in Ukraine. In Ukraine itself, I would like to thank Valentyn Yakushik; Ihor Ostash, Yurii Petrus and all the staff at the International Association/School of Ukrainian Studies. I am grateful to Natalka Petrus for her hospitality. Above all, I would like to thank Helen Skillicom in London for her love and support. 6 List of abbreviations: ACAIF Anti-Communist Anti-Imperial Front CDFU Congress of Democratic Forces of Ukraine CNDF Congress of National-Democratic Forces CPU Communist Party of Ukraine DPU Democratic Party of Ukraine DSU (Organisation for) Ukrainian Statehood and Independence GPU Green Party of Ukraine KUN Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists LPU Labour Party of Ukraine OUN Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists OUN-r OUN-revolutionary (radical Banderites) OUN-s OUN-solidarity (more moderate Melnykites) OUN-z OUN-'abroad' (social democrats) PDRU Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine RUP Revolutionary Ukrainian Party SDPU Social Democratic Party of Ukraine SNUM Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth SPU Socialist Party of Ukraine SRs Socialist Revolutionaries UCDF/P Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front/Party UCRP Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party UDRP Ukrainian Democratic-Radical Party UHG Ukrainian Helsinki Group UHU Ukrainian Helsinki Union UIA Ukrainian Inter-Party Assembly ULS (Taras Shevchenko) Ukrainian Language Society 7 UNA Ukrainian National Assembly UNCP Ukrainian National-Conservative Party UNDO Ukrainian National-Democratic Organisation UNF Ukrainian National Front UNR Ukrainian People’s Republic UNS Ukrainian Nationalist Union UNSO Ukrainian National Self-Defence Forces UOU Union of Officers of Ukraine UPA Ukrainian Insurgent Army UPDL/P Ukrainian People's Democratic League/Party UPDP Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party UPSF Ukrainian Party of Sodalists-Federalists UPSR Ukrainian Party of Sodalist-Revolutionaries URP Ukrainian Republican Party USDPU United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine USDWP Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party UWPU Ukrainian Workers’-Peasants' Union VOST All-Ukrainian Organisation of Workers' Solidarity WUU Writers’ Union of Ukraine 8 1. Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine: Political Parties, the Intelligentsia and the State. Introduction The years 1987-91 witnessed the spectacular growth and ultimate success of a powerful movement for national revival and independence in Ukraine. The formal declaration of Ukrainian independence on 24 August 1991, its ratification by popular referendum on 1 December 1991, and the subsequent struggle to underpin the declaration by building a viable nation-state have had profound consequences for the balance of power in Eastern Europe. Ukrainian independence was the single most decisive factor leading to the dissolution of the USSR, and Ukrainian nationalism has been a key factor in regional politics ever since. After Russia, Ukraine is the largest state in the region, and the fortunes of its smaller neighbours are inextricably bound up with those of the new Ukrainian state. Moreover, the interplay between Ukrainian and Russian nationalism will be the key determinant of the prospects for regional stability into the next century and beyond. Ukrainian nationalism was a relatively weak force in the pre-Soviet period, and even in the Gorbachev era developed late. Hence Ukraine’s declaration of independence caught many observers by surprise. Many were also surprised by the degree to which Ukrainian nationalism had apparently changed since the last serious attempt to gain Ukrainian independence, led in the 1940s by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN's uprising in 1941 followed