
An Incentive Security Model to Provide Fairness for Peer-to-Peer Networks 1st Samaneh Berenjian 2nd Saeed Hajizadeh 3rd Reza Ebrahimi Atani dept. Computer Science dept. Mathematics, Statistics, dept. Computer Engineering Stevens Institute of Technology and Computer Science University of Guilan New Jersey, USA University of Illinois at Chicago Rasht, Iran [email protected] Chicago, USA [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Peer-to-Peer networks are designed to rely on re- of P2P networks in which there is no central entity that can sources of their own users. Therefore, resource management control and arbitrate access to all resources, and to schedule plays an important role in P2P protocols. Therefore, resource fair allocation of bandwidth for a router. Moreover, in P2P management plays an important role in P2P protocols. Early P2P networks did not use proper mechanisms to manage fairness. networks there is no perception in advance regarding the However, after seeing difficulties and rise of freeloaders in amount of bandwidth resources available and peers cannot networks like Gnutella, the importance of providing fairness be relied upon to specify their own resources honestly [7]. for users have become apparent. In this paper, we propose an Although free-riding can be a deliberate act, many users may incentive based security model which leads to a network infras- become freeloaders or infringe fairness for lack of a proper tructure that lightens the work of Seeders and makes Leechers to contribute more. This method is able to prevent betrayals infrastructure [8]. 1 in Leecher-to-Leecher transactions and more importantly, helps Since Seeders are in the network only for altruistic Seeders to be treated more fairly. This is what other incentive reasons, a fair network should be designed in a way to put methods such as Bittorrent are incapable of doing. Additionally, most of the traffics on the shoulder of Leechers. In this way, by getting help from cryptography and combining it with our instead of getting free downloads, more users are encouraged method, it is also possible to achieve secure channels, immune to spying, next to a fair network. The simulation results clearly to contribute to the network. Also, by mitigating the work of show that how our proposed approach can overcome free-riding Seeders, we encourage them to stay longer in the network. For issue. In addition, our findings revealed that our approach is able this purpose, we propose an incentive method which provides to provide an appropriate level of fairness for the users and can a proper infrastructure for fairness in P2P networks. This decrease the download time. enables us to protect both Leecher-to-Leecher and Leecher- Index Terms—component, formatting, style, styling, insert to-Seeder transactions. In other words, we do not only focus on protecting Leechers against freeloaders, but our goal is I. INTRODUCTION to protect Seeders as well. Furthermore, we show that by A Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network is a distributed solution getting help and combining the standard methodology in which uses the resources of its own users. In these net- cryptography, i.e. RSA, we can secure our channels against works, each node uses the resources of other users and also line spying, next to providing a fair network. has the capability to provide resources for other nodes [1], The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section [2]. These networks have many applications, including file arXiv:1906.09355v3 [cs.NI] 27 Jun 2019 II we review the existing work for providing fairness in sharing, distributed processing and messages passing to other P2P networks. Section III introduces our proposed approach nodes which can cause many security problems [3], [4]. P2P and its respective components as an incentive approach to networks are highly dependent on resources of their own provide fairness in P2P networks. In section IV we elaborate users [5]. Therefore, the infrastructure of a P2P network our proposed approach by improving it with proper use of should encourage users for contributions as well as using the cryptography. In this section, we show how it is possible to resources of other members. The behavior of using resources protect communication channels as well. In section V we of others without giving anything in return is called free-riding analyze the functionality of our proposed method through [6]. As a consequence, free-riders cause slower download simulations. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VI. times for contributing peers. Thus, it is an essential need for a P2P network to guarantee fair bandwidth allocation, II. RELATED WORK where a peer receives bandwidth equal to what it contributes. Incentive-based systems usually consider some form of Accordingly, the system will be able to guarantee a certain reward to encourage users for more cooperation. BitTorrent level of performance for contributing peers. Fair bandwidth allocation in P2P networks is not an easy 1For simplicity, we call nodes with all packets, Seeder and nodes without task that can be tackled simply. This is due to the nature all packets, Leecher. These terminologies are taken from BitTorrent protocol. is one of the first major attempts which used incentive in authors suggested the use if a new P2P file sharing scheme its protocol [9]. It proposed a tit-for-tat (TFT) mechanism in based on the repeated Public Good (PG) game model. They order to incentivize peers to contribute resources to the system mostly focused on trust evaluation, repeated interactions, and and discourage free-riders. As an important benefit, TFT iterative self-learning techniques. The idea is to induce all encourages peers for more contribution without the need for peers to share files as many as possible by incorporating a centralized infrastructures. However, one important challenge trust-based P2P mechanism. The simulation results showed regarding BitTorrent is that the robustness of the system is that the proposed scheme is able to maintain system efficiency questionable. This is due to the fact that many of the contribu- as high as possible respond to current network conditions for tions for improving the performance are unnecessary and can adaptive management. be reallocated or refused while still improving performance Trust management systems are methods to establish word- for strategic users. As a result, there are always some peers of-mouth for P2P networks. This means that based on transac- who contribute more data to the system than others. tions between nodes, they evaluate a degree of trust for each It was shown that a cetralized authority can improve the node which is mostly used for establishing a fair network. fairness in BitTorrent [10]. In [11] and [12], the authors used Finding a malicious user from its neighbors is a selection BitTorrent infrastructure to build their own fairness models. problem. Methods such as fuzzy decision making [17], [18] The main idea is to incentivize seeder stay longer in the Bit- and genetic-based algorithms [19] can be used to select the Torrent network. The authors argued that download bandwidth free-riders from multiple criteria. A successful trust manage- of a leecher is the sum of all its associated peers’ upload ment system that uses this approach is [20]. The [16], [21] are bandwidth, so redistribution of its associated peers’ upload other examples of trust management systems. EigenTrust is the bandwidth could manage the leecher’s download bandwidth. name of an approach proposed In [16]. This method uses an Although these approaches can help those peers who stay algorithm to decrease the number of downloads of inauthentic longer in the network get better download speed, in some cases files in a P2P network that assigns each peer a unique global they increase the overall download completion time. trust value, based on the peer’s history of uploads. For this Next to BitTorrent and its derivatives, there are other purpose, the authors proposed a distributed and secure method incentive methods which take an independent approach such to compute global trust values, based on power iteration. These as [13]–[15]. In [13], the authors mainly focused on locating values are then used by peers to select the peers from whom free-riders and taking actions against them. They proposed a they download. framework in which each peer monitors its neighbors, decides As a result, the network will be able to identify malicious if they are free-riders, and takes appropriate actions. Moreover, peers and isolates them from the network. EigenTrust is able their approach does not require any permanent identification to decrease the number of inauthentic files on the network, of peers or security infrastructures for maintaining a global even under a variety of conditions where malicious peers reputation system. The results revealed that their proposed cooperate in an attempt to subvert the system. In [21], the framework is able to reduce the effects of free- riding and authors have introduced an approach to predict a peer’s co- can, therefore, increase the performance of a P2P network. operation level, focusing on the cooperation induced by the Although this is an interesting approach, it suffers from a P2P protocol rather than the cooperation that results from low number of downloads by contributors which arise from user behavior or bandwidth limitation. This method mainly false detection in determining free-riders. This will ultimately focuses on live streaming applications. By investigating the influence the performance. correlation between a peer’s cooperation level, the authors In [14], the authors have proposed a Gnutella-like unstruc- tried to show that three centrality metrics, namely out-degree, tured P2P file sharing network that utilizes free-riders to index out-closeness, and betweenness, are positively correlated with files. This method is aimed to assist route query messages to the cooperation level.
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