America’s First Cold War Army Combat Readiness in the Eighth US Army 1949-1950 AMERICA’S FIRST COLD WAR ARMY: COMBAT READINESS IN THE EIGHTH U.S. ARMY, 1949-1950 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Major Thomas E. Hanson, United States Army B.A., M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2006 Master’s Examination Committee: Approved by Dr. Allan R. Millett, Adviser Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Jr. Dr. Alan D. Beyerchen ____________________________ Adviser Department of History Copyright by Thomas E. Hanson 2006 ABSTRACT This study of the Eighth U.S. Army’s 1949-1950 combat training program argues that the generalizations regarding “occupation troops” used by historians and soldiers are simplistic. In point of fact they do little justice to the tens of thousands of soldiers and officers who did indeed seek to prepare themselves and their Army for war despite America’s post-war atomic monopoly. The American soldiers sent to Korea in the summer of 1950 suffered from gaps in their professional preparation, from missing and broken equipment, and from unevenly trained leaders at every level of command. Nevertheless, they expected to defeat the Communist enemy. Their confidence resulted from many factors, not least of which was an appreciation of the skill and cohesion developed over the course of the previous twelve months—a year of progressive, focused, and iterative collective training based on the lessons of combat in World War II. No one was more surprised than they when the North Koreans not only didn’t turn and run, but instead fought with courage and skill that required Herculean efforts to overcome. But because these American troops did not instantly stop the Red horde, their performance has become an indictment of the Eighth Army, and the U.S. Army as a whole, in the years 1945-1950. This judgment is based on a misguided and simplistic interpretation of events. The men of Task Force Smith and thousands like them in the understrength infantry regiments of Eighth Army achieved a signal strategic victory by ii preventing the Communists from completing their conquest of South Korea. This could not have been done had the men of the 7th, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division not possessed a significant degree of familiarity with U.S. doctrine and tactics, a familiarity that could only have come from a well-planned and progressive training plan. Without doubt there were shortfalls in training, ammunition, vehicles and spare parts, weapons, and even clothing. But unlike American soldiers of previous wars, the men of 1950 found themselves hastily projected into what was later termed a “come- as-you-are” war. Denied the luxury of a months- or years-long mobilization and training period such as their fathers and older brothers experienced in 1917 and 1941, the soldiers of Eighth Army fought with the tools at hand, and won. Acknowledgement of the Eighth Army’s accomplishments in 1949 and early 1950 should facilitate a shift in the debate away from the lack of preparedness of “Occupation troops” and back onto a discussion of policy decisions made by the Truman Administration in the wake of World War II. These decisions required a much larger military than the President was willing to support. In another time and under other circumstances, an Army Chief of Staff warned of the dangers of embracing “a twelve- division strategy with a ten-division Army.” Recognizing the significant constraints under which the Eighth Army operated in 1949 and 1950 will allow scholars and soldiers finally to discard what Douglas MacArthur called the “pernicious myth” of professional, physical and moral ineffectiveness that has heretofore prevented an honest discussion of Eighth Army’s capabilities and limitations on the eve of war in 1950. iii TO MY FATHER, LEE A. HANSON Second Lieutenant, Signal Corps Korea, 1953 iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am indebted to a host of family, friends, advisers, superiors, and archivists, all of whom contributed significantly to this project. In the interests of brevity I can thank by name only a few. First, I thank Professor Allan R. Millett for his unflinching support and faith that I would complete this project despite the competing demands of a full-time military obligation. His advice, support, and friendship have kept me focused on the goal and prevented my from overestimating minor obstacles. Second, I thank Professors John F. Guilmartin and Alan Beyerchen for the thoughtful criticisms and insights rendered while this project developed. Without their assistance and perspective I would have missed many fruitful avenues of inquiry whose results have immensely improved the whole. Third, I thank my colleagues and superiors at the U.S. Military Academy, especially Brigadier General (Retired) Robert Doughty, Colonel Matthew Moten, Professor Jenny Kiesling, Major Tom Rider, and Major Rick Black. Their encouragement and the many spirited discussions we had helped me refine my argument in several places. Fourth, the staff of the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, provided