NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : THE SOVIET UNION, EASTERN AN D WESTERN EUROPE BEFORE AND AFTE R GERMAN UNIFICATIO N AUTHOR : Angela Sten t I CONTRACTOR : Georgetown University PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Charles Gat i COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 800-0 2 DATE : October 199 0 The work leading to this report was supported by funds provide d by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . The analysis and interpretations contained in the report ar e those of the author . NOT E This Report supplements that of Charles Gati (April 1990 ) entitled "THE BLOC THAT FAILED : Soviet-East European Relations i n Transition", and the textbook bearing the same title published b y Indiana University Press in May 1990 . It is one of a series o f lectures given during the summer of 1990, all of which, togethe r with the textbook and a course given at Georgetown University, wer e funded by the Council to strengthen East European studies . The Report consists of an interpretive account of Sovie t policy toward East and West Europe from the Brezhnev era to Jul y 1990 and concludes with a brief analysis of the possible nature o f future Soviet-European relations . It presents Soviet-Wes t European, especially Soviet-West German, relations of the Brezhne v era as a major factor in subverting the Eastern regimes ; analyze s motivations and perceptions underlying Gorbachev's departures, an d describes in some detail the shifting Soviet policy on Germa n unification . The collapse of the Soviet empire in Easter n Europe was primarily caused by the disintegration of communis t regimes within those countries imposed by the Kremlin an d never accepted by their populaces . Gorbachev's moves withi n the Soviet Union to dismantle the apparatus of the repressiv e ) bureaucratic communist system also hastened the demise o f Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Europe . Yet there was a third factor that contributed toward the East Europea n revolutions of 1989--the subversive impact of the Soviet-West European, especially Soviet-West German , detente of the Brezhnev era that ultimately helped to undermine Soviet power in Eastern Europe . In the pre-Gorbachev era, Western scholars who examine d the connection between Soviet policies toward Western an d Eastern Europe or the impact of Soviet West European policy o n Soviet East European policy usually came up with rather meage r results . l The whole subject was considered marginal to th e study of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe . Indeed, befor e Gorbachev took power the Kremlin consistently sought to kee p the two halves of its European policy discrete . This wa s particularly true of its relations with the two German states , although Brezhnev used the promise of closer inter-Germa n 1 The best example of such scholarship is Pierre Hassner , "Soviet Policy in Western Europe : The East European Factor, " in ed . Sarah M . Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe , (New Haven :Yale University Press, 1984 ) pp .285-314 . 1 relations to seek concessions from the Federal Republic . I n general, Soviet policy sought to control Eastern Europe an d influence Western Europe . 2 Under Brezhnev and in the earl y Gorbachev years, the Kremlin tried to calibrate its policies toward both halves of Europe . But it proved impossible t o calculate the effects of policy toward one part of Europe on the other . In retrospect, what was advantageous for Soviet Westpolitik proved to be disadvantageous for Sovie t Blokpolitik ( policy toward Eastern Europe) . Today, whil e Moscow struggles to exert any kind of influence on Easter n Europe or Western Europe, it is no longer possible for the Soviet Union to separate the two halves of its Europea n policy . Indeed, while one can discuss Gorbachev's polic y toward Western Europe, one can question whether the Sovie t Union indeed has a policy toward Eastern Europe . This paper will examine the links between Soviet West an d East European policy by examining three areas . It wil l discuss the Brezhnev era and the legacy of the interactio n between Soviet policy toward both halves of Europe tha t Gorbachev inherited . Secondly, it will analyze Soviet polic y in the first four years of the Gorbachev era, when the Sovie t leader essentially tried to continue the more successfu l aspects of Brezhnev's policy toward Europe with a more activ e West European policy than that of the waning Brezhnev and interregnum years . Thirdly, it will discuss Soviet polic y 2 See Hassner, op . cit . p . 285 . 2 since the annus mirabilis of 1989, focusing on Soviet polic y toward German unification, which symbolizes the demise of a dualistic Soviet policy toward the two halves of Europe . THE BREZHNEV LEGACY It is virtually impossible today in the Soviet Union t o find one positive word written about the Brezhnev era , th e "era of stagnation" . This is as true of domestic policy , where immobilism increasingly characterized the latter year s it i s of Brezhnev's rule, as' of foreign policy, in which there wa s in fact much greater mobilism . 