outstanding support during my several visits there. Despite the fact that I descended upon them annually with a dizzying variety of record requests, they v managed to find almost every document I sought. To them goes the lion’s share of the credit for the information contained herein. Finally and most importantly I must thank my children for their support of this endeavor despite all the travails of recent years. Though they have often not understood my quest for answers on this particular project, they have recognized in my efforts the pursuit of a dream. For their forbearance, their patience, and their understanding, and their love, I am eternally grateful. vi VITA February 25, 1965…………………………Born, Hibbing, Minnesota 1987………………………………………..B.A., History, University of Minnesota 1988-1992…………………………………Private Soldier and Noncommissioned Officer, United States Army 1992-present………………………………Commissioned Officer, United States Army 2002……………………………………….M.A., History, The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS “The Eighth Army’s Combat Readiness Before Korea: A New Appraisal,” Armed Forces & Society 29, 2 (Winter 2003), 167-184. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract………………………………………………………………………...………….ii Dedication………………………………………………………………...………………iv Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………..….....v Vita………………………………………………………………………………….…...vii List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………ix Chapters: 1. Introduction…………..…………………………………………………...…………...1 2. Postwar or Prewar Army?..............................................................................................20 3. The Bumpy Road From Rhetoric to Readiness……………………………...………..47 4. The 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division…………………...………………77 5. The 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division……………………………...……..97 6. The 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division…………………………...……..130 7. The 8th Cavalry Regiment (Infantry), 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry)……...………..154 8. Conclusions…………………………………………...……………………………...183 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………196 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1.1 Task Force Smith At Osan, July 5, 1950 2 1.2 Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker and 4 Major General William F. Dean, July 1950 2.1 Location of Major Unit Headquarters, 1949-1950 22 2.2 Japan and Northeast Asia 29 4.1 Colonel John W. Childs, 1950 78 4.2 Rifle Marksmanship Instruction, 1949 80 4.3 Heavy Mortar Crew Drills, 27th Infantry, 1949 82 4.4 Maneuver Training At Fuji-Susono, 1949 84 5.1 The Gunboggan created by Captain Hertel’s 120 Company E, 31st Infantry 5.2 Advanced Rifle Marksmanship Training At 124 Camp Crawford ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION I. Prologue On a rainy morning in early July 1950, American soldiers went to war for the second time in a decade. Four hundred and two men of Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith’s 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, fought a delaying action against the Communist Korean People’s Army (KPA) near Osan in South Korea. Beginning with its June 25, 1950, invasion, the KPA had repeatedly crushed all Republic of Korea (ROK) Army units in its path. American political and military leaders were stunned by the speed and audacity of the Communist assault. President Harry S. Truman on June 30 authorized General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to employ U.S. ground troops in Korea to restore the status quo ante. MacArthur, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command (FECOM) believed that without direct American intervention the North Koreans would quickly overrun the poorly-armed, numerically smaller ROK Army. Like most Americans, however, he also felt that a demonstration by a small American ground force as “an arrogant display of strength” would suffice to halt the KPA and save South Korea from Communist domination.1 As a result, on July 5, 1950, the soldiers of Task Force Smith became the physical embodiment of what MacArthur later described as a desire “to fool the enemy into a belief that I had greater resources at my disposal than I did.”2 1 Doris M. Condit, The Test of War, 1950-1953, Volume II, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), 53. 2 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 336. 1 Figure 1.1: Task Force Smith’s Fight Against the KPA 4th Division, July 5, 1950 The officers and men of Task Force Smith began their fight at 8:16 A.M., pitting their six 105-mm howitzers against 33 Soviet-built T-34 medium tanks. As the tanks closed 2 on the infantry position, soldiers armed with 57-mm recoilless rifles and 2.36-inch rocket launchers joined the fight. The combined fires disabled just two tanks; the others passed through the American position and continued south toward Pyongtaek. Two hours later the main body of the KPA 4th Division (about 4,000 infantry escorted by three more tanks) came within range of the defending Americans.