3 Yet an examination o f Brezhnev's policies in Western Europe suggests that the Sovie t Union, at least until 1979, reaped considerable benefits fro m its activities in Western Europe before detente began t o undermine Soviet control over Eastern Europe . 4 From the point of view of Eastern Europe, detente betwee n the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic was the single mos t important aspect of Brezhnev's Westpolitik that affected hi s 3 See Vyachesly Dashichev, "Vostok-Zapad :Poisk Novykh Otnoshenii O Prioritetakh Vneshnei Politiki Sovestkog o Gosudarstva," Literaturnaia Gazeta May 18 198 8 4 See Angela Stent, "Western Europe'" in ed . Gerrit W . Gong , AngelaSoviet Stent and Rebecca Strode, Areas of Challenge for Foreign Policy in the 1980's (Bloomington, Ind : Indian a University Press, 1984) pp . 1-51, 131-13 3 3 Blokpolitik. Initially, the Soviet Union's internationa l position was considerably enhanced by the rapprochemen t between the FRG and the USSR . 5 After all, the government o f Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel normalized relation s essentially on Soviet terms by accepting the boundaries o f postwar Eastern Europe . As a result of the 1970 West German - Soviet Renunciation of Force Treaty ,the Soviet Union' s international status improved , its economy was strengthened by the significant improvement in Soviet-FRG trade, and th e West German public became increasingly favorabl y inclined toward the Soviet Union and developed a stake in th e continuation of detente . In the eyes of most FRG citizens , detente with the Soviet Union brought concrete results . 6 Brezhnev's image became much more benign and there was a growing disinclination to follow the United States in adoptin g a harsher policy toward the Soviets under the Carter an d Reagan administrations . 5 Angela Stent, "The USSR and Germany," Problems of Communism , September-October 1981, pp . 1-33 ; Roland Smith, Soviet Polic y Towards West Germany,Adelphi Paper no . 20 3 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,1985 ) 6 See Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Politica l Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980 . (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980 ) 4 The single major reason for the West German perceptio n that detente had worked was also the ultimate cause of th e undoing of socialism in East Germany, namely the improvemen t in inter-German ties . The promise of closer ties between th e FRG and GDR was the major quid pro quo that Moscow offere d Bonn in return for the recognition of the postwar Europea n status quo . The inter-German Basic treaty of 1972 undoubtedly enhanced the GDR's external legitimacy, since it was now, fo r the first time, recognized by the world community and n o longer an international pariah . But detente with West Germany ultimately challenged the GDR's already fragile domesti c legitimacy by facilitating the penetration of East Germa n society by the West German media, despite the policy o f Abgrenzung, or demarcation, that Erich Honecker so assiduousl y pursued . 7 The undermining of East German society was the mos t dramatic result of Soviet-West German rapprochement . But European detente also facilitated West German contacts wit h other East European states and contributed toward the breakin g down of the real and symbolic walls between the two halves o f Europe . This development was also reinforced by the evolution o f the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE ) process . CSCE was initially viewed in the West as a Soviet 7 See Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the Germa n Democratic Republic," in ed . Sarah M . Terry, op . cit, pp . 33 - 60 . 5 triumph, since Moscow had been calling for the convening of a n all-European conference that would legitimize the division o f Europe since 1954. Yet, despite the fact that Basket One of th e Final Act of 1975 recognized the current borders of Europe an d Basket Two pledged both sides to increase economi c cooperation, which was clearly more in the USSR's than in the West's interest, the Soviets ultimately paid a price for CSCE . Even though they observed Basket Three more in the breach than in its original spirit, it legitimized the claims of dissident groups in USSR and Eastern Europe whose voices becam e increasingly loud . Ultimately, CSCE contributed greatly towar d the opening up of Eastern Europe to the West . 8 The desire to avoid the destabilizing political impact o f thoroughgoing economic reform in the Soviet Union led Brezhne v to seek detente, calculating that the USSR could impor t economic modernization from the West rather than tackle i t domestically .